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Show I TWO OGDEN BOYS WITH I DIFFERENT VIEWS. j Richard Goss, who was with the French forces, 3a) B the Americans were too reckless in their advances and, as a consequence, paid dearly dear-ly for the victories won. He declared that the French army, to which he was attached, made the same progress as the Americans on the j right, but with one-fifth the loss, and he attributes this to the knowl j edge of trench warfare and covering-up tactics which the French warned by four years of hard experience. A German general, in an interview given an American correspond-Kit correspond-Kit in Berlin, expresses much the same idea when he says the Ameri-1 cans did not know how to protect themselves as did the French. The j German also says the Huns welcomed the displacing of French troops I by Americans because the Americans did not give them the unrest in-flicted in-flicted by the poilus. Thad Smith, just back from the front, who saw intensive service, i agrees with Mr. Goss that the Americans suffered heavy initial losses. ! I but holds to the opinion that the fighting of the Yanks was more effective ef-fective than that of any of the Europeans, and this is his explanation : Pershing knew the temper of the American boys He was aware of the fact that the doughboy could not be made a plodder, as he had spirit which would forbid a slow, waiting conflict. Pershing, therefore, there-fore, threw his men into the conflict in a manner to make the most of the relentless dash of his troops. When the Yanks went over the top they did not stop to dig in two or three kilometers away, but drove home their offensive with all the power of a resistless flood of humanity. What was the result They broke the morale of the Germans within 30 days after they began their thrusts. The French never were capable of accomplishing that as they made short lunges, dug in and always allowed the eneemy ample time in which to recover re-cover from the shock. French troops, operating on either flank of the Americans, were in position to take advantage of the psychological effect of the American Amer-ican attacks. Of course, it is too early to get a correct understanding of all the fighting in France, and it may later be disclcsed that the French method meth-od of attack was most effective, but, with the information at hand, there is reason to believe the American aggressiveness, which seemed to disregard losses, was after all the demoralizing power that broke the heart of the Germans, who saw millions of a resolute, irresistible B i Hb enemy coming up and overwhelming with the force ot a tidal wave. The German officer's comment as to preferring the opposition of Yanks, is not altogether supported by fact. All that part of the front from below Verdun to the Vosgcs mountains was known as a quiet sector until the Americans entered, but from then on became one of the flaming points in the great battle line fiom the sea to Switzerland-There Switzerland-There were no quiet sectors occupied by Americans. The St. Mihiel salient is an illustration. There the warfare had become a stalemate, but no sooner had Pershing's troops gotten into position than they did what the French in four years of struggling could not do. They swept the Germans out of the salient in 24 hours, capturing 15,000 prisoners prison-ers and much booty and eliminating the last menace to the security of Verdun. The St. Mihiel offensie, though not on a mammoth scale, was the sharpest blow of the war. |