Show THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE CASE in district court toky at ov oc ck ek p n in aase on JA wt atu V was N as brought it bc be LAP honors ilono chief Juk justice tice TJ fore their rs 11 I ift hunter in ter aa and As judge eni erson forthe purpose of re requiring quirin k deputy registrar showell show ell to allo allow W mrs wescott to register as a voter in his precinct the said mrs wscott claiming to have all the necessary qualifications entitling her ber to I bo be registered this as pr previously avious sly anno announced u aced was a casto case to test the validity ofell of the c acton act of 1870 conferring upon the WO women men of utah the elective franchise franchic on behalf of the ladles ladies there ap r A i reared ilar ds LIL kirk dat pa patrick Crick arthur brown I F S richards W S dusenbury R kwil K wil liams etc and on behalf of the plaintiff I sutherland Suther rland laDd tac eride brida marshall royle jena jonasson Je nasson son etc the court announced that in in J consequence of judge emersons urgent desire to return to ogden in the morning four hours would be allowed for th the arguments ments the time to be divided amongst the counsel as they might decide ran r OW IV al 11 mil IND proceeded with lily his ar areu aument ment I aai summarized by the emeret t he said they affirmed that the act art of 1870 entitled an act conferring upon women the elective franchise is void and they contended that the pa passage mage of that law was by dijt i the exercise of a power of legisla alon prohibited to the territorial al legislature by the organic act ac an and other acts oi Congress applicable to this territory lie ile referred to 1859 and 1830 odthe feder al revisions these were incorporated in the utah compilation on page oe e 40 section 1859 was aa as follows evary E very male citizen above the age t pe persons esons who S have legally declared lo 10 o become citizens in any territory IL I hereafter organized and who are tire t L nta Terii territory tory at shall ha be ennit diio vote at tit the first elect of or such territory ferri tory and to I i w v hold bold any office therein subject nevertheless to the limi limitations tati ns spec ifield in the next section that fl section the judge continued referred only to the first election clec tion and it stated who might vote at that I I election and what was important in support of his position was the I concluding clause odthe of the section and the contents of the section following I I I I referred to in that clause viz subject nevertheless to the limitations specified in the next section that waa was added to the section s I which defined the qualifications of voters at the first firn election I it t might jj S be supposed from a bare reading of that section and this cc concluding clause that in t the ile next section tion there would be some qualification some restrictions upon the right to vote at the first election that would bo be fl f w the tile natural reading of it but 11 l they came to read the tile section 1860 t t I there was not any allusion at all to the qualifications of voters at the first election there was no limitation of the light right to vote and hold oft fice so absolutely granted in section but the next section applied c X to subsequent elections and to the thi power of the legislative assembly to define the qualifications of voters and of persons to hold office now what must be tho force ft and effect of adding that clause for the purpose followed by such a section lection to the section which applied exclusively to the first election now it was a well known v rule ulo of further construction of stat OW t aute utes t that every part of it every word of it was to have a meaning the authorities upon that subject were very numerous the judge I referred to one or two authorities on I k this point and continued by saying that the meaning of those authorities I was that in reading a statute the court must regard all the clauses in that statute and it must be assumed to begin with that every yan t bordo tai used advisedly I U I I for tor some effect and that the intention of the legislature could not be carried out without giving effect to every word and clause in it now with that rule he invited S P v t their honors attention to the necessary effect of the words word subject nevertheless to the limitations apeci fled fied in the next section what is y y therein there in the section 1859 1850 that is 11 didde ma dc subject to the provisions of the next suction sect ion the ourt must find that out in order to be able to F i r give ive force and ef effect feet to that clause now there was something in that section that was I subject to the liia stations specified apeci fitA in the next section the right to voto at nt the first election was not subject to this provision ion why because the next sec see tion was expressly confined to subsequent elections nannel namely at all subsequent sube quent elections however in ill any territory hereafter organized by r con congress gros as well weil as at a all 11 elections in territories already organized the qualifications of voters and of holding li office be such as may be prescribed Y by the legislative assembly of bac each i terri territory tory subject in eject Q to the following fol livin restrictions strict ions on of the power of the tile legislative c isla tive assembly namely and the balance of the section cont contain ains an enumeration of certain persons that shall not be excluded and all persons that shall be excluded so that the whole section relates necessarily and all expressly and exclusively to sub subsequent elections then there was nothing in that section which qualified the right of any person named in section 1859 to vote at the first election and yet in order to give that clause effect there was something in that B action action which was affected by the provisions following or r otherwise therise that clause was meaningless S ow what was it it was the right to vote and hold office in the tile territory without u t regard to the election sor lor at s sub u bi quent elections the tile right t of male ma I e citizens citi zeni 21 years of aoe age to vote and anti hold office at subsequent elections the tile right of those persons to vote was the exclusive subject of the next section it followed therefore necessarily it followed with mathematical certainty fity that when a legislative assembly exercised the power granted by section 1860 it legislated in a manner characterized by the word limitation and by way of qualifying the right of voting and holding office mentioned in section 1859 therefore both sections related to the same persons the same voter the same candidates for holding office male citizens 21 years of age he ile contended and this point was entirely independent of the other that it was not the intention of congress in in passing the organic act and an d in i passing ass ng the acts from froin which he lie ba had quoted to authorize the legislative assembly togia to grant fit the elective franchise to females that intention was ivry iv ry forcibly suggested ob by section 1859 which was made wade applicable to all territories i congress expressly confined the elective franchise to male cit citizens eizens overal over 21 years of age age there was not a foot of land within the dominion 10 of the government over which congress has ever legislated for a aAvo woman man or any action of congress by she has been permitted to vote there is no cc court urt held under the constitution in tho the exercise even of powers granted by acts of congress where women have been admitted to any of the privileges el of a voting citizen they have not riot been permitted to practice law therefore ther afore there is nothing that has ever been done by congress or by the federal government to suggest any intention of the general government to extend the franchise to females lcokwood not allowed to practice law judge brown yes she sl ie is is i permitted to practice in the supreme court and c power permitting her to do so was granted by the legislature judge sutherland well that is of late but at the time these acts were passed female suffrage was struggling for the attention of politicians and the only effect of tho the movement in favor of woman suffrage was to demoralize politicians ians and statesmen and lie did xi d not k now DOW what others P judge brown lawyers judge jud sutherland yes yew lawyers lati judge judge g c brown sutherland me bride it has had some effect upon us this question had been struggling foe for attention and recognition betit would not be contended for a moment that in 1850 the idea of granting the ballot to females occurred to the mind of congress there was no evidence to show that congress Cun gress ever had any such intention and ali tho the judge contended that even if it could be deduced from this legisla tian 10 n that the legislative assembly had power to grant the ballot to fe males it was not the intention to give ta to the legislature the power to grant the ballot to different diffie rent classes of voters on different terms in this territory where female cufr suffrage exists it was incumbent that the males should bo be taxpayers tax payers but that fl females might vote without paying taxes and this being the case the judge argued that the law was not uniform that congress Con grets never intended to enact laws that did not give the suir suffrage rage on equal terms to do so would be to upset the fundamental maxim of equality and uniformity this concluded judge sutherlands Sut argument we give the continuance of the arguments as reported in tho the S L hera gerald id J ESQ Q next spoke in behalf of sirs mrs westcott commencing by quoting an authority as its to the ri man dakur to lie in california pennsylvania missouri and the district of columbia under the fourteenth amendment the right of females to vote had been tested ho he referred f first arst to a case cue from missouri where a woman claimed the right to vote under the fourteenth the flie statute of the state provided that males only should vote the decision of the court was that the constitution marlc made no voters at all nor did it make any provisions the fact being that congress had never attempted to interfere with the qualifications of voters and that f until the laws of the state are yip sup renic As as to qualifications the opinion pinion also aea to show that not only are ae he I I qualifications as to voters dif different in in din dif erent lerent states but the qualifications are dif different in single states sta teai the elective franc it ise is not an inherent right a person acra on does not get it because he lie is a citizen but because lie fulfils fulfills certa certain iii prescribed qualifications the law here requires that every voter shall bo be a taxpayer and a person paying poll tax is considered co entitled to to vote the law says that the poll tax shall bo be paid by men under CO 60 would your honor hold that when a man mail was ivas over 60 years of age you oil could take away his franchise franchi I A after he waa was 60 because he lie waa was exempt from poll tax INI mr r jonason Jona aon saon aho abowd that the revised statutes of the united states in which is given the tile right of if the tile territory to prescribe pres cribb the tile qualifications of the voters was passed four years after the female sufi suffrage rage act had been passed the act has fills been in for twelve years vears and has been approved thatis is it had received the implied approval of congress Congre sm acau because c congress had bad never declared it null and find void the speaker read from an all opinion delivered by harlan one oneat of the supreme court justices in the case of a woman who came anie to thia this country while her son was under age married a citizen and the son soil on becoming of noo age had voted justice harlan n held belda that as soon as the woman set foot on american soil and married a citizen she became herself naturalized COL for the applicants for mandamus I next bloke reg regretting g that so little time was allowed to the tile discussion ofa matter of such great importance the first question is has the territory the power to pass such an all act second is that power properly exercised by the territory all tho territories ries have tho the power to 1111 legislate alq on all rightful subjects of legislation 1111 11 aaion as far as granted gr antel in in tile organic act I take it that the tile most decided opponent of woman womans comans I S suffrage will not s y that the matter of womans comans y ago is not a r rightful subject of legislation egi the opinion of this Q court urt will naturally depend greatly on the construction placed u upon poll 1859 and 1860 of the revised statutes the position taken by counsel on the other side is is that the tile legislature Leg slature cannot allow ciny any other class of citizens t to vote except those mentioned free firce white male citizens it will not be denied that women are as much citizens as male now tow there arc are exceptions to tills this section in tho the revised statute iteli and I am of the opinion that these thes exceptions to this section in the tile revised statutes and I am of the opinion that these exceptions actually strengthen the position women may be allowed to vote they had intended to exclude women they would have noted it in the exception but it says that citizens it docs does not say only the exception points the rule hence if it said that no males could v vote te except those over six feet fee high thigh and under four feet high it would at once be K known that all others could yote so when it says that all citizens odthe of the united states shall vote except such as are proscribed then it is understood all others can call vote hence it is but a fair construction of the organic act that congress intended they should should allow all to vote except such as arc are expressly elpi L jy excepted it is a very grave tiling t hill for f or the judiciary to declare a solemn law odthe of the legislature void it should not be for any light cause that a law solemnly framed by tho the I legislature should be declared null bull and void by the tile judiciary except for very clear and very decided reason and if there is a doubt theace must have the benefit of that doubt if it is dt blared void it must bedolis be done upon an overwhelming wh weight of authority that the tile legislature has made an all infraction of its power and it requires tho the keenest and most acute logic of counsel on the other side to the exercise of authority by ky the legislature lo 10 bean be an in invalid valid and unlawful one it is undoubted that congress gave to the legislature of the territory the right to prescribe the qualification of voters alter the first election admitting this t to be a correct idea the question is has this power been improperly exercised in giving to females the right to vote here tho the speaker cited authorities the section of 1859 and that of 1870 notwithstanding the tile argument of judge St sutherland itherland to the contrary the two acts are tire upon the same subject for the reason that both relate to the right of suffrage it is eaid said that because different borders arc are placed u upon I n males from those upon females to that a t they the laws lack uniformity colonel merritt then quoted from froma a decision bv by judge emerson in the case casp of lyman against martin which brought up the same question in thia this decision according to the construction of G ol 01 merritt judge emerson held that the provision which required males to be be a taxpayer while females had no such burdens imposed upon them not being uniform was void if that be true this question is wholly out of the C court ourt and can hold no position I say that by reading the I jaw a w any fair construction will |