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Show OUR GREATEST UNCERTAINTY. How serious ate our foreign lluan rial problems is disclosed by F. H. Simonds. the war historian, in a ape Cial dispatch from Washington, dealing deal-ing with the present readjustment of world finances Slmonds shows th relationship of our forelRU trade to tho financing of Europe, and he says: Here in ashlnfifon. at Ihe present hour, congress Is considering consider-ing many measures and being subjected sub-jected to endless pressure, be cause American producers, and particularly wheat, cotton and wool producers. hHe on hand enormous stocks which cannot he sold in Knrope, owing io the credit and exchange sit nations And at the precise moment the iable are clogged with minatory dispatches, suggesting that ve shall lore the European market altogether because both governmental govern-mental and private agencies refuse re-fuse further loans or credits. Can Europe "go It alon" "" To this question theie is only one conceivable nnswi r. Europe is not merely incapable of such a mlraClfl now, but will not be in any time which can be forecast. Frahee and Cermany may reach an agreement by which they can barter coal lor iron, this Is an inevitable development, but for most American raw msterli It l!nro Is a Emopean demand which must remain cons ant almost al-most indefinitely. We have invested 910,000,000,-ouo 910,000,000,-ouo in loan.- in Europe and to our wartime allies. Ol this sum there is reasonable prospect that lUi $4,000,000,000 owed us by the British Will uliiuiately be recovered. recov-ered. The British mean to pay and are do. eg their level best to provide tbe m thod and means for a pa men:. Their present condi-t condi-t I'm. while serious In the extreme, ex-treme, does not by any means warrant absolute pessimism. As to the balance, the 10,000,000,000 owed by BelglUtOi France and Italy, Ihe Italian fraction Is as good as lost, the French and Belgian Bel-gian fractions the latter of which Is relatively small-depend upon a German payment o! reparations, which surpasses any present prospect. We can, of course, do nothing. This amounts to continuing In tbe pathway which we have followed .for many months with ever Increasing In-creasing completeness This means that we shall accept the position of a s.elf-contalned country, coun-try, except In so far as we can find markets for our surplus in South America and In Asia. We cen. .In effect, wash our hands economically, as wo have politically political-ly . ol all European responsibilities and advcnturcB. Such a courre canles w ith It ob-v ob-v lous consequences The first ot these Is the almost certain loss of all ol our public loans anu private credit! in Ehrrope, -ome ? 1 1,000,-000,000, 1,000,-000,000, always conceding that the British will still endeavor to pa) tbelr share and not impossiblv will succeed, although their chance of recovery will be much lessened. But. after all, there is no small probability that, save In tbe British case, we shall suffer this loss in any event. Perhaps more serious is the certain cer-tain Complicating Of our own domestic do-mestic readjustment, which would follow economic isolation from Europe. We should have to accept ac-cept the total loss of our surplus in raw material? and fOddStuffl now on hand, for which there is no market save in Europe, w e nhould have to go through a fui ther period of domestic dullness, paralysis, financial readjustment, which would be fairly long and certainly difficult. 00 |