| Show irk general 0 9 S story of the A ae E eia 11 ad copyright 1931 1 a all countries tithe north amerl ily general 1 newspaper alliouse Alli onse world rights reserved V including the ih reproduction 1111 in whole V service john joth J J pershing 4 co gonlia a aad CHAPTER continued of course all present knew that no authority to dictate regarding luch such matters had been conferred agh courses upon him and hll his remarks only ruet CIVIL arat FA a that the allies were ready rady I 1 aeronaut to go to almost any length to carry canive mg special act their point 11 make makes etc premier clemenceau then aid said hf h settle meem greed with ith general foch and fit a stories lored an american army but that the germane germans were ere at sit bre leclair ahw tonne ux and if the lines were broken there the enemy might V I 1 WOOD quickly arrive under the walls of registrar parts and liaison between the allied alred armies might have to be established on the loire or if the lines were pierced ot at hazebrouck teil descend the enemy could reach the tea sea cases of the what Is 13 important for the I 1 a haven in morale of our soldier soldiers he said Is rhey vent to not to tell them tint that the american heir denture soldiers old lers are arriving but to show russia and them that they hae have arrived in my opinion the plan proposed rara nt of was wais entirely unsound and und I 1 colonization thought that the best and quickest I 1 the colony way to help the allies would be to ions their build up an american army moreover to mallit aln the implied presumption that ri guage ger the council might dictate to us exempt from either as a council or through the swearing in tilled allied commander in chief in the arbitrary manner indicated set me sufficient ig more firmly than then ever ag colo Am american pirlean units annl arving in 1111 ed to live ac armies the dayi days discussion macs macl I 1 of their an it quite clear that both allies in tended to get commitment to the proposed schedule as far into the future as possible r SIGN saw pershing pel thing opposing wilton wilson A telegram tele cram sent by the british secretary of state for foreign affairs april 8 1918 to lord read let ing british ambassador at wash ington said it Is evident from the brief account 1 of the conversation that gen r K T aei oral trot ings views are absolutely ai i 1 inconsistent with the broad pol pot icy ley which we believe belie the dent has accepted the main dif dlf ference of course Is that we inter pret it as meaning mean lii that in fantry and mach machine lzie pins guns are to be brigaded with ith french and troops in the course of four months general pershing admits no such obligation tind does not conceal the fact that he disapproves of the policy A second and minor difference in that while th ife british government ise quite agree agrees as to the propriety f UTAH of ultimately withdrawing american troops triga brigaded ded with the I 1 Is 1 finest french and british so as its to form i n an american army they do not hoppl ta alick irk this process could or ought nellion n ne clion to be attempted until the end of the season for active operations opera tlona ith bath this year dro drafts s to its close eay say in october or november 1 I am unwilling ln to embarrass the Pre president who has shown ench such a 1 firm am grasp of the situation with led criticisms of his but the i business IV W difference of opinion Is to so funda fundo at one of his mental and touches eo so nearly the I 1 so he wrote issue issues of the whole war that we are bound to have the matter ling if they cip cloirec tred up nedy replied at if suggestion children were the meeting of the council was ad charlie journea at this point that foch As he lie wai lord allner and I 1 might meet and i a mailbox niall box he examine the question and see if d by a truck come some agreement could not be reached whereupon we to en adjoining room and went over the whole hole subject again my sly proposal was more liberal rs u etere ere down than the circumstances or my own night views on the subject really warranted I 1 when the it conceded priority for a into the bay limited number of the infantry and noticed by the machine gun units but generally ene rally it d that some contemplate the shipment of ar or ie harmony for divisions and corps and railway troops mechanics and la to he be boyst corn com bor troops for te t e service of the don dont sound it rear ell of which were badly needed 1 the basso it was the distinct understand tand ay life iny however as already promised by foch that if we would consent td to muke make concessions as to infantry and machine gun units the french u a thinking calis ou help VIP ile with vat raca the h c time came to form an american army but buts of course it requires they could not furnish men for other s services nor for the services of supply without which we could yale ale in joy not function as its ao an aimy almy other others In insist siston on program when we met Il mil liner and especially foch insisted that the war would be lost unless their program was carried out I 1 rep repeated ested the arguments already presented to the council and added that I 1 fully real lied the military emergency but oes did not think that the plan to brin bring over untrained units to fight under british and french commands would cither either relieve the situation or end the war I 1 pointed out regardless of ot the depressing conditions and the very urgent need of men by the al at ie lies their plan wai was not practicable and that even it if sound in principle there was not time enough to pre pare our men as individuals for eff efficient lelent service under a new system with the strange surroundings to be found in a foreign arny army here foch sald said 1 lou ou are wiling to risk our being abeln driven back to the loire I 1 said tes yes I 1 an am willing willin to take the risk moreover the tine time may come when hen the american army will have to stand the brunt of this war and I 1 countries it Is not wise to fritter away our a in this manner the ecdao pan morale of the british french and an aut italian armies Is low while as you a know that of the american army Is very tery high and it could be a grave y no 31 1931 mistake to give up the idea of build ff A ing an american army in all iti its details ai as rapidly as possible cant budge him an inch at about thil this juncture lloyd george 11 clemenceau and premier orlando of italy evidently beckin ing lm impatient walked into the room met lloyd george at the door and said in a singe stage wills whis per behind bis tits hand ton yon cant budge him an inch lloyd george then eald said well vell how Is the coin com cittee getting alongi hereupon whereupon we all an ant down anil and loyd lloyd george aid said to me cant you eee see that the war will be lost inless we get this supporal sup which statement was echoed in turn by clemenceau cau and nod orlando in furt fact all till five of the party attacked me with all the force and prestige of their high position but I 1 had already yielded to their demands ai as far as pos possible sIbIA with out disrupting the plans toward which we had been striving tor for over a year and a continuance of may tiny shipments into june without and provision for transporting ar thiery and auxiliary and service of supply troops could not be granted without making it practically impossible in the future to have an amer lean ican army after I 1 had gone over the whole situation titu atlon acain again and stated my po they still insisted whereupon I 1 truck the lie table with ray fist and said with the greatest possible emphasis I 1 gentlemen I 1 have thought this program over jellberg abely and will not be coerced this ended the discussion in con com cittee and when the council recon A E F phone girls M clemenceau stated that the question of american troop troops would be taken up again on the following day when the council met for the aft an ernson session of the second day the discussion of shipments ihla nent of american personnel was it at once resumed general foch spoke it at length repeating previous ments and giving a r rather other grandl ose dissertation of the allied situ atlon and the dire things that would happen unless the americans agreed to the proposal of the coun ell lloyd georges challenge mr sir lloyd george in turn spoke at some length lie ile asserted that the germans hoped to we use up the british and french reserves before their own were exhausted and that the british had already called up n arly men for their army ad aid ai d navy and bad had ex tended their age limits to all men between eighteen and fifty years of age if the united states does not come to our aid he said then per he be calculations will be correct it france and great britain should have to yield we defeat would be honorable for they would lave lane fought to their last man while the united states would have to stop without having put into una line nore than little belgium 1 ios realizing real ning ane unfairness of the comparison comp irison he quickly went on to say that he was as sure I 1 wai was doing my best to meet the emer gency and that general pershing desires that the aid brought to us by america should not be incompatible with the creation of the american army as rapidly as possible 1 I 1 too am counting countI rg on the he t ex istance of that army ind lad I 1 am counting on it this very year to deal the enemy the floal blow but to do that the allies will have to hold out until august I 1 speaking in the name of the american army and in the name of the air african people I 1 told the supreme war council during the see second day of its session at Ab abbeville beville hay 2 1918 11 1 I want you to realize that we are ready to bear as large forge a part as possible of the burden of the war lne e all want the sane same thing but oar means of attaining it Is different from yours america declared war In depend antly of the allies and she must face it as soon as possible with il n powerful army there Is one carl call to tal point to which I 1 wish to call your attention that Is the im to the morale of our sol got dere d era of fighting ting under our own flag on america Is already anxious to know where her tier army Is the get mans mads have once more started a strong campaign of propaganda in the united states the purpose of which Is to insinuate that the allies have so little confidence in the american troops that they ahre are obliged to distribute them among their own divisions tell tells cf of american pride the american soldier Is as its proud as to any other and the time will toon soon come when our troops as well as our government will ask to eglit as its an autonomous army under the american high command I 1 understand that in prime min mill later ister lloyd georges proposal we hall shall hate base to again examine the situation Itu atlon in june before deciding for july that ahat Is all that I 1 can agree to at present to show my desire for solidarity with ith the cause of the allies lloyd george had previously taken up a revised program submit ted by myself and after some discussion he proposed that america gives us 10 20 WO infantry men and machine gunners in may kay the same nun in juie ith a supplement of CO infantrymen and machine janners iun ners if it we scrape together the tonnage to trant transport port them lie ile further proposed that the sit nation be examined again in june before deciding whether there was reason to extend to july the program decided upon for may stay and june he ile then called on the coun ell to accept bis his plan as the proposal sub witted by lloyd george bontem plated the shipment of the num bers mentioned in british tonnage leading american shipping entirely free for us to use as we should decide an agreement was soon reached substantially as set forth in the foll following cablegram to the secretary of war following agreement adopted by supreme war council may stay 2 at Ab abbeville beville cable more in de tall later it Is the opinion of the supreme war council that thal to carry the war to a successful conclusion cl an american army should be formed as early as possible un on der its own commander and under its own flag ong then it was thought the war or would run to 1919 in order to meet the present emergency it Is agreed that meri can troops should be brought to france as rapidly as allied trans port atlon facilities will permit and that as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an ameri amerl can army preference to be given to infantry and machine gun units foi fot training and service with french and british armies with the on standing der that such infantry and machine gun units are to be with drawn and united with their own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the american commander in chief after consultation with the commander I 1 in n chief of the allied armies in france it is also agreed that during may stay preference should be given to the transportation of infantry and machine gun units of six divisions and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such troops as may be determined by the american commander in elief june shipment up to pershing Per thing it is further agreed that this program shall be continued during june upon condition that the brit ish government shall furnish transportation por tation for a minimum of ka men in may nay and men in june the understanding that the ike first six divisions of infantry shall go to the british for training and service and that troops sent over in june shall be allocated for train ing and service as the american commander in chief may deter mine it Is also birther agreed that if the british government shall after the conference win wits that of pooling allied supplies lIeL I 1 explained it advantages and the giving in tonnage that would re lull sull ur llord george and aad mr or enild did not commit but accepted it in pran ciple as st clemenceau aa had done and each agreed to designate deel nate an oil officer licer with business experience to meet with ui us at an carly date to study die uie question lun with this beginning at least a step had been taken toward our objective even though the prin ciple might not be extended as a far as fit we thought desirable A few days later 11 clemenceau cau aa called a meeting in tile tits office ollice of the representatives senta tives gen sir traven travers clarke acting for the british ind col cot charles 0 dawes for the 0 ameri amerl cans CHAPTER on the hels beis of all fie vie clamor for nothing but infantry and I 1 received a request from front bl arshal british commander askling artillerymen artilleryman artillery men this fully bore out a prediction I 1 had cabled lV washington ashington that the allies would be asking artillerymen before long it trill will be readily understood however that once the ilc bad had made a demand for infantry and nod machine gunners they all joined in concerted effort to bring it about bout regardless of hat their real needs eeds might be in reply I 1 reminded At marshal ershal haig that the Ab abbeville agreement giving priority to infantry and raa mit chine gun shipments would prevent the arrival of our artillerymen for some time in fulfilling our part to military to we had already gone far beyond the mere recognition of the principle of unity of command and had begun to bring over bun deeds of thousands of men almost regardless of the organizations to which they belonged that the might be available in to the event of extreme necessity second division DIv lilon it was my custom throughout the war as both a duty and a pleasure to visit the tte troops as frequently as its possible to keep in to touch with the hanto of effi efficiency clency and the morale of officers and men ai As nundus I 1 second division |
