| Show beneral pershing IS lo 10 25 1931 inq qs ce opening stora of the A E fe ir from 1931 Is ill all cov ettles by tb north orth R we r all nv world corli bt ocoral on oral te firoved to adt to rayed 1 Ind udini w Z I 1 in the la in chok bol ot or la in pirt part john J abor of file sarvis L een desirous ice but until every one in authority milled realized to obtain a that all resources the allies could ill iame his muster would be required to meet personally successfully the gortat offensive of the central power powers impeded in the but to use them effect effectively liely close C I 1 ose cooperation among com ricka aas it man mandera deris would mould bo be imperative Impe rathe with tills in mini I 1 proposed to premier that the corn com mandra in chief and chief of naff staff ret get together to examine the situation titu atlon and it possible determine ose a general program of combined action U clemenceau at once bp Lp proved the suggestion it v mas as also favor ably received by general foch ies who mo it will be recalled was as chief of the french general staff I 1 proposed that the meeting be held at my n headquarters but the french elected selected retain 0 U Q at the meeting january 24 1918 is robertson no bertson for the british spoke first and suggested a general statement as to 1 mutual support supped between allied armies 2 situa tion as to re rescues series 3 question of troops in italy y 4 situation as to alic transportation of the amer lean icon army and facilities given it in F fance ance we petain favored defensive def nilve Getie general ral retain thought that for the present the allies mould be rs forced to remain on the defens defensive he because of tack lack of men he lie said till the franth army had 07 97 divisions with on an infantry strength of from to men each some thir cef an tj ty odd of these divisions being in p reserve ami and the rest in the trenches besides elfeldt cavalry divisions two of 0 which were dismounted and six mounted all divisions i he thought could be kept up until april if there should be no fighting but later on even without a battle he lie would have haie to break up tip five fire diAl divisions sion to maintain the others the six mount j ed cavalry divisions would mould have to R S be reduced to four and before the end of the year the total force would mould have to be reduced by 2 20 divisions foch was for counteroffensive general foch de declared lared that the beat means of halting a strong and persistent offen offensive she was a powerful counteroffensive the german offensive at tit verdun was stopped not by our resistance there but liy by our offensive on oil the somme in said bald general foch FOOL such an operation Is 13 possible only when hen foreseen and prepared beforehand in planning the counter olen offensive sive I 1 think that the entire front must be considered as a R abole and not the french as 0 one ne part and the british as 83 another the plan roust must envisage them together preparing for offensive ac tion on a common battle field with all the forces at their disposal general robertson It expressed a ac c cord with voth foch roch but he fie did not see mete or with mth what means su such ch an offensive could be executed and stated that the war could not be won by remaining on the defensive give ive us back the troops from Sal Fal and we will commence olen offensives said general halg hall ile e were not speaking of often off en elves but of counter counteroffensives offensives it general foch re replied ailed general robertson remarked that of course tre french and arlt british S could reinforce each other and make inake counterattacks counter attacks and then asked could they do more than that I 1 cot without the americans general petain an answered sered him dependent won U S general Rober roberthea then said 1 I think our only hpe lies in ameri amerl can con reserves and ho be wanted waned to bear from me I 1 stated that but few of the allied authorities seemed to realize that american participation could depend upon the amount of shipping available for the transportation of 0 cup t q and en that hut aba th tima when they would be needed was near a at t hand band As there had been some ref arence to amalgamation I 1 also took occasion to emphasize the point that we expected as a matter of course that the american art army bould have haie its own oin front as an in dt dependent force and not be und merely as s a dimne to be sent here and there one inoperable rea son on I 1 said why ne me could not amalgamate with mith the french was the difference in langu language age and I 1 added that we would mould not use our troops in to that wy at all unless it became absolutely necessary I 1 ben then dis cued our problems calling attention to the delays at the french boits and our shortage 0 of rail transportation and touched on the back state of procurement of equipment munitions and airplanes rhey all appeared surprised to learn of our atles especially general foch roch although even as chief of the general staff 11 lie 0 apparently could not interfere in nia matters aters handled directly direct li by the ministry it was astonishing to find end how little c comprehension any of 0 them had of the enormous ta bk that confronted the americans foch slid bald none of these questions has been liten referred to me whereupon petain retorted tart aone one should not wait until such things are brought to bin hir attention but should look around and find them thern petain added at once that he coald send an off official iclal to study our situation and llala later sent ole 01 e of hit lilt officers who mho offered blany suggest suggestions lars out of his owa own experience blis bliss favor favors british plan conversations conversation with general robertson continued the nest next day at the crillon brillon hotel in paris with general biles bliss present the same arguments were repeated in favor of incorporating american units into british division divisions and general bliss expressed himself in favor of the robertson Il plan I 1 nas mas forced to declare myself then and ilithe tilt e my ily stand nas vins not quite what general robertson berteon Ilo had ex I 1 acted and the meeting adjourned with the position of all concerned no longer in doubt general bliss and I 1 met later by appointment to talk the lie matter over between ourselves and if pos sible come to an understanding after some discussion he suggested that each of us cable table his views to washington and ask for a decision it was not my policy then or at any other time to put anything up to washington that I 1 could possibly decide ui tul self this would mould have been the last thing to do in this case especially as the secretary had left in my bands hands the determination as to how hov our troops should be emp employed loed for tao men in our positions to hae haie appealed in this tills way any would have a clash and wash h ington had enough trouble besides the secretary could not possibly have been sufficiently in touch with the undercurrent of ehfe te ne nesella g oil a eions to make a wise decision bo I 1 euld suld well bliss do you know ahat mould happen if we should do that we would mould both be relieved from further duty in france and that Is exactly what we should deserve ae e then spent some time thre exam ining the question from angles until finally he lie came come around to my view and said 11 1 I think you are right and I 1 shall back you up in the position you laic haie taken CHAPTER once general bliss and I 1 had reached an understanding us as to our attitude toward amalgamation of our troops with the british he gave roe me his support in later confer ence t when we saw the british the british and american com ale marn lerg in chief 11 7 that of arm arms and equipment be fettled settled in similar manner war council motto again the supreme war council began tta its third session january 30 at the opening session mr air lloyd george a statement in some detail of the situation on the allied fronts lie then spoke of the large number of enmities casualties tho allies bud bad puttered KUff cred during luring 1017 and in a very pointed manner declared that the costly offensives had bad produced no tangible results but instead Ini tend he said the allies now found them selves short of man power at a critical period of the war ills harp criticism was eil evidently dently dl di retted at sir douglas ilaug and general robertson but nelt neither hermas as given an opportunity to reply the military representatives pre dented a joint note with reference to military policy as directed at the december meeting and the opinion ghen fit en anns as identical nith alth that hat of the conference at corn com hegne january 24 and also tn in august angust at the meeter in parle paris except that the campaign under gen eral erial allenby then lu in progress lo 10 palestine should continue the joint note was we approved as its the decision of the council with the understanding as suggested by dy the arc french rich that do a vi bite troops should be ant from france to palestine it as decidedly the 0 cpin in ion of 11 clemenceau Clemence ou and of ail others present who expressed themselves that the war could not be ended until 1010 1019 when the american army it was thought would reach its maximum strength the allied forces at the moment were superior in nil all active fronts e I 1 L c pt in the bat Bal balkanas kans kana but the greek mobilization when completed would mould add sufficient lelent strength to ghe the allies alio there also the american strength nas as thea then negligible but the prospect was that we me should have a few more disis lovi ready for service by june and by september possibly 17 or the equivalent of 34 french divisions the danger on the western stern front lay in the continuous increase Ir crease of he file german forces and in their ability to concentrate tn to turn against the french find and british and as neither nelt lier had sufficient reserves of their on oan it as clear that unless some arran arrangement ement could be made between them for better coordination and support the war mar might easily be lost before the americans should arrive plan allied reserve the study of this problem by the military representatives led to an 11 1 1 GO 0 M 0 CHANN c erta C g e evris onn 44 Z roll 4 PARIS tou 1 res 0 aumont neuf eau le ma d E at curtil bif Z C rt st naza ir U 6 evrea dejori 1 tes bourges ourges neve 0 0 P A 11 la pallice 1 N 0 V rochefort 0 1 paull a basse lyord 7 A 11 beaus ram marseille PA at jq SEA towns and railroads used by the american army 9 gentral headquarters A ef EP belgian bigien sector 0 headquarters S 0 S Bat leUne p ench sector jg a ports porm railroads ma n lines 0 important towns secondary lines dounda atal 0 too M lea 6 forest ry I 1 representative for further tails talks at versailles N er sailles january 29 1018 all their arguments were met frankly and squarely after they had bad present cd d their case prime minister lloyd george e orge asked bliss fur for bis his views to lie replied Ter pershing shing will sl cak for us and whatever he says ft ith regard to the d tion of the american troops aill live my approval an agreement imire ement was then signed by mr air lloyd george general maurice and mi myself self as set forth in the following follon ling copy of the memorandum d submitted and later cabled to washington in order to meet the situation as presented by sir william hob rob ertson and hasten the arrival and training of troops it Is proposed that the british government use the available sea transportation in question f far bringing over the personnel of e alre divisions under the foll following oming conditions 1 I 1 that the infantry and auxiliary troops of these divisions be trained with british divisions by battalions under such plan as may be agreed upon 1 2 I that the artillery be trained under american direction in the use of french material as at pres ent 3 that the higher commanders comm inders and staff officers bo be assigned for training and experience alth ft ith corresponding units of the british army 14 4 that when sufficiently trained these the ze battalions be reformed into and that hen the artil lery Is fully trained all till the units con each be united uder u der their own olin officers leers off for service 15 5 that the above plan be car ried out without interference with ith the plans now in operation for bringing over american forces 1 0 that question of supply be arranged by agreement between other joint note which proposed a plan tor for the organization of a gen eral allied reserve it pro provided videl that the file british french and italian armies each set apart a certain number of divisions to institute ansti tute this reserve which would be called into action only in a great emer gency geney the discussion of this ques tion been rp acrimonious halg and retain petain both pointed out that they would be short of divisions very soon in case of severe fighting and presented figures on the subject that were mere very disturbing but the councils council a scheme was cut and dried the recommendations set forth in ali note were adopted then and there by the council the general rescue resme was created and its control was placed under an executive war board to consist of Cene generals rais roch representing the french chairman blits the americans cadorna the italians and a british general OM to be named at this meeting sir lloyd george designated gen sir henry allson as british representative to the jery ery evident disappointment of general gentral robertson Koh ertson ho vins pres ent at the session the selection of 11 allson vilson was nas regarded by the british high command and the war as open disapproval of their conduct of the mar ar it hai been said that the minter n inter of 19 IS 18 m was as the most se severe ere of the war the cold was at times so intense as to make the generally un heated houses barns and lofts used as billets nearly able the gloom of short days and long nights lights in the isolated and largely depopulated french villages can hardly be described then as me a have base seen there was also a shortage of heavy win ter clothing clot liing although frequent cables early in ill the fall had called attention to alf tl of a deficiency no doubt tha demands 4 m were renter greater than the quarte quart rim ermas ter deportment could meet but the relatively mall small number of troops in france going through the win ter under actual war conditions should have been given first trot con alde alteration ration much of the clothing that we received for our troop loop I 1 looked to be hoddy shoddy and leing tells light and thin of course offered insufficient pro lection left tec ton tion 11 ilie lie were met in part art by purchases from the British fi although our men did not tala kind ly to the idea of wearing the uni form of another nation and it as thith betth considerable protest and cha krin ran that they did so 10 until our oln on a could be supplied to the credit of our officer officers and men bo be it eald said that they generally ignored adverse conditions and barring borne some irritation at french methods and occasionally at our own they kept at their task tasks with commendable looking back over the dif lerent phases phase of the war I 1 regard that winter with its difficulties anxieties and apprehension for the future ns abo in most trying period of them all CHAPTER at the ports in france the amount of freight dl charged in january 1018 was more en courns ing being about two fifths as its much as during the preceding beien months the rate of discharge was accelerated to some extent by the better distribution of our irons trans ports by the navy more afore construe alon material was being delivered where it wits wa needed for port works and the future was somewhat |
