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Show Qenerat Pershing's Story of the A. E. F. (CopTrlcht. IMl. la all aoontrlaa hi th '' North Anaricaa Nr.p.p.r Allium World , XJn General rights rwd, iocludina the Scaadiaaviaa, IUpr.d-c.lo. ta .boW rtap. prohlUud.. j J PerMq WNU Sanrioa many's beat determination to crush the allies before our soldiers could arrive In ufflclent numbers to dominate the battlefield. Faced Defeat With Allies. Our estimates of the shipping for troops and supplies as set forth In the plan by which a due proportion of combat and line of communication communica-tion troopa were to form such increment in-crement of six divisions would require re-quire by June 1, for the shipment of 24 divisions, a total of over 2,000,000 tons. So one seemed to know where we were to obtain the 1,400.000 tons of shipping in addition addi-tion to the 600,000 tons we were then supposed to be using. it appeared almost certain then that should dlsuster befall the allied al-lied armies under these conditions we would have to go down with them. I always felt certain, however, that tonnage could be found for our purpose If the necessary pressure pres-sure were exerted to force it into use. Appeals were made continuously continu-ously and peralstently in an effort to get action on this vital question, but several months elapsed before It really came. Taken aa a whole, the apparently apparent-ly slow progress of our preparation. prepara-tion. In Europe also caused considerable consid-erable adverse comment, if not dismay, among the allies. Inquiries were made directly by the military and civil officials as to why we did only recently been received, and gave me an Idea of some of his problems. In part be wrote as follows fol-lows : "I am especially concerned that our troops should not be engaged Id actual fighting In France until they are there in such numbers and have made such thorough preparation that their first appear-! appear-! ance will be encouraging both to their own morale and to the spirit . of our people here. I think it goes without saying that the Germans will make a very special effort to ! strike swiftly and strongly against any part of the line which we undertake un-dertake to defend, in order to be able to report to their people encouragingly en-couragingly about our participation and also with the object of discouraging discour-aging our soldiers and our people as much as possible. "In the matter of selecting corps arid division commandera I constantly con-stantly feel that I ought to have your advice and judgment From all that you have said, supplemented supplement-ed by all I have learned elsewhere, the need for young and physically strong men Is apparent and I am perfectly willing to go any limit In meeting this requirement "It will, of course, necessitate passing over a substantial number of our older generals who are very eager to go to France and who In their own ideas and that of the country have certain right to be preferred. But their occupation here In the training of troops Is, of course, a valuable contribution to the cause and, whenever I can feel sure in the selection of the younger man that be actually has the capacity to develop to a sufficient suffi-cient extent to justify bis being preferred to a man of .greater experience ex-perience I shall not hesitate." CHAPTER XXI The units of the Twenty-sixth division, UaJ. Gen. Clarence Edwards Ed-wards commanding, began to ar-live ar-live the latter part of September, continued during October and the early part of November, and wetv as. . cabled In the billeting area I CHAPTER XIX Continued. I admitted that such an organ!-cntlon organ!-cntlon might serve to unite the allies al-lies In common purpose, but that the conduct of operutlnns by the combined armies should be under military direction. I got the distinct dis-tinct impression that while he was seeking to secure greater unity of action, be also sought some means of controlling the activities of the British army. During previous months that army had been engaged en-gaged in almost continuous offensive offen-sive operations, practically single-banded, single-banded, with very heavy losses and few compensating advantages. Mr. Lloyd George went on to say that there was to be a meeting of the prime ministers at Kapullo, Italy, and that he hoped they might reach some agreement that would result in a council such as be had In mind. He thought that the United States ought to be represented repre-sented at this meeting and suggested sug-gested that I should attend. As the purpose of a council seemed to be more for political co-ordination than for purely military control, I told him that it seemed best for me not to participate without some Intimation from my government to do so. In the afternoon, at M. Palnleve's request I called on him, and he also told me of the proposal to form a supreme war council and wanted me to go to the confer ence In Italy. I gave him the same the great powers after the war, than he does of territorial or specific spe-cific things going to this or that country, What he wonts is to smash the German military power and bave a society of democratic nations afterwards. But to England, Eng-land, France and Italy these tnlngs are phrases, useful, perhaps, but of secondary Interest "England wants to maintain her colonial possessions to keep her position po-sition on the sea, and her commercial commer-cial place in the world. We know what France wants Alsace Lorraine, Lor-raine, as Indemnity and security for the future. Italy has definite teriltorlal claims. Thus the governments gov-ernments of these countries think a great deal about what they want for themselves and less about Ideals, unless these Ideals are incidental inci-dental to success. So there Is no clear unity among the allies in Europe Eu-rope and America." CHAPTER XX Soon after the first division entered en-tered a quiet sector of the Vosges the peaceful aspect of the situation situa-tion was disturbed by a German raid on an Isolated post of the Six. teentb infantry November 8, 1017. A group was caught in a box barrage, bar-rage, and although the men made a courageous resistance three were killed, five wounded and twelve captured. ' These were the first casualties that had occurred In our army to not move more rapidly, to wmcn the reply was always, "lack of shipping." New British Offensive. Immobilised by the mud of Flanders, where British attacks bad continued intermittently from the end of July to the middle of November, with rather excessive losses, the British commander in chief turned to a more southerly portion of his line for the final offensive of-fensive of the year. Choosing the Cambrel front on which to launch the effort, careful preparations, including in-cluding the concentration of an unusual un-usual number of tanks, were made V. Insure a break through the enemy's ene-my's defenses. The tanks and the Infnntrv wen tn make an onenlne N. . ' ' r , - , , V ' - ' (' - ( - ' V, ' I L --V - - If 1 '- fc.M in T1 .... - Gravea of Corporal J. B. Gresham and Prtvatea Enrlght and Hay. inrantry were to maae an opening through which the cavalry was to pass and attack the flanks of the enemy. Then French troops held in readiness In the vlclnty were to follow. As to the question of command com-mand of these combined forces when both should become engaged It was to be left to the senior general gen-eral officer In the vicinity, who might be either French er British. In going over these plans It seemed to me that their Idea of securing co-operatlon after the French should begin participation was rather vague. During the day we first went to visit General Byng, commanding the Third army, who explained further details of the attack and the progress already made. He and his chief of staff were busy receiving news from the front and felt that all was going well. British Victory Spurs Allies., The attack was made on a six-mile six-mile front and the British had the advantage from the outset The sudden debouchment of the long line of tanks, closely followed by the Infantry, all without the usual warning of long preliminary artillery artil-lery bombardment, completely surprised sur-prised the Germans. The tanks broke wide gaps in the wire and , subdued the machine-gun nests, aiding the Infantry through the defenses with a minimum of loss. The front was rather narrow, considering the depth of the objectives. ob-jectives. A maximum gain of some four and a half miles was secured the first day, and a greater great-er result was prevented. It was said, by a serious, check to the tanks at Flesquleres. For some reason or other the French were not called Into action, but presumably it was because the British cavalry, which was to precede pre-cede them, could not go forward as planned. The offensive continued contin-ued for two or three days longer with varying success. It was. how- r.ear Neufcbateau. J I I Inspected the division November Novem-ber 11, 1017. and found the various I organizations presented a very creditable appearance. The officers seemed alert and military and the personnel looked strong and vigorous. vigor-ous. Their Instruction bad been carried out under the direction of Brigadier General Traub, one of the brigade commanders, and seemed to be well advanced. The probable situation as to man power in which the allies would find themselves in the spring was causing much solicitude. The Germans Ger-mans had captured BIga In September. Septem-ber. Kerensky's power was at an end and the Bolshevik government was established, with Lenin and Trotzky'ln control The situation was such that Russia had become entirely negligible as far as assistance as-sistance to the allies was concerned. con-cerned. , An analysis of the possible strength of the contestants showed that Germany would be able to spare a considerable number of divisions di-visions from the Russian front Careful study by my staff. In cooperation co-operation with the allied staffs, bad led to the conclusion that her total number In the west by spring would be as many as 217, not counting the possibility of the added add-ed strength of 43 divisions from Austria. The greatest number the allies could muster, according to estimates, would be .109 divisions, counting two American. Italy could not be counted on to do more than barely bold her own, even with the help of the eleven allied divisions then on that front Other American divisions might possibly be In Europe by May 1 If they should arrive according to schedule, which was doubtful, but they would be too late to participate partici-pate in the expected early spring campaign. At the slow rate of arrival ar-rival we should not have more than half of the 21 divisions promised units serving In the trenches. The dead were Corporal James B. Gresham and Privates Thomas F. Enrlght and Merle D. Hay, all of Company F. The French took charge of the funerals and turned out a formal guard in addition to our own. The services were conducted by the French General Bordeaux, who came with bis full staff and delivered deliv-ered a beautiful oration over the graves. A large number of French troops came Informally to pay their final tribute. This joint homage to our dead there under the fire of the guns seemed to symbolize the common com-mon sacrifices we were to make In the same great cause. Ammunition Question Acute. .The -ammunition question again became acute at that time, despite our agreement with the French and their positive assurance that they would make prompt deliveries, but their explanation was that we had not ' furnished the full amount of raw material required. In my early reference to the prospects pros-pects of procuring artillery of 75mm. and lWnmi. calibers and ammunition am-munition for its nse. It had been expected ex-pected that nothing should dlmln ish our efforts at home tn their manufacture, but when the probability proba-bility of delay and possible failure of the French to furnish ammunition ammuni-tion for these guns was reported to Washington my cable met with the complacent reply, much to m.v surprise, thnt "the French govern ment must furnish it, for there is no other way of getting it At the present time there Is not In this country any actual output of ammu nltlon of the type mentioned. None . has been expected." Home Ports Overcrowded. The difficulty of providing the French with raw material was largely traceable to the lack of shipping, ship-ping, and, of course, the unsclen title use of what we had. The fact Is that the ports at home were overcrowded with all sorts of material ma-terial and supplies awaiting vessels. The French had over 000,000 tons of supplies at seaboard, which they were unable to move, and were clamoring for 150,000 tons addl- & - - -.y--..rv ' ; '.' . ' V reply that I bad given Mr. Lloyd George. Shortly thereafter the Rapallo meeting was held, resulting in an agreement among the prime ministers min-isters of the governments participating. partici-pating. Great Britain, France and Italy. Approved by Wilson. ' The creation of the council did not meet with universal approval, the commanders of the British and French armies and many high officials of-ficials In civil circles being opposed op-posed to It Military commanders were afraid It would result In undue un-due interference with the conduct of operations and - in derision it was often referred to as the Soviet The action of the three governments govern-ments at Itnpallo was approved by I'resldent Wilson, November 17, nnd that fact appeared in the press a day or so later. , The President's action strength ened the hands of those who favored fa-vored the council and probably be-' be-' came the Influence that saved It. The fact Is that If the French and British army commanders, In a frlenrily spirit of co-operation, had made a joint study of the mill tary problem of the western front - as a whole end then had seriously undertaken to pull together, as though under one control, the supreme su-preme war council would never have been born. The supreme war council made a favorable start and gave the Impression Im-pression that a wise and conserve tlve exercise of Its really unlimited powers would characterize Its actions. ac-tions. It refrained from Interfering Interfer-ing directly with military com manders and operations and con fined Itself largely to questions of policy, such as the co-ordination of allied resources and the con aervatlon and distribution of allied strength. However, as time went on, the supreme war council as eumed greater and greater authority author-ity over military questions. Conflict With Wilson Ideals. As to the political situation, the undercurrent at the moment, as nearly as could be learned, showed a continued lack of accord among the different nations, which were ' not at all in agreement with President Pres-ident Wilson's Ideals. Each bad Its own aspirations and each sought to gain some advantage over the others. Some of the divergent war alms bad to do with territory distant from France and troops were sent that might have been more usefully employed on the western front. ; - In a letter to Secretary of. War Baker I inclosed a memorandum which was a report of a conversation conversa-tion held by a man in my confidence confi-dence with a British official high up In the counsel of Great Britain, The date of this conversation was October 24, 1917. "Perhaps it should not be taken too seriously," I wrote, "but it Is an indication of the British attitude." atti-tude." Sees Difference In Alms. In this conversation the British official declared: "The European allies and America Amer-ica are not fighting for the same tiling. Mr, Wilson thinks a great deal more of his Idens of people governing themselves, r a friendly friend-ly working arrangement among all Doughboys in the Trenches in Winter Time. I ever,' a decided victory, and, while not as great as the British expected, expect-ed, It. gave encouragement to the allies on the western front and no doubt , helped to offset temporarily the depressing effect of the serious defeat recently sustained by the Italian, army. CHAPTER XXII An American mission beaded by Col. E. M. House arrived In France toward the end of November for an interallied conference. Other mem bers of the mission were Admiral W. S. Benson; Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, chief of staff; Oscar T. Crosby, Cros-by, for the Treasury department; Vance McCormlck. chairman it rhn by the War department ready for service by June. In this war, where the battle lines extended across entire countries, coun-tries, and in which the qualities of the opponents were about equal, the strategical aspect largely resolved re-solved Itself into a consideration of the number and location of divisions di-visions on either side. The situation situa-tion was of such a character that it was a question which side could provide the superiority of forces necessary to success. In other words, the outcome would depend upon the number of troops that America could send over. All eyes were on the eastern front To allied statesa the collapse col-lapse of Russia meant possible grave political consequences; to tije allied commanders It forecast the release of approximately 100 divisions and the increase In the enemy's ranks in Belgium and northern France to a preponderance preponder-ance that could not be overcome. To us it Indicated a nice between America's best effort to pour our I fighting men into France and Ger- tional steel rails. As the situation in which we found ourselves regarding artillery ammunition was approaching a crisis, it became necessary to lay the whole question before the interallied in-terallied munitions board. After a full Investigation of their resources, both the French and British concluded con-cluded that they could undertake to meet our requirements, with the distinct understanding that their "plants must be greatly Increased In capacity and that we should furnish raw material promptly. The late Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, chief of the War department general gen-eral staff, represented us In the allied al-lied conference and reported the results and agreements reached. He bad brought the latest data from home and his knowledge concerning concern-ing steel and munitions enabled him to give valuable assistance to my chief of ordnance In our efforts to find a solution to the difficult uiu nitlons problem. Baker Writes of Problems. A letter from Secretary of Wai Baker, dated September 10, bad war trade board ; Balnbrldge Colby, shipping board; Alonzo E. Taylor Thomas N. Perkins, war industries and Paul Cravath. (TO BB CONTINUED.) |