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Show THE LIBERTY LOAN AS AN JXVHSTMEXT. Some people may be dallying about buying the third Liberty Loan bonds, either because they think the iss'ue will be oversubscribed, or because they deem it shrewd to employ funds in quarters that offer better than 4 V4 per cent. Anyone who looks for more than $4.25 a year for the use of $100 loaned to the government at the present critical period is undeniably un-deniably short on patriotism. Assuming, As-suming, however, that there are people peo-ple who cherish the desire for better interest than the government pays, one may be pardoned for asking such 1 persons to contemplate the prospects for appreciation in the value of a .' United States bond after the war ends. Suppose peace comes this year, j or within another twelve months, is j it not probable that Liberty bonds j will sell at a premium? And every dollar of appreciation above par means so much added to that 4 per ' cent the United States is certain to j give. Another argument involves the hypothesis that when the war ends commodity prices are likely to j decline, the purchasing power of the s dollar to increase and investments j i.eaiaig fixed interest to advance. For commodity prices to fall 30 per cent or more after the war would not be very strange, seeing that the level lev-el today is fully 115 per cent higher than in July of 1914. It is axiomatic that investors usually seek bonds when the tide of commodity prices is .own hill, whereas when prices are ' climbing the tendency is to buy .-locks. In ihe light of numerous precedents, he who sells the United f States bonds short is certain to rue i the policy, and the man who neither I serves nor fights, or who fails to buy I Liberty bonds according to his means, I ..s likely to bear an unwelcme label 1 after the war and to have the addi- 1 tional knowledge that he missed an 1 exceedingly good investment. ' |