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Show WASHINGTON NEiWS rTj FROM OUR CONGRESSMAN W. K. GRANGER Food Prospects for 1945 Victories in the past year have increased demands on available food supplies, however, food shortages cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that , they ai-e a necessary price of allied victories in Europe and the Far East. Maximum production was reached in 1944, but maximum reeds are just now developing. Stocks were not built up to the maximum possible extent last year to meet this emergency due largely large-ly to lack of sufficient storage facilities, yet we increased our irod consumption in the U. S r.''ne per cent over prewar years. This is to be expected since high incomes always create increased demands for food. Prospects are that food production produc-tion in the U. S. in 1945 may not be as great as in 1944. It may, in fact, be 5 or 10 per cent below the quantity produced in 1944. Nevertheless, U. S. food supplies will still be 23 or 30 per cent above those of any five prewar years. Since we entered the war, we have more than doubled our production of many important items, thus making it possible to provide the best and the most abundant diet in the world for will of necessity be greater . since the U. S. Army and Navy are now at full strength. Considerably larger numbers of troops than in 1944 are outside the ".ontinental U.SE. The farther troops are from "home, the more food is required to keep the supply lines full. The services are also responsible for helping to feed contingents of al- countries which have only recently re-cently been liberated or are still occupied by the Germans. In the light of present supplies, the-most that can be accomplished is to provide such foods as will tide the people of Europe over their immediate difficulties. The long-term long-term problem Is to supply as quickly as possible transportation equipment, fuel, fertilizer, seeds and the other things which they must have in order to get their own agriculture goins again. The one bright spot is the wheat situation. The-problem, of -meeting the urgent needs - o . . liberated Europe for wheat is one of movement move-ment rather than supply, since world supplies of wheat, exceed n "ments by more, than 300 million bushels. both military and civilian needs. In 1944, 76 per cent of the record re-cord U. S. food supply was distributed dis-tributed to the civilian population, popula-tion, 13 per cent to the armed forces and 11 per cent to foreign countries for military and civilian civil-ian use. In 1945, with our military mili-tary forces at their maximum strength, almost 16 per cent of the prospective supply must be furnished to fill direct military needs. As a result, less food will be available for civilian uses. Interesting comparative figures on the consumption . of sugar indicate in-dicate that the U. S. consumed an average of 96.9 pounds per capita per year before the war, while the United Kingdom consumed con-sumed 104 pounds, yet in : 1944 the average U. S.. citizen- consumed con-sumed 83 pounds and the British only 71.5. The meat consumption picture is very different with the average U. S. citizen consuming consum-ing 125.6 pounds per year before the war and 147 pounds during 1944. while the British consumed 125.5 pounds before the war and only 108.1 in 1944. Military needs of the future uuu wno are hgnting with us. The rapid advance of all 'allied 'al-lied armies; the staggeringly large numbers of prisoners taken in Europe; the freeing of millions of persons who were carried into Germany as Nazi slave labor; the demands on the military services to provide a minimum diet to prevent disease and unrest in the wake of battle all greatly in crease demands for food which the military must supply. The high humanitarian and political priorities for delivery of adequate ade-quate food- supplies to Western Europe can no longer be kept jin second position; for we must fully realize that - disillusionment and disappointment, as well as economic and political instabil ity, will certainly follow in the wake of victory unless it is possible pos-sible to supply minimum quantities quanti-ties of food. We must recognize the fact that spring advances of allied armies insufficient seed stocks, fertilizer' and tools, to say nothing of population dislocations, have prevented pre-vented sowing of crops in many battle stricken areas this year Conditions are worse in thnJ |