Show russian admiral tells of long defense and disastrous fate of citadel and lauds general kondratenko tollo jan 23 A russian admiral who just joined the prisoners from fort arthur now in japan has given to the ot the associated press an extended statement covering the defense and surrender of the fortress he the surrender before the garrison had reached its ex as a disgrace bitterly critics es gen stoessel and lauds major general kondratenko commander of the fourth east siberian rifle brigade as the true hero of the defense ot port arthur the admiral says that vice admiral makaroff who commanded the hussun at port arthur and who went down with the battleship ask on april dictated the policy of inactivity on the part of the squadron taking the ground that it would be hopeless owing to the inferiority of the russian naval strength to engage the fleet of vice admiral togo and that tt would be unwise to divide the force defending port arthur by running ships to vladivostok or to neutral ports the admiral admits that bitter friction existed between the army and navy and intimates that there is a possibility of inquiry into this matter by court martial he insists that the russian i destroyed their warship at port arthur beyond any possibility of salvage by the japanese the statement Is as follows the first japanese naval attack on port arthur was an absolute surprise to both the russian army and navy I 1 admired the manner in which the japanese handled their ships and the remarkable way in which they concealed their movements but they erred on the iffe of caution K in this first attack they had launched all their torpedo boat flotillas against the russian ships which were in a condition of instead of ending only a few vessels they could have executed a coup de main by destroying practically every ship in the hur bor had a similarly bold policy been carried out the japanese could leave landed a force to tho west of the fortified lines and captured the fortress practically without opposition the forts had not then been completed and the majority of the gun had not been mounted tho garrison manning the entire line of over ten miles numbered there was friction botteen the army and tha avy agthe result of orders received from st petersburg these orders came to general stoessel and intimated that tha navy should emerge and fight the japanese it would have been useless to emerge without a definite object in view we knew that we must tight immediately after we left the harbor for bogos fleet awaited us then after fighting our badly damaged vessels would have been forced to run to neutral harbors and there disarm cur essela escaping damage or slight damage would have been compelled to run the long distance to vladivostok after fighting a second engagement with vice squadron in the tsu straits the meaning of as obvious some of our ships s a majority of them might hav been able to reach vladivostok la a more less damaged condition but what it Is they have done there therefore the heads of our naval force at port arthur notwithstanding the orders from st burg deemed it prudent not to divide the defending force which action would relieve togo of the necessity of keeping the majority 0 his fleet oft port arthur in order to protect japanese transport service it may le argued that it was always possible lor us to give togo successful battle but in that we new our own inferiority the cause of that inter bority dates beyond the present war the of the russian squadron at port arthur were the results of end ks experiments with all kinds of naval architecture and armament and there ans no attempt at uniformity the squadron was composed of all builds equipment and speeds we were terribly handicapped in the matter of speed or the maximum speed ot the squadron was that of its slow est unit which was under thirteen knots in every case the japanese Jap anere naval guns outranged out ranged our by 1000 yards the gun equipment of the fortress was completed by removal from the vessels and the mounting in the fortified positions of our now naval guns this policy was decided upon by the lamented makaroff our best admiral with the approval 0 all hla officers general stoessel who was in absolute command of the fortress vigorously opposed the naval policy he maintained that despite the edness of the fortress port arthur could easily be defended by troops armed only with rifles he opposed the idea that artillery was but tills resulted in causing fraction between him and the commanders of the fortress artillery 1 I am sorry to say that from the first general stoessel proved to bo incapable though in full command be never visited the fighting positions during the lifetime of general kondrat enito kondratenko was not only the life ot the defense but he possessed in a large measure the quality 0 A peacemaker he intervened in all cases ot trouble and always eloquently pleaded the caup of the emperor and the necessity tor defense and these he placed above private differences his ceaseless energy patience and courage won the confidence of the higher officers of both the army and navy and likewise won the confidence of the common soldiers fortunately for tho defense he was able in large lo 10 direct its Stoe sael left much to him and alio officers or the navy recognized him the one nini capable of fusing the discordant elements by dagand by night general kondrat every of the and constantly ilsk cd ilia life hc was our inspiration no need be ashamed of the defense made by tho garrison while o lived the harbor of port arthur which has botn described aa won jarful is a death trap for any fleet it the jap adese had succeeded in blocking the entrance it aull ou ll nave taken at least sixty ilas to remove the obstacles and that alth the roost powerful explosives plo it Is difficult for a russian officer to talk about the end it as worse than a mistake it was a dis giace the fortress could easily have held out for another month asit had food and ammunition sufficient for that period and if kondratenko had remained alive it would have held out for months longer in kondratenko tho garrison not only lost a leader but the one man aho vho had the ability and the power through his tremendous earnestness to control stoessel for nearly two weeks it was known among the officers that stoessel and laiq chief of staff delss who was incompetent was preparing to surrender through sels servants the soldiers became aware of what vas coming and brave as they bere iere the knowledge destroyed their enthusiasm at a council of war held three days before capitulation at which 22 of the higher officers of the army and navy were present general stoessel represented that it port arthur should be taken by assault there would be fighting in the streets and possibly A massacre he mentioned the women and children of the garrison and sail ho thought it was the autv of the council to avoid such a possibility notwithstanding these representations only three officers chief of start and two outliers ot liers favored capitulation Sto essela note to general bogl came without warning and tho word surprise inadequately expresses our condition after the sentiment of the majority of the council had been expressed what alip officers ceis said and felt and how the men thought and behaved all will be kaohn gatei but I 1 say nov and I 1 believe that the majority of the officers of the garrison ga irison TOP that the capitulation of the fortress was a disgrace to russia the capture of metro hill sealed tho fate of hie russian squadron which had previously been able by con scantly shifting jhc thc anchorages to protect the ships 1 l the fighting for the possession of that hill vaa the most desperate of tha siebe for ten days and the japanese assaulted continuously and bombarded unceasingly from metre hill hie japanese observed every movement of the russian squadron squad roa they able to place heir shells in any part of the barbor and to sink our ships the gnp alre of the japanese 11 inch howitzers howit was effective in several instances these projectiles landed on the decks of the battleships and went down clear through their bottoms when ohp news eliat general sel had sent a letter to general bogl offering to surrender reached the navy we realized the necessity of destroying our beyond the possibility of their use by the japanese accordingly on the sight of january ast 1st every vessel in the harbor as to be torpedoed several times in the engines boilers shafts and tunnels it was a hard nights but the japanese will never be able to utilized uti lizea single of our navy at port artur the japanese behaved excellently nhen they entered port arthur and was no suggestion of disorder or lawlessness 1 I came as prisoner to japan because I 1 felt it to be roy duty to abare i the destinies of our men 1 I do not criticism criticise critic ise who gave their but I 1 believe that be dishonored if I 1 returned to russia after doing so |