Show beneral qs of the A fie F V 1911 to 11 II 11 hj clr north M american world qu Cle I iklodi ia lodi th tin i R reproduce dr d J whole lo 10 part PI hilzim john alln J pershing nl inq ija CHAPTER XI I 1 continued the attack of the second french arnay army although made astride the meuse river was directed principally against HllL Mort and both famous in the struggle of 1916 to destroy the wire entanglements entangle ments and demolish trenches as a precaution tion against heavy losses the infantry rasa assault 1 it was preceded by tour four days dais continuous bombardment and relatively the amount of artillery ammu botlon expended exceeded that of any previous engagement its value being as an I 1 Lre remember member it some the proportion of the artillery force as aa compared to the infantry in this battle was as eleven to ten thefil the firing attained such precision and volume that the german troops in the forward positions were submerged and the attacking infantry readied reached most of its objectives by nightfall the first day making nn an advance of five kilometers and capturing prisoners the sector where the french attack took place was to have a peculiar in terest for me before the end of the war my headquarters as commander of the first faist army one year later mccu pled the building in bouilly souilly Sou llly illy then used by major general and the line reached by troops in the battle became our jump off faff line in the mense aleuse argonne battle in fact every foot of the ground covered cohered in this Inspect inspection lon with general petain became associated later with americas greatest effort in the war Petal petals Pet alna ns contact valuable after visiting the french ins instrella trilla cons and the manifold activities car aled on behind this front with the shift ing masses of combat troops and the thousands engaged in the services sen ices ol of supply and transportation it seemed quite improbable that we should be able to marshal a still clent army in time to replace the french on this front before 1019 1010 I 1 found it most agreeable as well ft ell as a instructive to be with retain in tim intimate way and have nn an rity to hear bear something of his bis expert ence ills his discussion of the defense of verdia Verd Uti in which lie he played an imbor taut tant part beg be g second in command was waa especially entertaining As we drove about he spoke of the courage of his troops and of the tremendous losses they had sustained ile fie polia pointed ted out the tha vast viivi amount of rodd road work work including the vote vole sacree from liar bar ledue leduc le due duc to verdun rebuilt under tinder his direction for the constant movements movement of large bodies of troops and supplies necessary to maintain the defense in lighter vela vein tits his comments on french politicians politician during this trip were amusing if not always complimentary nien tary and he congratulated me many times on being so far removed from political interference one afternoon the conversation drifted to painting and he asked lehow me how many times I 1 ba had d sat for my portrait several times already I 1 said the last one which was ft as very ery good was done by it a distinguished artist by tile the name of jonas english jonah for tion 11 immediately lie he said dont let them publish III dont do III every officer whose eliose portrait by jonas has appeared in that journal has been relieved from ills his command not that I 1 am superstitious quite thy the contrary but I 1 immediately forbade the publication of the portrait and to tills toils day it has never appeared builds build up french morale from the time of nivelles Nl NI velles failure in april the depression in tile french armies had been so preat grent that 1 1 X A 1 4 I 1 A kv P E 4 yanks yanka learning to use the bayonet who succeeded him had been content pimply to hold the trenches and no french offensive operation of consequence tin been attempted until this one from the moment 0 of his assign retain began to build up the shattered morale of his arroues ar villes and probably no other officer in france could have performed tho the task so well Petal petals Iet ulna ns immense success lu in the de louse of verdun find ft won on fur for hini him the confidence of the lie ar army y arid and the coun try and yet jet lie ha remained the same modest unassuming character consistent and conservative ue perhaps betow than any other understood the temperament of the rench r soldier whom he handled with infinite patience and tact CHAPTER XII in view odthe of the gravity of our ton nage cage situation it was highly imbor taut that thatis it be brought forcibly to the attention of the allies apropos the approaching inter allied conference on shipping I 1 cabled washington august 23 1917 in part as follows the british and especially the french have reached absolute limit of man power and any augmentation Q their military force cannot be expected im pera operative tive hasten our organization and training so that we will have the troops contemplated your project in europe for active service sen ice by may blay oi 01 june military activities of allies on land should be strongly reinforced by coin bained navies and destruction U boat boal bases accomplished if possible high british army officers confidential condemn waiting policy british admer ally in view of gravity of ship ping question recommend our govern ment meat insist upon aggressive policy by combined british and american navies 11 our position to in this war very ver strong allies now fully lecog nize dependence upon our operation cooperation co tied and awe w e need not hesitate demand both aggressive naval policy and full share i commercial comm shipping recommend american representative represent athe shipping con terence ference be instructed accordingly U S advised on powder bleed fl eed meanwhile a study by a joint french and american commission of the question of production of powders and explosives in france showed allowed that tile the greater greated part of the raw materials must be imported and that d due ue to the shipping situation france in decem ber would produce only about abou half of 0 the current output it was apparent therefore that to avoid calamity the united states must not only furnish powder and explosives tor for all of its own forces but must supply about halt the french requirements and the war department was so advised by this arrangement a large saying saving of if tonnage would be effected as tin tile weight of raw materials was ten tv C twenty times that of the finished prod duct As nitrates for the manufacture of df powder and explosives had to be imported from chill the hazard to shipping would be reduced by avoiding the long haul to france millions of dollars were expended in the construe tion of plants at home in on an at attempt temp to produce nitrates but none had been turned out before the end of the war dawes made supply chief in view of the uncertainty of obtain ing more than a limited amount of ocean tonnage it was ft as natural that we should procure abroad as large a prod pro portion of supplies as possible and our supply department began at once to make inquiries to meet tile the demands for construction material subsistence stores and engineering equipment many sources of general supply had been developed by the french and we soon found ourselves not only in id competition with them and the british but bul our different dit Terent departments also began to bid against each other to my mind the solution seemed to be merely a matter of ordination coordination co therefore I 1 established a purchasing board to consist of 0 one or more depre senta tives of endi each service making purchases of any sort including the red cross and Y M 0 A col charles 0 dawes wes seventeenth entee nth engl engineers ners well known as it 11 man of large business experience wits as the head fiend of nf this board the members meni liers of which were to meet together and make known their respect tive the needs and then agree among then selves as to where and by which de apartment parl part ment such purchase was nas to df bi made thus mutually assisting instead liiste ud of competing w alth ith each other oilier under the ar rangen bent operation cooperation co with the french was an and the agency became increasingly effective in linn lian tiling our procurement depend on french R R s the use of ballway tal tallia lii i fur for the moye ment of troops and supplies hail before attained attil nid any such lucli i as in tre me world bild war and mere lime was to ti service except tea ben traia tallon up 1 n which we placed greater dependence for or our success uc cess I 1 it t was apparent that we could not depend on the french without great risk of failure at a critical moment and it was evident that if we expected the maximum efficiency in this sen service ice we must provide our own personnel a as well as additional locomotives and tars cars all to be as far as practicable under american management with this plan in view commendable p progress ro gress had been made toward both procurement p and organization by colonel taylor tailor and complete estimates tor for rolling stock and construction at ports terminals and yards including aa an accurate survey of building and equipment requirements had bad been made under lils his direction by maj IV J williia iia formerly for mirly vice president of the new york central afterward it a colonel w who hu had been a member of the par sorts sons board these estimates without change served as a permanent guide tor for railway construction plans and ran material terdal creation of transportation corpt corps As ordinate coordinate co with the procurement anil and maintenance of material mate mati rial and equipment we were confronted with the vital question of organization tor for operation and but we had no officers in the regular service of 0 sufficient experience in railway men man argement to insure success therefore the evident course to pursue to which the precedent of both british a and d french pointed the way was to cren create e a transportation corps immediately immediate y gen W W atterbury under the direction of some man of outstanding reputation in the railroad world in accordance with the principle of obtaining the most competent men for important positions the following cable was ft as sent july 29 20 have billave made thorough study of rall rail road situation rind am convinced that operation of railroads must bi be under man with large experience in manag ing railroads at home successful sf u I 1 handling our railroad ralli oad lines so important that ablest men in it country 8 should hould be selected after almost results a with inexperienced military men run running ning railroads british selected ablest man could if find n d to lj have vec charge barge transportation question here heie mainly one of physical operation and management in intimate relation with french who retain gen era eral control which Is necessary to handle ordinary commercial traffic question of railroad transportation ot of course involves equipment maintenance find new construction at front as army advances and should be cally independent department al though nominally under engineers chosen should be sent here without delay together with three or four our able assistants of his own ova selection later on it Is believed these men should be given appropriate military rank in reply the war department rec om mended W V W Y atterbury then gen eral manager and now president of the pennsylvania railroad tor for the place and I 1 immediately requested that he be sent to france frame CHAPTER XIII the ithe most important question that con confronted fronted us in the preparation of our forces of citizen soldiery soldier tor for efel dent clent service was training except for the spanish american war nearly twenty years before actual combat ex per lence of the regular arm army had been limited to the independent action of minor commands in the and to two expeditions into mexico each with forces smaller than a mod ern american division the world war involved the ban diang of masses where even a division was relatively a small unit it via one thing tc t call or nr men to the colors and quite another thing to transform them into tin an or instructed army of meeting and holding its own in battle against the best trained force fone in ku EA rope with three years ye irs actual war experience per peri ence fence to its credit A general of schools for the A E P F was prepared hy the opera eions arid and training section but in order older that bat tills this instruction should lie is as corn and uniform its as possible lile and at the same time be co wl with th other activities I 1 declared that hint train ing should be handled bundled hy by officers who could devote their entire time to it an A n additional section of the headquarters staff therefore was established called the training section to function und under r my personal direction As aldef of this section col paul 11 wits was chosen with col 11 II U B aisie I 1 asle as 11 his I 1 a assistant the brytni methods of teaching trench warfare appealed to me a very strongly they taught tit Unlit men to lii lie abid ml to I 1 perfect thein in ID liand to tn li hand anil with bayonet gremito uni ili wr ii A irr ctr ct r inin angom all i klied 1 I wo V 1 in alp morale or of troops by giving them confidence li Is their own personal prowess prow ess through the kindness of sir douglin douglas claig aig we were fortunate early in OUT our experience to have assigned to us u 8 aleut genii en ii if K cutler butler and other oilier officers of the british army to assist in thill abl individual training later inter on several french and brit ish officers also came to lecture at a Illin dumber ber of our schools ay c found difficulty however ho weer in slug these allied instructors in that tile french and to a large extent the british lind had practically settled down to the conviction that developments since 1014 1914 had find changed the principles of warfare both held that new conditions imposed by trench fighting had rendered previous conceptions of training more or less obsolete and that preparation for open warfare no longer was necessary french publications and manuals were generally in accord with ft ath this theory it if the F rench french doctrine had prevailed 1 our instruction would have been limit ed cd to a brief period of training tor for trench fighting A new army brought up entirely entire on such principles would time have been seriously handicapped with out the protection of the trenches tt it would probably have lacked the as ag gress glossiness heness to break through the ene benl MYs ni s lines lilies and the knowledge of how to carry on thereafter it was evident that the victory could not be v won un by tile the costly process of attrition but that we should have hae to drive dile the enemy out into the open and ene engage acce him in a war of movement in st ruction in open warfare was based upon india bidual and group initiative resourcefulness i and tactical judge judgment L a t which were of equal adv advantage altage antage ID trench v warfare therefore we took decided issue with the allies end and without neglecting thorough preparations for trench warfare undertook to train mainly main for open warfare with the object fro from the start of vigorously forcing the offensive olTon she rifle practice urged intimately connected with the ques tion of training tor for open warfare var tare was the matter of rifle practice the earll earli est of my in cablegrams cable grams on this subject was in august in which it wits wai urged that thorough instruction in rifle practice should be carried on at home be cause of the difficulty of giving it in france study here shows value alue and |