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Show Back in 1930 They Planned To Block United States With Submarines. '! WASHINGTON. As early as 1930 Japan spread a smokescreen of propaganda and diplomatic double talk which may have helped to disguise dis-guise her intentions in Asia and the Pacific. This is suggested by the release of state department papers relating to American foreign affairs in 1930, the year of the naval disarmament conference con-ference in London, according to the Associated Press. The papers show the Japanese at this conference were seeking to get the prevailing naval ratio of 10-10-6 for America, Britain and Japan, set by the Washington naval treaty in 1922, revised to 10-10-7. Japanese naval experts told American naval attaches in Tokyo that if Japan had anything less than 7 to America's 10 in naval strength she would Inevitably In-evitably lose any war in which the two powers might become involved. Quick Decision. The theory they spread was that In the event of war, America would seek a quick decision, because a war of attrition would use up American merchant shipping and lose Ameri- can carrying trade to rivals. The American fleet, they theorized, theo-rized, would go immediately from Pearl Harbor to Manila if war should be declared, and, as a counter coun-ter measure, the Japanese would intercept in-tercept them with a large fleet of submarines operating from the Marshall Mar-shall and Caroline islands. All this was reported at the time to the state department by William R. Castle Jr., then American ambassador ambas-sador in Tokyo. He further reported that Masanao Hanihara, former' Japanese ambassador ambas-sador to the United States, had called upon him with a story about how public opinion in Japan feared an American attack because it was believed American naval plans covered cov-ered the possibility of war with Japan Ja-pan to compel Japanese aceeptance of American ideas regarding China. 'Acting Under Instructions.' Hanihara told Castle that war with the United States would be the worst possible disaster for Japan, and Japan Ja-pan could never think of it. Castle' informed the department that Hanihara Hani-hara was obviously acting under instructions. in-structions. He said he told Hanihara that "our aims approximated the Japanese as both countries wanted only a China which was substantially substantial-ly and politically sound." Against this background, the events of the next 11 years stand out: . The next year, 1931, Japan struck in Manchuria, in a campaign of aggression ag-gression against China which continues con-tinues today. In 1941 the Japanese struck first in the Pacific and attempted to force a decision themselves by knocking out Pearl Harbor and capturing Ma-1 nila quickly. Their alleged plans about using submarine fleets to stop American naval advance through the Mar-shalls Mar-shalls and Carolines did not materialize. materi-alize. One of the great mysteries of this war is the little Japanese submarine sub-marine activity that has been reported. |
