Show enral ral le r s h alwort horn of ill the A E fe V Copy 1931 in all 11 countries by the north nonh A anrica rican allio world qu G 1 1 right reserved the i reproduction in whole or baart 11 1 n li J olin J pars hi inq service CHAPTER continued lil making our dispositions for battle e our older divisions the first second and forty second had received positions on the southern face opposite the open spaces to enable them to to flunk flank the wooded areas quickly illicitly thus aiding the advance of less experienced ced units assigned to these areas the whole line hue pivoting as planned on oil the eighty second division on oil tile the right advanced resolutely to the lie attack the entire operation aas aa car tied lied through alth hish and hy by ile hie troops lind had pushed beyond iligir scheduled schedule objectives and by evening lind hod reached ilic ali second daa davs s objective tin ili most of f the lie southern frnnk the Il vilon of if tile hie fourth corps Dic dickinsn kinon and tho v mi the left of llie I ID I corps corlis 11 II gelf overwhelmed alif lie hostile garrisons ona mid quickly overran their carrying lna the hie tight fight ing into tile open the german flerin mi resist tince oil iii llila part of if flip ernut arout was ills dla liy hy HIP rap lity of our nd ad vnnie and wa was soon overcome al AI t I 1 hugh the eite enemy lily was expecting tin an 11 luck lie daiil it not think thinh it would take lake p sn s a and it therefore came w a surprise waln I 1 lie flip first division on oil the of tile southern attack lind broken through the hostile forward positions the lie squar sou adion lion of cavalry attached to the fourth corps was passed through tile the breach at 14 p ni it pushed forward to reconnoiter recon the ronda roads toward vigneulles Vigne ulles but encountering machine guns in position was forced to retire western attack slower on the western face of the salient progress was not so satisfactory the twenty sixth division in its attempt to make a deep advance toward Vigne vigneulles ulles met considerable resistance and except for a battalion 0 of f the division reserve had not reached tile the days objective tile the french at the up tip of the salient had attempted to follow up the flanks of our successful penetrations but made only small advances upon the request of gen E J Blond lat commanding the french second colonial corps a regiment of the eightieth division cronkhite in reserve was sent seat to his assistance on the afternoon of the twelfth learning that the roads leading out of the salient between the two attacks were filled with retreating enemy troops with their trains and artillery I 1 pave gave orders to the commanders of the fourth mid and fifth corps to push forward without delay using the telephone myself I 1 directed tile the commander of the fifth corps to send at least one regiment of the twenty sixth division toward vig neulles with all possible speed that ELN evening Lening a strong force from the fifty first brigade pushed boldly forward and reached vigneulles Vigne ulles at a in the it immediately made dispositions that effectively closed the roads lending leading out of the salient west of that point in the fourth corps the second brigade of the first division advanced in force about dawn of the its leading elements reaching vigneulles Vigne ulles by 6 a m the salient was closed and our troops were masters of the field could have passed hindenburg line the troops continued to advance 0 on tile the when the line was established approximately along the final objectives sot set for this offensive IQ in view of the favorable situation created just west of the moselle river by our successes farther to the left a limited attack was made on that part of the front by elements of the eighty see sec ond and ninetieth olivis divisions lons with good results during the night our troops all along the line were engaged in organizing their new positions foi defense defence preparatory to the withdrawal of divisions and corps troops for participation in the meuse argonne battle batti 4 september 14 15 and 16 local opera eions continued consisting of strong and occupation of better ground for defensive purposes beginning begioni ng I 1 the lie ali several counter attacks were repulsed the line as finally established was Elaud haudiomont lomont fresnel fresnes en cn doncourt jaulny saulny Vand leres reports received the and indicated that the enemy was retreating in considerable disorder without doubt an immediate continuation of the advance would have carried us well beyond tile hindenburg line and possibly into metz aletz and the temptation to press on was very great but we would probably have become deeply involved and delayed the greater meuse argonne operation to which we were wholly committed during the fighting from september 12 to 10 the german one Il hundred undred and twenty fifth eighth landwe lir eighty eighth and twenty eighth divisions re enforced the alne arid and several other divisions arrived in reserve po september 10 in front of the first army there here were ten german divisions und and two brigades in line and seven divisions in reserve french overjoyed by release nearly prisoners wei were e taken nod and some enemy guns had fallen into o our casualties sum bum bared about As aa the enem enemy y retreated lie set lire fire to many large supply dumps and several villages the few remaining french inhabitants who found themselves within our lines ne were overjoyed to be released front from tile the domination of the enemy hut bill many were left destitute by the burning of their homes at the very moment of deliverance on tile lath general retain petain came by my headquarters and we went together to st ft where here the people including children carrying french flags gave us a welcome which may well be imagined when one realizes realize that they had been held as prisoners entirely entire out of touch wl with th their own countrymen con i trim en for four years though always within sight of the french lines on my visit to several corps and dl vision headquarters the lie following day I 1 found nil all jubilant jubil ant over the victory and overflowing with incidents of the fighting reciting many cases of andl vidual heroism among the troops CHAPTER 1 in with the understanding of september 2 we were now moving rapidly toward our second great of offensive Otiest questions ions concerning tile the concentration and supply of tile elements of the first army in the battle areas were being worked out by the staff of that army weft were glen given every possible assistance by the staff at G U H Q the general plan of action of tit billed 11 armies art nies as agreed upon nt at the confer conference enen of commanders in chief july 21 24 2 1 was to state it simply and briefly that the offensive should con dinue each army driving forward as rapidly as possible the allied and american operations during the summer had resulted in the reduction of the chateau thierry Th lerry allens amiens and st fel sal salientes lents find and the great offensive was now under way immediately west of the mouse river the battle line llop had remained practically unchanged since sin I 1 ce 1017 1917 it wits was on this front the american army aimy was to play its great part the disposition of the belgian british french and american armies on the wide front between the orth sea and verdun was such that they would naturally converge ns as they advanced so long as the enemy could hold his ground on the east of this battle line frontal tit attacks tacks farther west might drive him back on ills his successive post eions yet a decision would be long deluded delayed yanks face strong position ills his main line of communication and supply rou ran through Curi carignan gnan sedan and Me Ale it if that elioud should li oud he be intel erupted before lie could withdraw his armless armies from froin france and itei gitin I 1 lie in the narrow avenue which lay iny between tile the Ar dennes forest and the dutch frontier were so limited eliat he would of oe unable adequately to supply his foi foicey aps cps or to evau evaluate ate them before ills his ruin would be accomplished As our objective was tile the sedan carignan railroad rill mad it was evident that the sector assigned to the tie american army was opposite the most sensitive part of the germin german front then being attacked the danger confronting the enemy made it imperative that he should hold on in ili front of tile the Ainer american lefin army to the limit of his irtes germans strongly strong ly fortified the area between tile blanse river find and the Arg ardonne ontie forest was ideal for defensive fighting on the east the heights of the aleuse beube commanded that river valley and on the west the rugged high hills of the argonne for est dominated the valley of the atre aire river in tile the center the watershed between the alie aire lie and the leinse alv rivers r commanded both valleys with flip heights of montfaucon Mont faucon cuppl cunel ito mange and of the hols bols de Bar barricourt ricourt stin standing ding out as natural strong points from these heights observation point poli jt c I 1 completely covered the entire german front the terrain leral over which tile the attack was to be made formed a defile blocked by three successive barriers tile the heights of montfaucon Mont blont faucon then those of cutlet and Ilo Ito mange and farther back the ridges of the dots bois de Bar barricourt ricourt a and nd of the bols bois de bourgoyne the meuse aleuse river was the alre aire river fordable only in places in addition to the heavy forest of the argonne there were numerous woods with heavy undergrowth which were serious obstacles these natural defenses were strengthened by lvery aery artificial means imaginable A dense network of wire entangle ments covered every position it was small wonder the enemy had rested four searf hearp on this front without being molested 4 hindenburg position petition Is objective in accordance with the principal pal m mission which remained the same throughout this great offensive the main attack of the first army was to be launched west of the meuse aleuse river its right to be covered by the river and by tile the operations of the french seventeenth corps on the east of the river that corps being a part of our army our left was to be supported by a simultaneous attack by the french fourth army our attack to include the argonne forest was to be driven with all possible strength in the general direction of Ale meleres the first operation of our army wai wa to have for its objective the hindenburg position on tle front sur meuse romagne sous orand grand e with a following development in the direction of buyance Mer Ille leies in order to force the enemy beyond the meuse and outflank his positions on the vouziers lers rethel line fine from the east in conjunction with our advance which would outflank the lion south of tile the ainne aisne the french bourth army by attacking successive ly the positions between the ainne aisne and tile the suippes rivers would be able to ciupy the line rethel after that it would operate in the direction of the plateau east cast of the rethel sig ny nv habbaye road alm aim at tactical surprise our purpose was to effect a tactical surprise if possible overcome tile the first and second positions in the area of montfaucon Mont faucon and cote dame marle of his third position before the enemy could bring up strong re enforce ments it was tin an ambitious plan and we w 01 e that would require a rapid advance of ten miles through a densely fortified zone from an estimate of tile reserves and thedr location it was realized that ve must capture and ofle cote dame marle by the end of tile second day it was thought reasonable to count on the vigor find and aggressive spirit of our troops to make up in a measure for their inexperience but at the same time the fact was not overlooked that lack of technical skill might considerably reduce the chances of complete comple tp success SUK against well organized de fenders general retain petain had already given ghen it as his opinion that we should not be able to get farther than mont faucon before winter CHAPTER the meuse aleuse argonne offensive opened the morning of september JO 20 to call it a battle may bp be a misnomer yet it was a battle the greatest must most prolonged in american history through 47 lays days we e were engaged in n per sistena struggle with the enemy to smash through ills defenses the attack started on a front of 24 miles which y extended until the enemy was being actively assal assailed led from the lie argonne forest to the mo selle river DO 00 miles tn in all more than were ero em aloyed and the attack was driven 32 miles to tn the north and 14 miles to the before the armistice hostilities the outstanding fact that I 1 deslie desire to tn emphasize Is that once started the lie battle wits was maintained continuously aggressively and relentlessly to the end all difficulties were overridden in one tremendous sustained effort 1 to 0 terminate the war then a and not there in n victorious manner mannel after three hours dolent the attack began begaii at a in m at the same time to divert diren the attention elsewhere local raids and demonstrations were made on tile the aleuse moselle front the french fourth army gouraud to our left on the west of the argonne forest began its attack half an hour later tile the battle opened favorably our atta attack clat at that particular place and tit nt that time evidently came as a surprise to the enemy and our troops were enabled quickly to overrun his forward positions the vast network of undestroyed barbed wire the deep ravines dense woods and heavy fog ninde made it difficult to ordinate coordinate co the movements of the assaulting infantry especially of some divisions in battle for the first time yet the ho advance throughout was wag extremely vigorous third corps reaches second line the third corps bullard billiard nearest tile the mouse carried the second position before dark the thirty third division bell wheeling to th the e right as it advanced occupied the we west st bank of the mouse aleuse to protect the lank flank of the army the bols bois de forges with its difficult terrain and strong machine gun defenses was carried in splendid fashion the right of the eightieth division cronkite had by noon cleared the bols bois jure in the face of heavy machine gun fire and established its line north of Danney dannevoux on its left after an allday all day fight the division forced its way through the strong positions on hill and reached the northern slopes of that hill the fourth division I nines IInes on the left of the eightieth took Sept arges and firmly established itself in the woods to the north it was abreast of Nanti nantillois llois and its left was more than a mile beyond montfaucon Mont faucon but through some mIsInterpret misinterpretation adon of the orders by the third corps the opportunity to capture montfaucon Mont faucon that day was lost three counter attacks against tile the division during the afternoon were broken up fifth corps falls short in the center the fifth corps cameron with the exception of the nine ty first division johnston on its left fell short of its objectives the seventy ninth division Xu kuhn hn on the right of the corps took malan court but bill in the open ground beyond encountered encounter ed consider considerable considerably abl e opposition and the advanced elements were not in position before montfaucon Mont faucon until late afternoon the attack of the division launched against this strong point early in the evening was met by the fire of artillery and machine guns from the southern slopes of the hill which held up further progress the thirty seventh division farnsworth in ili the center of the fifth |