Show I 1 general per i ends 40 story of the A E F CAPy right rishi 1911 la in all countries IT by the north amerl by 17 general t sea e newspaper alliance lne world dishis reserved W including Inc ludin the scandinavian 1811 reproduction in whole john J Pew orlo part J pershing shing CHAPTER continued if lt the had been mine I 1 hould net have hesitated R moment to put into the battle any for or all of c our five me divisions then in france the tile first was the only one usel for the time being the other others being placed in quiet sec tore tors each to relieve two I 1 rench dl visions As A our divisions acre more llan van twice as large as theirs it amounted to almost immediate enforcement re of ten divisions at the time of the german attack a battalion of the tile american sixth regiment regi of engineers wa was I 1 on duty behind the tile british fifth army en on la a railway construction and repair repairs these troops were given arins and participated with the british forces in the defensive op lorm until after the tile lines were ere stabilized y 1 CHAPTER I 1 secretary of aar baker went to 0 london to discuss mith the brit I 1 lith 11 authorities the projects ts for additional shipping and also the general fie subject of munitions while there lie be sent me the tile foll following oming tele grain march 25 1918 embodying suggestions from the prime ter which ahomed the deep anxiety of ohp british 1 I hare have just had a it long talk with ith the minister lie ile urges three proposals prop for your consideration first that our divisions in france be placed immediately in line to relieve e french dl divisions ismons for seri service ice elsewhere quiet sectors being chosen for troops mith v alth least train ing 1 d that all available engi beer troops be taken talon from lines of communication work and find sent to aid of british engineers preparing positions back of present preen lines it 11 Is urged that suspension of our work be but temporary and that the work suggested Is impera tive third that infantry be sent first of the entire six ahi to be atod by british in view slow of present acute needs of that army no 0 o ansier to the foregoing Is nee essary until I 1 see vou tomorrow when we can discuss the eions full first division ordered into line my diary notes lie tile following Cl aumont friday march 29 1918 bield conference with the secretary of war and general bliss yesterday on joint becom recommendations merida t ions of military representatives of t the he war mar council left paris this morning for Clin at petals Petal ns request the first il slon llon ordered to battle line which ir fr baker said people at home am would mould enthusiastically approve mr bir paul cravath dined with us this e evening ening and speaking of unity favored placing control in the hands of a committee composed of marshal haig general retain and myself the situation had become so serious that the military rc re presenta tives teemed seemed to think it necessary to recommend that all pr previous estous plans for or the shipment of american troops be disregarded and that nothing oot blo but infantry and machine gun units be shipped until otherwise by the supreme war council this they did in the form lot of a joint or unanimous note which was of course approved by the supreme war council I 1 was very much surprised at the E attitude of general bliss our mill tary representative with the coun icil ell As without his consent the joint note could not have been submitted to the council when the joint note was present ed to secretary baker I 1 pointed out to him and general bliss that the proposal if approved by the prest dent would place the disposition of american units entirely in the hands bands of the supreme war council and und take them quite out of our crint control roL alan ta trai nino boule illious illi out doubt destroy alt all bilty of our forming an on amer lean ican army the secretary was as strongly opposed to any such puch outcome as 1 I and after some discus discussion alon he die dic bated I 1 Is s views fews in a cable to dent ivinson explicitly recommend ing blat the control of our forces should be retained by our corn com mander in chief and that the joint note be approved only in that cense reply from wilson the message forwarding the joint note with mr bir bakers corn com nas was answered by calle cat ie from dated march 30 whirl which tic tio president concurs coit ars sa i the joint note of the permanent mill tary representatives of tile he su preme war council in the sense for mutated inu in your no 61 6 march 28 and wishes you to regard yourself authorized to decide questions of immediate co cooperation operation or replacement I 1 it as thought that this statement coming froni from the president would check at least for the time being the lie demands of the allie that we e provide units for building up their divisions but thair in kristence ri si stence continued the presidents message was fol owed lowed march SO 30 by a cable from the deportment dap which stated the recommendations of secretary f t war to president that preferential transportation be given to Ane infantry and machine eun gun units fr r present emergency un der stood and abd will be followed it vent went on to ta soy say that these units pertaining to three divisions the third T fifth and seventy seventh Bc vi would be sent at once and those of three other divisions about tilly 1 replying Ilc plying april 3 to the depart mci met to t e cable I 1 emphasized that it wag was not intended that our unite units shall replace the lie losses of british or french organizations there ii 11 re our artillery should be held in readiness to follow ft hen called for although it was possible that the lie situation wight become so seri serf ous that some of our infantry units will be to tosane acrie jtb with temporarily my intentions were further indi catch by sayings saying americans roust must not lose sight of the to build up tip divisions and corps of their own and also we must lust avoid the tend cacy to incorporate our infantry into british divisions where it will be used up and never rell relieved eved my cable recommended that the infantry of two divisions be sent by british shipping and two by our commander ue we hate base already had experience enough in trying to coordinate hie the opera operations tImis of the allied armies without success there has never been r real unity of atlon such ordination coordination co between two or three anile Is impossible no mattar who the commander in chief may be raci commander in chief if Is interested in hia his own on army and cannot let the other commanders comm point of view nor crap grasp the problem as a whole I 1 am ID in favor of a supreme commander and believe that the tile success of the allied cause depend upon it IL 1 I think the necessary action should ft be taken by this council at once I 1 am in favor of conferring the supreme command upon gen cral loch och hen I 1 had finished mr lloyd george came over to where I 1 sat sal took roc me by the band hand and enid 11 1 I neree agree fully with ith general per ailing this Is a ell put after some further informal dis kras bril albert rive amiens Si Quentin are md adi ie PA 40 S ayo 1 1 ground gained by german offensive 0 25 comiles 50 miles oun oft n but that present elins should go no further than this it was my purpose not to become too deep ly implied in an agreement that would make it impossible later to corgi our own independent force under our own off officers leers CHAPTER secretary baker and I 1 had fre discussed the question of a supreme allied commander and ne me mere ere both ready to accept it in principle when prop proposed in re response onse to a notice from premier clemenceau I 1 went ent april 3 to beauvais Beau vals to meet with the su st preme war council arriving early colonel bod and I 1 had to malt an hour at the hotel de mile tile before BI clemenceau and lloyd george came into the conference room marshal haig generals boch loch ie pe talu sir henry wilson bliss iley ey gand and myself were mere the others participating brigadier general spiers acted as interpreter and aleut col coll sir 31 maurice aurice II 11 ankey who usually accompanied compan led mr I 1 loyd george as recorder the meeting was finally called to order by 31 clemenceau who ho stated its purpose siyan in substance we hae haie come together to settle a very simple question re regarding harding tiie tile functions of general foch I 1 think we are all in agreement as to the ordination coordination co of allied action but there Is some difference in the understanding of general fochs powers as conferred upon him at the doullens Doul lens conference of march 26 general foch will explain his big difficulties foch calls call for action general foch then set forth briefly his situation as follows the powers conferred by the doullens Doul lens conference were limited to the ordination coordination co of action between the allies they were conferred while the action was on the row low er to co ordinate coordinate has been con to be Ili elicited cited to the time the allies mere in action that vas was march 26 at Doul doulens lens isow now we are at april 3 now w ant tho hp tun ato armies are no longer in action but have stopped and are facing each other there Is nothing to coordt co nate there should be authority to prepare for action and direct it so we are right back where we were and nothing can be done until an action starts again lloyd george pleads for unity mr air lloyd giorge glorge then ther entered the discussion ba baang ing substantial ve hae hilie had more than three years of this war and me e have not ha nd unity of action during that time during the last year m e have had two kinds of strategy 0 one be b halg haig and another by Ic tain boh different and nothing has beci gained the only thin thing that waa all accomplished as by general nl velle when he was ans in supreme cora com mand gereral foch Is now empowered to ordinate coordinate co the action of the allied arrows but this does not go far enough as he has no authority to control except by conferring con ferrini with ohp respective commanders in chief lie wants authority to pre pare tr action I 1 think the resola tion alde at doullens Doul lens should be modi modified fled so that we may have a bet ter understanding I 1 should liko 1110 to apar what general bliss and general pershing have to say pershing Per ehing give gives his HI view views I 1 then cuve gave my ifer lew which was set forth in a brief memorandum prepared in pencil after the blyscus ion slon began ns as follows the tile principal of unity of corn coin mand Is undoubtedly cn the correct one for the allies to follow I 1 do to I 1 not belles it Is possible to hae haie unity of action without a supreme cus slon a draft of the resolution wai was submitted omitted rel derence to the american army thereupon hereupon I 1 called attention to the oversight saying 1 I think this resolution should include the american army the arrangement Is 1 to be in force as is I 1 understand it from now on ani the Ame american Amerl cin army will soon be ready to function as such and should be included as an entity like tile the british and I 1 rench armies I 1 there Is no Ame american army yet as its such general retain petain interject ed I 1 as its units are either in mriln ing or are amalgamated with the british and i trench rench pershing has U S included there may not be an all american army in force functioning now I 1 replied but there soon will be and I 1 want mant this resolution to apply to it when it becomes a fact the american Amerl cau government Is represented here at this conference and in the war and any action as to the supreme command that includes the british and french armies should also include the american army 11 the foregoing account of the conference may not be an exact record of the language used but it is given as my aid took it down the following resolution was then read and adopted general foch Is charged by the british french and american go governments ern ments with the ordination coordination co of the action of the allied armies on the western front to this end there is conferred on him all the power necessary for its effective tion to the same end the british french and Arre rican governments confide in general foch the strategic direction of military operations the commanders in chief of the british french and american armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies each commander in chief will have base the right to appeal 0 tr 14 41 e 14 it V W ta salvation army baies handing out doughnuts to his government it in hip hi opinion ill his army Is i 1 iced in danger by the instructions received froni from general foch allied commander in chief the idea of an allied commander in chief had been suggested and discussed many times unofficially but for various arlous reasons political and oth otherwise emise it had never been bee definitely adopted by the supreme war council etli the distrust that existed among the allies it I 1 was mas not easy to ariti bring rt ut 1 the decision in favor mor of i supreme coin mander and it 1 l was uns made possible only by tile extreme emergency of the tile situation tl e designation of general foch as in chief of the nl at hid armies in france was u proposed by cie french april 15 I 1 received a letter from il it Clemenc ciu adels ir me that mr bir lloyd deorto had approved the and asked if I 1 acred d I 1 replied in a personal note ex eil bessins my iny agreement subject to the of allson ll son which alch came april 17 once tile lie question of eupheme e coin command bland as settled tile co to erdl bated energies of the allied armies could be directed edth ith in maximum effect toward to ard R common end N bile dark das da i still till ahead we were e spared the cano chagrin g ri n estima of 1 anem n belfil cle clency n through eug h la lack of t t teamwork 0 CHAPTER now that the supreme effort must be made on our part and when n unite units 7 ere sorely needed fir vt immediate mediate active service it was fol found ind much to my surprise that thal although the div leloi g then thet coming to prance france had been under training for fix all months or eien more they still contained a large perc wage of untrained men ae As already pointed out the geu artil staff when called upon to pro vide ide v men for special services had relied upon taking them from corn coin bat divisions instead of ing such requirement requirements and segre gating these special tie sto from the start and mining training them as such this was a most vicious applina applina von in time of war of a nry objectionable practice that bad had grown up in our army in time of peace it appears alii t the tion oll 0 our arn lea in tre oe IN orld war no oilier other plan wad wab and the practice wa carried to such an or x tent that divisions with say men which should have been held intact and each one perfected as an n organized team were constantly balled called upon to send large g groups rout is of their trained soldiers to other duties inspect available divisions in view of their poss possible lible early employment I 1 wanted to look luto into the u beneral of rib clency of our available some personal instructions about raining training going the rounds I 1 met general flir who was one of the tile able french generals Rene rals and found him very enthusiastic about the second which had been in line at under uncle r his command confirming my own ion formed from observation and anti reports he ile said that without doubt it was as then as efficient as any of his trench demons the tile ilist was vins further advanced adian ced than any of the tile and its morale was high at the prospect of going into the battle line developments hid irid brought bron glit the question |