Show Ce general beneral fershi at S stori LJ V of the A 16 A Z ee F 0 V in all 11 II IT by clr norah amelm cpr AM world B hi y q otheral Oti x eral fl rights r arved nd ing the th st dialia reproduction la in whole or in pert prohibited 1 i john J service CHAP CHAPTER TER continued replying april 3 to the depart linen menta ts cable I 1 emphasized that it was waa not intended that our units should replace the losses of british or french organizations and therefore our artillery should be held tin lu readiness to follow when called for although it was possible that the situation might become so serious that some of our infantry units will be forced to serve with british temporarily aly intentions were further indicated by saying americans must not lose sight of the purpose to build up divisions and corps of their own and also we must avoid the tendency to incorporate our infantry into british divisions where it will be used up and never relieved my cable recommended that the infantry of two divisions be sentry sent by british shipping and two by our own but that present plans should go no further than this it was my purpose riot not to become too deeply involved lu an agreement that would make it impossible later to form our own independent force under our own officers CHAPTER secretary baker and I 1 had frequently discussed the question of a supreme allied commander and we were both ready to accept it in principle when proposed in response to a notice from premier clemenceau I 1 went april 3 to beauvais Beau vals to meet with the supreme war council arriving early colonel boyd and I 1 lifted to wait an hour tit at the hotel de ville before 31 clemenceau and lloyd george came into the conference room marshal halg haig general foch retain sir henry wilson bliss and myself were the others participating brigadier general spiers acted as interpreter and col sir maurice alan hankey who usually accompanied mr lloyd george as recorder the meeting was finally called to order by M clemenceau Clemenc enu who stated its purpose saying in substance we have come together to settle a very simple question regarding the functions of general foch I 1 think we are all in agreement as to the coordination of allied action be I 1 hut h u t there ts is some alf terence in fyie fou understanding u nd e estand of general fochs powers as conferred upon him rt at the doullens Doul lens cun con ference of march 20 26 general foch will explain his difficulties foch calls calla for action general then set forth briefly his situation as follows the powers conferred by the doul lens conference were limited to tile the ordination coordination co of action between the allies they were conferred while the action was on the power to co erdl nate has been construed to be limited to the time the allies were in action that was march 20 at Doul leus now kow we are at april 3 now that the two opposing armies are no longer in action but have stopped and are facing each other there Is nothing to ordinate coordinate co there should be authority to prepare for action and direct it so we are right back where we we were and nothing can be done until an action starts again lloyd george pleads for unity mr lloyd george then entered the discus discussion ilon saying substantially we have had more than three years of this war and we have not had unity of action during that time during enough la in trying to ordinate coordinate co the op orations erat ions lons of the allied armies without success there has tie never ver been real unity of action such ordination coordination co between two or throe three armies Is impossible no DO matter who the commander in chief may be each commander in chief Is interested in his own army and cannot get the other commanders point of view nor grasp the problem as ag a whole I 1 am in favor of a supreme commander and believe that the success of the allied cause depends upon it 1 I think the necessary action should be taken by this council at once 1 am in favor of conferring the supreme command upon general foch when I 1 had finished mr air lloyd george came over to where I 1 sat took me by the hand and said 1 I agree fully with general pershing this Is well weil put after some further informal discussion a draft of the resolution was submitted which omitted reference to the american army whereupon I 1 called attention to the oversight say ing nieuport A ato ghent ll 11 V ap 5 N YS calais keimel III hazebrouck ouila MODS 0 ground gained by german of offensive V 0 2 armilea the last year we have had two kinds of strategy one by haig and another by petain both different and nothing has been gained the only thing that was accomplished was by general navelle Nl Ivel velle lc when lie he was in supreme command general foch Is now empowered to coordinate co ordinate the ac alon of the allied armies but tills this does not go tar far enough as he be has no authority to control except by conferring with the respective spec tive commanders in chief lie ile wants authority to prepare for action I 1 think the resolution made at doul lens should be modI modified fled so that we may have a better understanding I 1 should like to hear what general bliss and general pershing have to say pershing gives hla his views I 1 then gave my view which was sot set forth irl in a brief memorandum prepared lu in pencil after the discussion began as foil follows aws the rhe principle of unity of command cam cpm IP 19 undoubtedly tue the correct one for the allies to follow I 1 do not be chtive it la id possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander y we hats already had bad experience 1 I think this resolution should include the american army the arrangement Is 13 to be in force as I 1 understand it from now on and the american army will soon be ready to function as such and should be included as tin an entity like the british and french armies there Is no american army yet Rs as such general retain petain interjected as its units are either in training or are amalgamated with the british and french pershing has U S included there way may not be an american army in force functioning now I 1 re plied piled but there soon will be and 1 want this resolution to apply to it when it becomes a fl tact fact the amert amerl can government Is represented here at this conference and in the war and any action as to the supreme cow corn mand that includes the british and preach french armies should also include th ohp american army the foregoing account of the conference may not be nn an exact record of the language used but it Is given as my aid took it down the following resolution was then read aim adopted general foch Is charged by the british french and american governments with the ordination coordination co of the action of the allied armies on tile the western front to this end there Is conferred on him all the power necessary for its effective realization to the same end the british french and american governments confide in gen eral foch the strategic direction of military operations rations the commanders in chief of the british french and american armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies each commander in chief will hare the right to appeal to his government it if in his opinion his army Is placed in danger by the instructions rec received elved from general foch allied commander in chief tile the idea of an allied commander in chief had been suggested and discussed many times unofficially hut but for various reasons political and otherwise it had never been definitely adopted by the supreme war council with the distrust that existed among the allies it was not easy to ro bring about the decision in favor of a su preme commander com mauder and it was made possible only by the alie extreme emergency of the situation the designation of general foch as commander in chief of the allied armies in france was proposed by the french april 15 1 I received a letter from M U Clemenc clemenceau enu advising me that mr lloyd george had approved the suggestion and asked if I 1 agreed I 1 replied in a personal note exar expressing e asing my agreement subject to the confirma tion of president walson allson ll son which came april 17 once the question of supreme command was settled the co en L agles of the allied armies could be directed with maximum effect toward a common end while dark days were still ahead we were spared the chagrin of inefficiency through b lack of teamwork 0 CHAPTER now that the supreme effort must be made on our part find and when units were sorely needed for immediate active service it was found much to tb my surprise that although the divisions then coming to france had bad been under training for six elx months or even more they still till contained abarge a large percentage of untrained men As already pointed out the general staff when called upon to provide men for special services ha had d relied upon taking them from combat divisions instead of anticipating such requirements and segre segregating 9 abing these specialists from the start and training them as such this was a most vicious application in time of war of it a very objectionable practice pra atice that had grown up in our rimy army in time of peace it appears that during the preparation of our armies in the war no other plan was followed and the practice was carried to such an extent that taint divisions with say men which should have been held intact and each one perfected as on an organized sed team wore were constantly called upon to send large groups of their trained sold lesto to other duties 0 inspects available divisions in view of their possible early em I 1 wanted especially to look into the general state of efficiency of our dIvIs divisions Idlis and give some personal instructions about training going the rounds I 1 met general hir who ho was one of the able french generals and found him very enthusiastic about tile the second which had been in line at Somme aleu under his command confirming my own opinion I 1 on formed from observation and re N r s vy the red cross was wan en the J job cb ports he ee said that without doubt it was then ns as eff efficient lelent as any of his french divisions the first was further advanced than any of the others and its morale was high at the prospect of going into the battle line developments had brought the 9 question U accent stion ot oi the employment of american troops into immediate consideration tile the presidents approval of bf the recommendation of the supreme war council as embodied in joint note no 18 was seized upon by the allies and construed as a concession for the unlimited absorption of our troops in their armies no doubt my offer to general foch tent lent encouragement to the allied view on oil the lay of secretary bakers departure general and general over from the british war office to discuss arrangements tor for transportation of Arpe american rican troops in accordance with the provisions of joint holni note no IS 18 the conversation indicated that the british understood we were to send men per month to train with them and that they were bringing over thu the same number making a total of per month beginning with april they held field that the app approval rosil of note no 18 had superseded agreements previously made including the six division plan baker speaks plainly the british conferees entirely ignored the specific condition that the tha final arrangements as tc training and disposition of nit nil our units were to be left in my hands their error was pointed out and mr balter then said what Is pertinent to the present discussion J Is that american troops are going to the british for training I 1 dont want th british public or army or the french public or army to get an exaggerated idea that this scheme provides or will provide a means by which their losses will be made up in the future 1 I want no feeling of disillusionment when general pershing calls for the troops In trusted to them for training mr air bakers visit to our armies dur ing this critical period was fortuitous as the problems that confronted us could then be seen in their true perspective spec tive he had an opportunity to meet the allied leaders both civil and military and get in touch with ith conditions to la the different countries of still greater importance he saw with his own eyes the building of our organization lie ile was a keen observer with clear understanding and a logical mind and obtained in a short time nn an accurate conception of 01 our task and its difficulties As to our relations he gave rue me from the start that strong and sympathetic support which means so much to ito a military commander in the field feared british were lagging before ur mr baker sailed for home ahad I 1 had sent him the letter quoted bolow and althou although ib ye we later discussed its contents briefly it Is given as showing the reaction of at least part of the ilie british press at the time april 5 1918 dear air secretary I 1 noticed the other day that one of the british papers in referring to the fact that plans had been made to send american troops to the assistance of the allies staged would rp bileve the british of the necessity of depleting the strength of the forces kept at home for purposes this suggests to my mind a certain political phase of the british situation which may give gideus us additional explanation as to why mr lloyd george and british representatives are isa si urgent in their appeals for or assistance from america following this furber further may I 1 suggest that you give the matter serious thought there Is so very much at stake for us that it seems to me very frank representations should be made to tile the british government as to the urgency of their putting into the army every possible man that can be mustered to meet the immediate emergency it may be that you would think it advisable to go to london or else to intimate to the president by cable the urgency of great britaina Brit ains putting into the ranks every possible man to withstand the present german onslaught even if they have to promise to withdraw them in six months rind and of their doing so without waiting on us or counting on up u in the slightest degree there will be few enough men even with the best we all can do it will be time enough for great britain to consider the defense of england after she has put forth every possible energy on the continent here la Is the place to beat germany and not on british soil sail in writing this I 1 have in mind what you told me regarding available men in england CHAPTER on april 12 1918 washington reported ted a j fp crease in cargo ange 1 e by the use of dutch ships infantry and machine gun personnel of four divisions were promised for that month the allies were at last thoroughly alive to the necessity of an extraordinary effort to provide tonnage for transporting our troops after months of delay and discussion they realized fully that the superiority of forces vitally necessary to avert defeat must come from across the atlantic america had become their sole reliance not only for the forces necessary to save them from defeat but for unlimited old aid as well mr air bakers firsthand first hand knowledge of tile the situation in france enabled him to give a fresh impetus to the efforts of the war department with gen peyton peton C march as chief of staff the general staff ani and the supply departments began to exert more energy the war industries board reorganized under the leadership of U q 11 baruch had taken definite control and direction of the nations industries with the sole alm aim of aiding us to win the war in the face of the crisis activity at home had at last repin ced the apparent deliberation of our first year in the war our hope for an improvement in methods and a more corn com potent ordination coordination co of effort seemed about to be |