Show cae meral LL poe r s hie inas LL act JS rou of if the a A A E alli ja OF 0 v 1 1931 in ill all countries by the th north orah american newspaper alliance AU inc world o 0 Cler seral rights reserved the reproduction in whole or in nit nut i 1 john J pershing inq WW service 1 CHAPTER continued in making our dispositions fo tor r bat tie our older divisions the first sec see ond and forty second had received positions on the mout bouthern bern face opposite the open spaces to enable them to flank the wooded areas quickly thus aiding the advance of less experienced units assigned to these areas the whole line pivoting as planned on the eighty second division on the right advanced resolutely to the at tack the entire operation was car ried through with dash and precision by afternoon the troops had pushed beyond their scheduled objectives and by evening had reached the second day days 8 objective on moat most of the south ern front the fhe division of the fourth corps dickman and those on the left of the first corps liggett Ug gett overwhelmed the hostile garrisons and quickly over ran their gositt ns us carrying the fight ing into the open the german resist ance on this part of the front was dis organized by the rapid ty of our ad vance twice and was soon overcome al at though the enemy was expecting an attack he did not think it would take place so soon and it therefore came as a surprise when the first division on the marchin flank of the southern attack had broken through the hostile for ward positions the squadron of caa airy alry attached to the bourth corps was passed through the breach at 1 aa 40 p in it ed forward to reconnoiter recon the roads toward es but en countering machine guns in position was forced to retire western attack slower on the western face of the salient progress was not so factory the o 0 enty sixth d vision in its attempt to make a deep advance toward vigneulles Vigue Vigne ulles met cons demable resist ance knee and except for a battalion of the division reserve hid cot rot reached the days day s objective tl TI e french at the tip of the te salient I 1 ad attempted to follow up the flanks of our successful penetrations bit b it made only small advances upon the request of gen E J Blond Biond lat corn com mand ng rig the french second colonial corps a regiment of the eightieth dl di vision cronkite Cron Cronk kUte lite in reserve was tent sent to his assistance on the afternoon of the twelfth learning that the roads leading out of the salient between the two attacks were filled with eating enemy troops with their trains and artillery I 1 gave orders to the commanders of the fourth and fifth corps to push forward without delay using the telephone myself I 1 direct ed the commander of the fifth corps to send at least one regiment of the twenty sixth division toward vig Re neulles tilles with all possible speed that evening a strong force from the fifty first brigade pushed boldly forward and reached vigneulles Vigne ulles at 2 R 15 a in the it immediately made imade d lons that effectively closed the roads leading out of the salient west of that point in the fourth corps the second brigade of the first division advanced in force about dawn of the its leading elements reaching vigneulles Vigne ulles by 6 a in the salient was closed and our troops were misters of the field could have passed hindenburg line the troops continued to adrance on the when tie line tine was list ed approximately along the final objectives set tor for this off offensive ensiNe in view of tl it e favorable situation created create just west of tie tl e moselle river by our successes farther to the left a limited attack was as made on tl atiat at part of the front by elements of the ty sec see ond t nd ninetieth divisions with good results during the night our troops all abang the line were engaged in organ liln their new positions toi foi defense preparatory to the pitr krawal of di visions and corps s tor for pation in the meuse argonne battle september 14 15 and 16 local opera eions continued consisting of strong reemi inces and occupation of better ground for defensive purposes beg nning tt it e counter attacks were repulsed the line as finally established was claud omont amont I 1 resi es en doncourt jaulny saulny Vand leres reports rece received iNed the and indicated blat the enemy was retreat ing in considerable disorder without doubt an immediate continuation of the advance would have carried us well beyond the hindenburg line and possibly into metz and the tempha tion to press on was N ery great but we would probably have become deeply involved and delayed the greater meuse argonne operation to which we vie were v w I 1 oily olly committed during the fighting figi ting from september 12 to 10 the german one hundred and twenty fifth eighth landwehr lighty eighth and twenty eighth divisions re enforced the enemy s line and several other divisions arrived in reserve po sitione sit ions beaten her 10 in front of the first my I 1 ere were ten german divisions and two brigades in line ilde and sen seven en d N visions in reserve french OvAr overjoyed joyed by release learly early prisoners sones were taken and some 40 guns had fallen into our inda hinda h our casualties num bared about 7 As the enemy retreated he set fire to many large sup ply dumps and several villages the few remaining french inhabitants who found themselves within our lines were overjoyed to be released from the domination of the enemy but many were left destitute by the burning of their homes at the very moment of deliverance on the general petain came by my headquarters and we went to gether to st where the peo pie including children carrying french flags gave us a welcome which may well be imagined when one realizes that they had been held as prisoners entirely out of touch with their own countrymen for four years though al at ways within sight of the french lines line on my visit to several corps and dl vision headquarters the following day I 1 found all jubilant over the victory and overflowing with incidents of the fighting reciting many cases of andl vidual heroism among the troops CHAPTER in accordance with the under stani stan I 1 ing of september 2 we were now amov ing rapidly to vard our second great offensive questions concerning the concentration and supply of the elements of the first army in the battle areas were be ng rig worked out by the staff of tl atiat at army who were given ei en ery poss ble assistance by the staff at G 11 Q the general plan of action of the allied armies as agreed upon at the conference of commanders in chief july 24 was to state it simply and briefly that the offensive should con dinue each army driving forward rig a rapidly as possible the allied ani aril american operations during the sum mer had resulted in the reduction of the chateau thierry amiens and st sal salientes lents and the great offensive was now under way immediately west of the meuse river the battle line had remained practically unchanged since 1917 it was as on th s front the american aimy was to play its great part the disposition of the bel belgian beljan jan frit ish trench brench and american armies on the wide front between the north sea and verdun was such that they would naturally converge as they ad advance vancel L so long as the enemy could hold his ground on the east of this battle line frontal attacks farther west might drive him back on his successive post dons yet a decision would be long delayed yanks face strong position his main line of communication and supply ran through carignan Carl gnan sedan and Ue Me if that should be in before he could withdraw his armies from france and belgium the communications in the narrow avenue which lay between the ardennes forest and the dutch were so limited that he would be unable adequately to supply his forces or to evacuate evaluate them before his ruin would be accomplished As our object objective lie was the sedan carignan Carl gnan railroad it was evident that the sector assigned to the american army was opposite the most sensitive part of the german front then being attacked attached the danger confronting the enem enemy made it imperative that he should hold on in front of the american army to the limit of his resources germans strongly Forti fortified fed the area between the meuse river and tt tl e argonne forest was ideal for defensive fighting on the east the heights of the meuse commanded that river valley nalley and on the west the he raged high hills of the argonne argonde for est damli abed the valley of the aire river in the center the watershed between the aire and the meuse aleuse rivers commanded both valleys with tl e heights of montfaucon Mont faucon lunel ro mange and of the bols bois de standing out as natural strong polnar prom from these heights observation point completely covered the entire german front the terrain over which the attack was to be made formed a defile blocked by three successive barriers the heights of montfaucon Mont faucon then those of cunel bunel and and farther back the ridges of the bois de Bar barricourt ricourt and of the bols bois de bourgoyne the meuse river was the aire river fordable only in places in addi tion to the heavy forest of the ar gonne there were numerous woods with heavy undergrowth which were serious obstacles these natural defenses were strength ened by very artificial means able adease A dense network of wire entangle ments covered every position it was small wonder the enemy had rested four year on this front without being molested hindenburg position Is objective in accordance with tte tie principal mission which remained the same throughout this great offensive the flip main attack of the first army was to be launched west of the geue river its right to be covered by the river and by the operations of the french seventeenth corps on the east of the river that corps being a part of our army our left was to be supported by a simultaneous attack by the french fourth army our attack to include the argonne forest was to be driven with all possible strength in the gen eral direction of Mez leres the first operation of our army wa was to have for its objective the hinden burg position on the front sur meuse romagne sous montfaucon Mont faucon grand j e with a following development in the direction of buzancy Me in order to force the enemy beyond the meuse and outflank his position tlona on the vouziers Vou rethel line from the east in conjunction with our advance which would outflank the enemy s post tion south of the ainne the french fourth army by attacking successive successively the post positions eions between the ainne and the rivers would be able to occupy the line vouziers Vou rethel bethel after that it would operate in the direction of the plateau east cast of the rethel sig ny I 1 abbaye abbage road e tactically call aim at tactical surprise our purpose was to effect a tact tactical leal surprise if possible overcome the enemy s first and second positions in the area of montfaucon Mont faucon and cote dame marle of his third position before the enemy could bring up strong re enforce ments it was an ambitious plin and oi 01 e hat bat would require a rai ral id ld aan ad in e of ten miles through a densely fortified zone from in estimate of tie tl e enemy s reserves and their location it was realized that ve must capture montfaucon Mont faucon and cote dame marle marie by the end of the second day it was thought reasonable to count on the vigor and aggressive spirit of our troops to make male up in a measure for their inexperience but at the same time the fact was not overlooked that lack of technical skill might consider ably reduce the chances of complete success against well organized de fenders general petain had already oven tt it as his opinion that we should not be able to get farther than mont faucon before winter CHAPTER the meuse argonne offensive opened the morning of september 28 26 to call it a battle may be a misnomer yet it was a battle the greatest most prolonged in american history through 47 days we were engaged in a per sistena struggle with the enemy to smash through his defenses the attack started on a front of 24 miles which gradually extended until the enemy was as being actively assailed from the argonne forest to the mo selle river 90 miles in all more than 1200 were em ern aloyed and the attack was driven 32 miles to the north and 14 miles to the northeast before the armistice bated hostilities the outstanding ino fact that I 1 desire to emphes ze Is that once started the battle was maintained continuously aggressively and relentlessly to the endal difficulties were overridden in one tremendous sustained effort to terminate the war then and here there in q victorious manner 14 after three hours dolent ar artl llen nar atlon the attack attach begaii begau at 5 40 10 a ra at the same time to divert the enemy a attention elsewhere local raids and demonstrations were made on the meuse aleuse moselle front the french fourth army gouraud to our left on the west of the argonne forest began its attack half an hour later the battle opened favorably our attack at that particular place and at that time evidently came as a sur prise to the enemy and our troops were enabled quickly to overrun his forward positions f the vast network of undestroyed destroyed nn barbed wire the deep ravines dense woods and heavy fog made it difficult to ordinate coordinate the movements of the assaulting infantry especially of some divisions in battle tor for the first time timed yet the advance throughout was ex vigorous third corps reaches second line the third corps bullard nearest the meuse carried the enemy s sec see ond position before dark the thirty third division bell wheeling to the right as it advanced occupied the west bank of the meuse to protect the flank of the army the bols bois de forges with its difficult terrain and strong machine gun defenses was car ried in splendid fashion the right of the eightieth division cronkite had by noon cleared the bois jure in the face of heavy ma chine gun fire and established its line north of dannevoux on its left after an all day fight the division forced its way through the strong positions on hill and reached the northern slopes of that hill the fourth d vision I nines IInes on the left of the eightieth took Sept arges and firmly established itself in the woods to the north it was abreast of Nanti nantillois llois and its left was more than a mile beyond montfaucon Mont faucon but through some misinterpretation of the orders by the third corps the to capture montfaucon Mont faucon that day was lost three counter attacks against the division during the after noon were broken up fifth corps falls short in the center the fifth corps cam eron with the exception of the ninety first division johnston on its left fell short of its objectives the seventy ninth division kuhn on the right of the corps took malan court but in the open ground beyond encountered considerable opposition and the advanced elements were not in position before Mont montfaucon faucon until late afternoon the attack of the di dl vision launched against this strong point early in the evening was met by the fire of artillery and machine guns from the southern slopes of the hill which held up further progress the thirty levente division farns worth in the center of the fifth corps after overcoming heavy ma chine feun gun fire pushed through the the bols bois de montfaucon Mont faucon and its at tacks in the afternoon carried the line up to and west of montfaucon Mont faucon the left of its line facing stiff opposition cleaned up the woods in its front and established itself just south of ivoury va a verdu oda a Q 0 if 2101 qt ST MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 11 11 J o 14 0 SEPT 1216 12 16 1918 W 0 Q 0 2 a a 3 qa 0 a I 1 gw a 1 RV F atom daae MR akiua 12 11 24 A 3 aa a 10 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