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Show (Capyrlht, la aUaaairUiir tk.Noctk A atari. an N.w.p.p.r Alliaaaa. WeM rlgbU f aaarvaa', Inrladlnf lh Sraarflnavlaau Spradullna la whola aalaaarlaraUUtaa.) , -WNt; Sarlaa CHAPTER XXXIX Continued Of course all present knew that do authority to dictate regarding uch matter had been conferred upon Mm and fall remark only showed that the allies were ready to go to almost any length to carry their point. Ciemenceau Makes Pl. Premier C'lenienceao then said he agreed with General Foch and favored fa-vored an American army, but that the Oermans were at VlllersISre-tonneux, VlllersISre-tonneux, and If the lines were broken there the enemy might quickly arrive under the walls of l'arls, and Unison between the al-lled al-lled armies might have to be established es-tablished on the l-olre. or If the lines were pierced t Hnzebrouck the enemy could reach the sea. What is Important for the morale" of our lliora. he said. "Is not to tell them that the American soldiers are arriving- but to show them that they hae arrived." In my opinion the plnn proposed was entirely unsound, and I thought that the bent and quickest way to help the allies would be to build up an American army. Moreover, More-over, the Implied presumption that the council might dictate to us either as a council or through the allied commander In chief in the arbitrary manner Indicated set me more firmly than ever against American units serving !n allied armies. The day's discussion made It quite clear that both allies Intended In-tended to tret commitment to the proposed schedule as far Into the future as possible. Saw Pershing Opposing Wilson. A telegram sent by the Ilrltish secretary of slate for foreign affairs af-fairs April 8, 1018, to Lord Heading, Head-ing, rsritish ambassador at Washington, Wash-ington, said: "It Is evident from the brief account ac-count of the conversation that General Gen-eral Pershing's views are absolutely absolute-ly inconsistent with the broad policy pol-icy which we believe the President Presi-dent has accepted. The main difference, dif-ference, f course, is that we interpret inter-pret it as meaning that 480,000 infantry in-fantry and machine guns are to be brigaded with French and British troops In the course of four J months, uenerai rershing admits no such obligation and does not conceal the fact that he disapproves disap-proves of the policy. "A second and minor difference in that, while the British government govern-ment quite agrees as to the propriety pro-priety of ultimately withdrawing American troops brigaded with the French and r.rltlsh ao as to form an American army, they do not think this process could or ought to be attempted until the end of the season for active operations this year draws to Its close, say, In October or November. "I am unwilling to embarrass the President, who has shown such a Arm grasp of the situation, with criticisms of his officers. But the difference of opinion is so fundamental funda-mental and touches so nearly the Issues of the whole war that we are bound to have the matter cleared up." At M. Clemenceau's suggestion the meeting of the council was adjourned ad-journed at this point that Foch, Lord Wllner and I might meet and examine the question and see If some agreement could not be reached. Whereupon we repaired to an adjoining room and went over the whole subject again. My proposal was more liberal than the circumstances or my own views on the subject really war ranted. It conceded priori! y for a limited number of the Infantry and iiiachlne-gun units, but generally It contemplated the shipment of artillery ar-tillery for divisions and corps and railway troops, mechanics and labor la-bor troops for the service of the rear, alt of which were badly needed. It was the distinct understanding, understand-ing, however, as already promised by Foch, that If we would consent to make concessions as to Infantry and machine-gun units the French would help as out with artillery when the time came to form an American army. Cut, of course, they could not furnish men for other services, nor for the aervlces of supply, without which w could not function as an army. Others Insist en Program. When we met MHner, and especially espe-cially Foch, insisted that the war would be lost unless their program was carried out. I repeated the arguments ar-guments already presented to the council and added that I fully realized real-ized the military emergency, but did not think that the plan to bring over untrained units to fight under Urltlsh " and French commands would either relieve the situation or end the war. I pointed out that, regardless of the depressing conditions and the very nrgent need of men by the allies, al-lies, their plan was not practicable, and that even if sound la. principle there was not time enough to prepare pre-pare our men as individuals for efficient service under a new system, sys-tem, with the strange surroundings to be found In a foreign army. Here Foch said : "Ton are willing to risk our being driven back to the Loire 7- I said : "Yes, I am witling to take the risk. "Moreover, the time may come ben the American army will haTe to stand the brunt of this war. and It Is not wise to fritter away our resources In this manner. The aiorale of the British, French and Italian armies Is low. while as yon know, that of the American array Is very high, and It would be a grave BUiuke to give op Uie Idea of build ing an American army In all its details as rapidly as possible." "Can't Budge Him an Inch" At about this Juncture Lloyd George, U. Ciemenceau and Premier Orlando of Italy, evidently becoming becom-ing Impatient, walked Into the room. Milner met Lloyd George at the door and said In a stage whisper whis-per behind his hand: "You can't budge him an Inch." Lloyd George then said: "Well, how Is the committee com-mittee getting along?" 'thereupon we all sat down and Lloyd George said to me: "Cun't you see that the war will be lost unless we get this support?" which statement was echoed in turn by Ciemenceau and Orlando. In fact, all five of the party attacked me with all the force and prestige of their hlgb positions. But I had already yielded to their demands as far as possible without with-out disrupting the pluns toward which we bad been striving for over a year and a continuance of May shipments Into June, without and provision for transporting artillery ar-tillery and auxiliary and service of aupply troops, could not be granted without making it practically impos sible In the future to have an Amer ican army. After I had gone over the whole situation again and stated my po sition, they still Insisted, whereupon where-upon 1 struck the table with my fist and said with the greatest pos sible emphasis, "Gentlemen, I have thought this program over deliberately deliber-ately and will not be coerced." This ended the discussion In committee com-mittee and when the council recon- f ': Ci tii I st in i! i vened M. Ciemenceau stated that the question of American troops would be taken up again on the following duy. When the council met for the afternoon aft-ernoon session of the second day the discussion of shipments of American personnel was at once resumed. General Foch spoke at length, repeutlng previous arguments argu-ments and giving a rather grandiose grandi-ose dissertation of the allied situation situ-ation and the dire things that would happen unless the Americans agreed to the proposal of the council. coun-cil. Lloyd George's Challenge. Mr. Lloyd George In turn spoke at some length. Me asserted that the Germans hoped to use up the British and French reserves before their own were exhausted, and that the British had already called up nearly T.O00.OUO men for their army and navy and had extended ex-tended their age limits to all men between eighteen and fifty years of age. "If the United States does not come to our aid," he said, "then per-haps per-haps the enemy's calculations will be correct It France and Great Britain should have to yield this defeat would be honorable, for they would have fought to their last man, while the United States would have to stop without having put Into line more than little Belgium." Possibly realising the unfairness of the comparison he quickly went on to say that he was sure I was doing my best to meet the emergency, emer-gency, and that: "General Pershing desires that the aid brought to us by America should not be Incompatible with the creation of the American army as rapidly as possible. ' I, too, am counting on the existence ex-istence of that army and I ara counting on It this very year to deal the enemy the final blow. But to do that the allies will have to hold out until August" CiiAPTPER XL Speaking In the name of the American army and in the nam nf .the ADvrican people," I told the supreme war council during the second sec-ond day of Us session at Abbeville, I Mar 2. 1913. "I want von r rvaiia that we are ready to bear as large a part as possible of the burden of the war. We all want the aame thing, but our means of attaining it U different from yours. America declared war Independently Independ-ently of the allies, and she mast face It as soon as possible with a powerful army. There is one capl-tal capl-tal point to which I wish to call your attention. That is the Importance Im-portance to the morale of our soldiers sol-diers of fighting under our own flag. "America is already anxious to know where her array is. The Germans Ger-mans have once more started a strong campaign of propaganda In the United States, the purpose of which is to Insinuate that the allies have so Uttic confidence la the A. E. F. Phone Girls. Sty General John J. Pershing American troops that they are obliged to distribute them among their own divisions.. Tells of American Pride. "The American soldier is as proud as any other, and the time will soon come when our troops, as welt as our government, will ask to fight as an autonomous army under un-der the American high command. "I understand that In Prime Minister Min-ister Lloyd George's proposal we shall have to again examine the situation In June before deciding for July. "That Is all that I can agree to at present to show my desire for solidarity with the cause of the allies." Lloyd George had previously taken up a revised program submitted submit-ted by myself and after some discussion dis-cussion he proposed that: "America gives us 120,000 infantrymen infantry-men and machine gunners In May the same number in June, with a supplement of 60.000 Infantrymen and machine gunners if we 'scrape together' the tonnage to transport them." . . He further proposed that the situation sit-uation be examined again in June before deciding whether there was reason to extend to July the program pro-gram decided upon for May and June. He then called on the council coun-cil to accept his plan. Inasmuch as the proposal submitted sub-mitted by Lloyd George contemplated contem-plated the shipment of the numbers num-bers mentioned In British tonnage, leaving American shipping entirely free for us to use as we should decide, an agreement was soon reached, substantially as set forth In the following cablegram to the secretary of war: "Following agreement adopted by supreme war council May 2 at Abbeville. Will cable more In detail de-tail later. 'It Is the opinion of the supreme war council that, to carry the war to a successful conclusion, con-clusion, an American army should be formed as early as possible under un-der Its own commander and under Its own flag.' (Then it was thought the war would run to 1919.) "In order to meet the. present emergency It Is agreed that American Ameri-can troops should be brought to France as rapidly as allied transportation trans-portation facilities will permit, and that as far as consistent with the necessity of building np an American Ameri-can army preference to be given to Infantry and machine-gun units for training and service with French and British armies; with the understanding un-derstanding that such Infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn with-drawn and united with their own artillery and auxiliary troops Into divisions and corps at the discretion discre-tion of the American commander In chief after consultation with the commander in chief of the allied armies in France. "It Is also agreed that during May preference should be given to the transportation of Infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such troops as may be determined by the American commander In chief. June Shipment Up to Pershing. "It Is further agreed that this program shall be continued during June upon condition that the British Brit-ish government shall furnish transportation trans-portation for a minimum of 130,000 men In May and 150,000 men in June, with the understanding that the first six divisions of Infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over In June shall be allocated for training train-ing and service as the American commander In chief may determine. deter-mine. "It Is also further agreed that If the British government shall CaDtureofCanti by 1st OivisioaMay rroni Lines 500 lOOO YDS transport an excess of 150.000 men In June, such excess shall be infantry in-fantry and machine-gun units, and that early In June there shall be a new review of the situation to determine de-termine further action." As stated In a cable from the secretary sec-retary of war, received May 12, this agreement provided less priority pri-ority for Infantry and umchine-gun units than recommended by the supreme su-preme war council. It was certainly certain-ly much more favorable to the ultimate ulti-mate formation of an American army than we had reason to expect la view of the recommendations contained In this note No. 13 of the military representatives, whir as we have teen, had been practl" colly approved by the President In the excitement over our agree ment with the British the full purport pur-port of this commitment was not emphasixed by the allies during the dlscuss!on. Pooling of Suppllea. Another matter, taken up Informally Infor-mally wita the prime ministers ... that Of aner me conrreu-p --- , . . pooling allied auppU Dlal Its advantages sod emphasixed the saving In tonnage that would re-suit re-suit Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Or-lanu. Or-lanu. did not commit themselves entirely, but accepted It In principle, prin-ciple, as M. ClemenceHU had done, and each agreed to designate an officer with business experience to meet with as at ao early date to study the question. With this beginning at least a step had been taken toward oor objective, even though the principle prin-ciple might not be extended as far as we thought desirable. A few days later M. (Jemencean called a meeting In his office of the representatives, repre-sentatives, Cen. Sir Travers Clarke acting for the British and Col. Charles Q. Dawes for the Americans. Ameri-cans. CHAPTER XLI On the heela of all the clamor for nothing but Infantry and machine gunners I received a request from Marshal flalg. British commander, asking 10,000 artillerymen. This fully bore out s prediction I had cabled Washington that the allies would be asking artillerymen before ,on& . A It will be readily understood. however, that once the allies bad made a demand for Infantry and machine gunners they all Joined Id concerted effort to bring it about regardless of what their real needs might be. In reply, I reminded Marshal Ilalg that the Abbeville agreement, giving priority to Infantry and machine-gun shipments, would prevent the arrival of our artillerymen for some time. In fulfilling our part In military co-operation we had already gone far beyond the mere recognition of the principle of unity of command and had begun to bring over hundreds hun-dreds of thousands of men almost regardless of the organizations to which they belonged, that they might be available In the event of extreme necessity. Inepecta Second Division. It was my custom throughout the war, as both a duty and a pleasure, to visit the troops as frequently as possible to keep In touch with the state of efficiency and the morale of officers and men. As Bundy's Second division, with. Ilarbord and K. M. Lewis at brigade commanders, command-ers, was leaving the quiet sector south of Verdun en route to the billeting and training area to finish fin-ish preparation for battle, the moment mo-ment was opportune to make s brief Inspection. I had an opportunity oppor-tunity to talk with a number of the officers In command of smaller units. I especially discussed the question of supply with officers charged with that duty. I visited Harbord's brigade of marines and found those I Inspected In good shape and their billets well kept The troops of the division that were seen on the march, especially espe-cially the trains, did not look so well. In an army like ours the care of animals Is difficult to teach. Cruikshank's artillery looked well. The entraining an Ancemont was carried out in n orderly and systematic sys-tematic manner. General Blondlat, In whose corps the Second had been serving, spoke very highly of the troops. The favorable fa-vorable Impression obtained of this unit was very soon to be confirmed on the battlefield, where its dlstln-giished, dlstln-giished, service was to make its name immortal. Frequently Had Guests. During the first few months at Chaumont I occupied quarters In the town, but later M. de Rouvre placed at my disposal his beautiful beauti-ful chateau some three kilometers away. My headquarters mess was limited to the few officers with whom I was most Intimately associated asso-ciated and consisted of my personal aids, the chief of staff, and one or two others. Nearly always there were a few guests at meals Invited from among the visitors, both French and American, who came to headquarters. Officers from French general headquarters were frequent guests and we were always glad to have them. As a rule there was a ban 'on everything in the way of shop talk and the rule was rarely broken and then only when we had special guests seeking enlightenment or In- formation regarding our policies and activities. There was one subject that would Iways start a discussion, and that was the relative value of the different dif-ferent arms, each being represented represent-ed by at least one officer. Rotation in office was earl adopted as a principle to be , P ed to the staff m genera a" S " ver possible fun? to carry it out most of the officers t my staff got their chance atJ ". Ith combat troops. Valor Lou, and Major Sha.Ienbrger wpr h first to go to ni; ,f?lon ,Boyd, who joined M aid shortly after my .rriT.i JJrance, remained throughouTtoe rro fca continued.) M II ii i i 'Tin Hats" on m J si i K.-iL i ' j'1 eaaWaAr.ViVl in iV--fc.V( vy:.-....w.w.ft;. Controlled by radio from a ,1.1 for forces. "Tin hats" were placed over chiners before the tests couia De conciuueu. Hollywood Fears, So Great Dam vv5 Jj" i- rv - - Because the people of Hollywood have been under mental pressure and fear that some day the i;f be washed out the costly Mulholland dam and the beautiful lake formed by It will be junked. The tfj cugmeeuug uuvisory ooara suggested abandonment, not on account tuoiogiwu reasons, to aiiay apprehension of the people living below It Three Best of the Women Divers (f. Vv kK : . s , 1 iTJ-tT,'" 'v's i Left to right : Miss Mary nazen -h . . Points; Miss Frances Meany who flnlRhi finlshed thlrd with 5432 "nd Georgia Coleman of tLorlnS a Wlth 79'31 poInts-in poInts-in the event by scoring S031 polntl nA,b who Gained her title NaUona, A. aT U. swlSg1 Sai&T at A Bristol (England) man, who SJSL1?"1 whcn rralgned Pleaded h, had been out of work so tong it was Impossible for him 2 hu PMUt 0f mlscnIe." If that a his Idea of mischief, an asy- hll8wherehe,e,onS. NeedeJ Mora Rr wh nl!1!1 J nephew iie on his first visit to the coun- Picked up a glass egg. looked at It nt saying. "This one Isn't done -Chicago Tribune. Vessel That Was navy vessel off the coast of southern the bombers of the crack "Fighting the funnels to prevent a bomb Xenon ,of the five recently dlscov-iVr? dlscov-iVr? e,mentafy substances In the hfl P ire' xenon. a both enob-fnnn8 enob-fnnn8 nn- 0nly ne part Is found In 170.000,000 parts of air, mo y.no known Process can It be else. combine with anything Clock Grow in Popularity t,TiievUmDer 01 c'ocks per capita throughout the United States has Deen more than doubled In the last wu Formerly only people of owned clocks, while today "ere is practically a clock for hom s. r00m even 111 moderate V f oxxo Bombers1 Ta i (4 (MBi (ti filial ) California, the old -destrow , I Squadron Six" nf Z9N from wrecking the StodfetLI Will Be Junked ojcao sc. i of structural weakness, out tor pe I MAY BE ambassador There are reports In fjf- that George Horace Lorimer, In chief of the Sa tordaj Sj Post may be dor to Great Britain If Ufa Dawes is drafted to conduct Republican campaign Presidential election. City'. DayTAT On September 29. 19. $ cahecan from the GdfrfJv and struck New OrdaM g a. m. The wind m, Iocity all day unUl W" andSOp-m-UwasWo 80 to 120 miles per hour rometer fell to 2S.1L w tq the lowest ever reW United States. In n ( .j Inches of rain tell Wgltf sided at about nine ociw evening. There was Jea fall from succeeding 6 15 days 22.24 inches of ra f Accident Factor. Dr. Louis Dublin says t:, fatal accident esperienc j United States s maae jb;!e.j Important factors, perfe- ; cidents come first wiw (f(i3 of the accident foilo- forlSpercentrtheseare. by drowning with 9j per l : by burns witn V" - . e-railroad e-railroad accidents with P of the accident totau Arid PleU- In Palestine ".j8! & mins only twi . t-nnW I"6 r'i would readily believe J amount of water and soaks Into the sou spring and autuna raw Ht). ! |