Show beneral pa el IS sto slora eq L LJ 0 of the A de F orv CO r 19 19 1 I 11 II I 1 tr the til N nark pj Amri caa All iaac world HI Cie ATif BrT I 1 PiE dOE moved Z R th 1 lo 10 1 or ia art I 1 t 1 1 john J pershing inq L service CHAPTER XI continued not that I 1 uni am superstitious quite the contrary but I 1 immediately forbade the publication of the portrait and to this day it has never appeared builds up french morale from the time of nivelles Nl Ni velles failure in april the depression in the french armies had been so great that petain who succeeded him had been content simply to hold the trenches and no french offensive operation of consequence had been attempted until this one from the moment of his assignment petain began to build up the shattered haltered morale of his armies and probably no other officer in F france rance could hare bare performed the task so well ns immense success in the defense of verdun had won vron for him the confidence of the army and the country and yet he remal remained ned the same modest unassuming character conti consistent stent and conservative he be perhaps better than any other understood the temperament of the french soldier whom he handled with infinite patience and tact CHAPTER XII in view of the gravity of our tonnage situation it was highly important that it be brought forcibly to the attention of the allies apropos the approaching conference on shipping I 1 cabled washington Washl august 23 1917 in part as aa follows the british and especially the frencl have reached absolute limit of man power and any augmentation their military force cannot be expected imperative hasten our organization and training so that we will have the troops contemplated your act in europe for active service by or june military activities of allies on land should be strongly reinforced reinforce I by combined navies and destruction U boat bases accomplished if possible sible high british army officers confidentially condemn waiting pol ley icy british admiralty in view of gravity of shipping question recommend our government insist upon aggressive policy by combined british Britis li and american navies our position in this war very strong allies now fully recognize dependence upon our co operation and we need not hesitate demand both aggressive naval policy and full share commercial shipping recommend american representative shipping conference be instructed accordingly numbers of officers of etli all armies felt very strongly that to check the losses by submarines the two navies should take some risk and attempt to destroy the bases from these boats operated it Is not known whether any steps were ever taken to convey this suggestion to the combined navies meanwhile a study by a joint french and american commission of the question of production of powders and explosives in france showed that the greater part of the raw materials must be imported and that due to the shipping situation france in december would produce only about half ot of the current output it was apparent therefore 1 N 6 na 2 W gen W W atterbury that to avoid calamity the united states must not only f furnish powder and explosives for all of its own forces but must su supply aply about half the french requirements and the war department was s BO advised by this arrangement a large saving of tonnage would be effected as the weight of raw materials was nas ten to twenty times that of the fin dished product As aa nitrates tor for the manufacture of powder and explosives had to be imported from chill chili the hazard to shipping would be reduced by avoiding the long haul to F france rance millions of dollars were expended in the construction of plants at home in an attempt to produce nitrates but none had been turned out before the end of tile the war dawes made supply chief in view of the uncertainty of obtaining more than a limited amount of ocean tonnage it was natural that we should procure abroad as large a proportion of supplies as possible and our supply departments began at once to make inquiries to meet the demands tor for construction material subsistence stores and equipment many sources of general supply had been developed by the french and we syon soon found ourselves not only in competition with them lind and the britti but bill our dl different departments also began to bid against each other to my mind the solution see seemed med to be merely a matter of co ordina tion therefore I 1 established a purchasing board to consist of one or more representatives of each service making purchases of any ans sort including the red cross and Y M 0 A col charles G da dawes wes seventeenth engineers well kno known as it man of la large r e business exper experience rii was appointed as the head ot of this board the members of which were to meet together and make knoell their respective needs and then agree among themselves as to where and by which department such purchase was to be made thus mutually assisting instead of competing with each other under tile the arrangement operation cooperation co with the french was established and the agency became increasingly effe tive in handling our procurement activities depend on french R R t s the use of railways for tile movement of troops and supplies had never before attained any such proportions as in the world war and there was no service except sea transportation upon which we placed greater dependence tor for our success it was apparent that we could not depend entirely on the french without great risk of failure allure at a critical moment and it was evident that it if we expected the maximum efficiency in this service we must provide our own personnel as well as additional locomotives and cars all to be as far as practicable under american management man gement with this plan in view commendable progress had been made toward both procurement and organization by colonel taylor and complete estimates for rolling stock and construction at terminals and yards including an accurate survey of building and equipment requirements had been made under his direction by maj W J wilgus formerly vice president of the new york central afterward a colonel who had been a 11 member of the parsons board these estimates without change served as a permanent guide for railway construction plans and material creation of transportation corps As ordinate coordinate co with the procurement and maintenance af f material and equipment we were confronted with the vital question of organization for operation and management but we had no officers in the regular service of sufficient lelent experience in railway management to insure success therefore the evident course to pursue to which the precedent of both british and french pointed the way was to create a transportation corps immediately under the direction of some man of outstanding reputation in the railroad world in accordance with the principle of obtaining tile the most corn com potent men for important positions the following cable hassent was sent july 29 nave have made thorough study of railroad situation rod and urn am convinced that operation of railroads must be under man with large expert ence in managing commercial railroads at home successful handling bandling our railroad lines so imbor tant that ablest men in country should be selected after almost disastrous results with inexperienced military men running rail roads british tish selected ablest man could find to have charge transportation question here mainly one of physical operation and management in intimate relation with french who retain general control which Is necessary to handle ordinary commercial traffic question of railroad transportation of course in bolves equipment maintenance and new construction at front as army advances and should be practically independent department although allbough nominally under engineers rail man chosen should be sent here without delay together with throe e or four able assistants of his own selection later on it Is believed these men should be given ampro military rank 11 in reply the war department recommended W W atterbury then general manager and 13 now ow president of the pennsylvania r rail all road for the place and I 1 immediately requested that he be sent to france CHAPTER XIII the most important question that thai confronted us in the preparation of our forces of citizen sold soldiery lery for efficient service was training except for the spanish american war nearly twenty years before actual combat experience of the regular army had been limited to the inde pendent action of minor command in the philippines and to two expeditions ions lons into mexico each witia forces smaller than a modern american division the world war involved the han ban riling of masses where even a oil li vision was relatively a small unit it was one thing filing to call or 2000 men to the colors and quite another thing filing to transform them into an all organized instructed Instruct erl army capable of meeting and hot hold ins 1119 its own in battle against the best trained force in europe with three years actual war experience to its credit A general scheme of schools tor for the A I 1 pa P was prepared by the operations and training section but in order that this instruction should be as complete and uniform as possible and at the same time be coordinated I 1 with other activities 11 1 declared flint training should be handled handl cil by officers who could de vote their entire time to it an al ad dit lonal section of the headquarters start therefore was wa established called the training section to bunc lion under my personal direction As chief of tills this section col paul B malone was chosen with col H B fiske as his assistant the british methods of teaching trench warfare appealed to me very strongly they taught their men to be aggressive and undertook to perfect them in hand to hand lighting fighting with bayonet bayone t grenade and dagger A certain amount of tills this kind of training was necessary to stimulate the morale of 0 troops by giving them confidence in their own personal prowess through the kindness of sir douglas halg haig we were fortunate early in our experience to have as signed to us gen R n H K butler and nd other officers of the british army to assist in this individual training later on several french and british officers also came to lecture at a number of our schools differ on war principles we found difficulty however in using these allied instructors in that the french and to a large extent the british had practically settled down to the conviction that developments development since 1914 had changed the principles of warfare both held that new conditions im posed by trench fighting had ten ren tiered dered previous conceptions of training more or less obsolete and that preparation for open warfare no longer was necessary french pub and manuals were generally to in accord with this theory it if the french doctrine had prevailed our instruction would have been limited to a brief period of I 1 training for trench fighting A new bew army brought up entirely on such principles would have been serious ly handicapped without the protection of the trenches it would ably bave lacked tile the aggressiveness to break through the lines and the knowledge of how bow to carry on thereafter it was evident that the victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition but that we should have cave to drive the enemy out into the open and engage him in a war of movement instruction in open warfare was based upon individual and group initiative resourceful ness dess and tactical judgment which were of equal advantage to in trench warfare therefore we took decided issue with the allies and without reg neg electing thorough preparations tor for trench warfare undertook to train mainly for open maifare wai fare with the object from the start of vigorously forcing the offensive rifle practice urged intimately connected with the question of training for open warfare was the matter of rille rifle practice the earliest of my cable grams on this subject was in au an gust in which it was urged tha thorough instruction in rifle practice should be carried on at home because of tile the difficulty of giving it in france study here shows value and de sir ability of retaining our existing small arms target practice course in view of great difficulty in securing range in france due to dens ity of the population and tion lion recommend as fast as tile the complete course be given in the united states before troops embark special emphasis should be placed on rapid fire my lly view was that the rifle and bayonet still remained the essential weapons of infantry and my cable stressing the fact that the basic principles of warfare had not changed were sent in an endeavor to influence the courses of training at horne home unfortunately however no fixed policy of instruction in tho th various arms under a single au an tho dhority thorl rity ty ever was carried out there insensible to advice the inclination was to accept the views of french specialists and limit training to the narrow fild fi ld of trench warfare therefore in large meas ure the fundamentals so thoroughly taught at west point for a century w wre wore re more or less neglected eted the responsibility for the failure of the war department to take positive action on oil my recommendations in such matters must fall up on oil tile the military head of the depart merit ment which was the general stat staff military police provided the maintenance of good order among our troops under the peen liar ilar conditions of service in france was most and for this purpose a military police was essen bial such rt force under the control of provost pr marshal general corresponded to the police department in a well organized city ex capt that its jurisdiction incle included ded only those in the military mill lary service tile the british whose situation was wa similar milar ol to our own pare gave us helpful information regarding their system hach which with a slight mollification modification was adopted for our ar armies inies in our previous wars the provost guard so called usually consisted ot of troops of tile the line detailed fol foi tile purpose but without a any 12 y 8 pe clat training for such duty col hnnson lily ely was as selected to organize the police corps and made a good beginning in laying foundation bu nt at his own request he was shortly relieved and sent t to regimental duty hla his successor col W U allaire All alre became provost marshal general until the following july when he be was waa relieved by col J C groome Gro onie brig gen IL 11 bandholtz on oil account of his special fitness for such work from his experience as chief of constabulary in the philip pine islands become became the permanent head of the corps in ID september 1918 due credit must be given to each of these officers but particularly to bandholtz tor for tile the smart appearance and the high efficiency of this force CHAPTER XIV in response to nay my request to washington tor for an experienced man to take tahe charge of rail transportation W W V atterbury general manager of the pennsylvania railroad arrived in france and reported to me september 1 1017 at suggestion a cable was sent requesting certain mento fill important positions in the organization the list included JA mcrae general manager of the long island railroad for general manager with C M bunting as c business manager 11 0 booz as engineer for construction and J 0 rogers as deputy the railway problem was tar far from easy and many were the obstacles to be overcome both in our own and in the french services successful management would have been very 11 1 1 IN I 1 da building in france used as school for officers of the A E F doubtful under a leader without at ter burys patience ability and force of character visits to our training Dg areas |