Show 0 geme CS R ir kan M ig 9 6 0 0 st OTY of the A efa copyright 1931 in all countries by the north arneri by fisli Ger wais seral can newspaper New paper alliance world right rights reserved reier ved woj include ag ng the scand anavian Re product on in whole ft joldoff neww Jol or in part aroh b bled ted service CHAPTER LIV cont aued TI tie e TI airty ti ir I 1 division cell bell was still with the baltish wien wl en tie corn coin bained attick of tie baltish r f and tl ti e friench fi ench first armies in the dier albert sector be began an au all bust just 8 tl TI e d v ision islon was in front line training tia ining with the british I 1 army and was attached to the british third corps for the operation the one livin dred and tl TI airty first regiment of in fantry being assigned to the british I 1 efty eighth division th s regiment joined in the attack august 9 against the Mor Alor lanco chipilly Chi pilly spur north of tl e somme ft it reached its objectives in asplend d fashion and led a line on the w western estern edge of gressmire Gres Gress saire alre wood extend ng southward ward along the river august 10 it continued to progress against decided appos tion gaining the eit e intern erD edge of the forests of fosse and marcon during the following three days the command having been shifted the one hundred and tl TI airty first infantry under the australian fourth division attained a line just west est of bray sur coninie the three other regiments w ere in reserve during the operations the one hundred and thirty first was relieved august 20 having adNall advanced eed over three miles and suffered heavy casualties I 1 motored to the british front sun day to be i resent at thirty third dl dt vision headquarters near moll ens aux bois on the occasion of the visit of king george who was then vis vig ting his armies general bl BI ss had pre ceded me and we both spent the night there tl TI at evening general bell relating the details of the participation of his troops with tl e british said their services I 1 ad been urgently re quested and thit they hid md acq aca i eted themselves well king george bestows decorations the king alrh ed aug 19 to pre gent sent decorations to selected men of the tl airty third dai division islon n who ho had in the recent attacks of the brit ish army soon after his arrival the birg invited general bliss and me to his room where he presented me with tl e grand cross of the order of the rath bath and bestowed tie tt e order of st mid ael and st george on general bl BI ss rie 1 e presentations wei e in formic as the king simply handed the decor it ons to us in turn at tl e same time expressing his appreciation of american as ass stance we then accompanied the Is it ng to tl ti e place tl e men were as em bled for tl e carem ny tie ile was gra cious in his compliments as I 1 e p nned lined the decorations on our men and the recipients were extremely proud CHAPTER LV the final decision that tl if e firs first american army would undertake the reduction of the st mihiel went il lent a its first operation was wis transmitted I 1 army headquarters august 10 an i the arn y stiff dimmed abely began tl ti e de of plans for the c n cen trail n of tl e necessary troops f r its execution it vas was certain the psychological el feet on the enemy of our success in this first operation by the american army as well as on the all es oar our own troops and our people at home w uld be of great in the attack must ta tte aref re not only succeed but a serious hostile reaction must be made imp isible the hea I 1 quarters ju arters of tl e I 1 arst army were rein bcd to abeau be tu tween een august 13 11 and 16 the special army troops assembled north of cl eteau thierry were ere moved east ward during the same period composition Compo sitio i of first army the t f allowing corps and divisions were placed at the of the first army for the st ahiel D and tl 0 air cond tion u ay y be iced as follows ta tte e ia arst and second divisions w ere excellent as to train ng equipment ai at d 0 rale they I 1 lad ad attacked I 1 july IS 18 in the I dr e the 1 ird fourth twenty sixth and forty porty second divisions v were ere of fine line morale and cons deaibe expert ence as they had fought in the de tense about chateau Ili lerry and in the advance toward the vesle river I 1 lie I 1 e plat fialty ty ninth and ninetieth div illy irions were going through tl air sector train ng on the front between beaw een toul toni and the moselle river and the fifth and thirty fifth divisions were tak ng their sector training in tl ti 9 e the thirty third seventy eighth eightieth and eighty second divisions had been training be bel ind the british front one brigade of the I 1 I 1 airty third having had front frontline line service with the british and the ninety first division rad tad never I 1 leen een in the front line and had received less than tour four weeks training in france M stead ng the germans ahe circulation of brool s in tl e st mihiel area natural ly attracted the attention of tl e peo pie and of ti tie e officers and sold solders ers albl ugh c against such d ds s cession the ty of an amer lean attack on the salient was d s cussed here and there to divert the enemy s att attention eption from our real objective it was feces sary first to create some incerta nty in the rr ands of our own tr ops aps tl e rumor vias therefore started around i t headquarters ead tead quarters that our first offensive maht be in the direction of 0 mul house in the rhine villey beyond the moun mounta tans ns northeast of bel fort it was also decided to make a dl di version in that direction an I 1 as a prel step an was sent to lease build in belfort at the same time i i confidential instructions w were ere sent malor major general bundy pom com manding tt e sixth corps to proceed to belfort with a hi ill cited staff and pre pare detailed plans for an offensive with the object f bezing se zing and the he gats to the east and eventually estabi sl ng our line along tl e rh ne in I 1 tl e letter of instructions seven divis ons were mentioned as having been designated for the attack and three officers from s i cb eb of tl ese ui its were detailed to report to a veneral bundy to assist in the recon ais als sance he ws wis d reeled to expedite the vv rk of preparation tion as the mover moer ent w uld probably pro batly bally begin Sep 8 under my personal command an attack by the tenth army begun august 9 1918 1018 was vas un der taken talen to force tl it e retirement of the enemy from tl e vesle and ainne rivers on its rel ef from the vesle august 7 the thirty second davist n alaan was assigned to the tenth army and entered tie tl e line august 28 immediately undertaking a series of local operations in which gilts g gill s were ere made in tl tie e lace of very heavy fire ire ravines and numerous caves canes in the region provided ideal cover for the defending troops the general attack of the army the following day met I 1 it slight success the enemy res stina desi irately al i I 1 Is entire front but on the bv i flank attack aiom the uth tt if e thirty second division capture 1 J ji I 1 v vigny pushing a sn all sal e eit it into tl e germin germ in lines hard fight fig litin lne continued august 31 but by the end of the day tie tl e thirty hirty ra second had ceacle re acle u the imp so st Q bontin roa I 1 where t 11 was relieved bei bel ten her ber 2 tl TI e I 1 i second division had advanced nearly uearl three miles and its success c i trib buted greatly to the forcel w thi of the german line to the aisne aasne river ng takes over sector As prearranged pr between general petain and myself the sector tr fr in port sur se lie ile east of the al selle river to katr anille in n ith of les I 1 sp arges forty two miles in extent then occupied by tl e entire french eighth army and a I 1 art of tl e I 1 second army was transferred to my command on august 30 10 the front included the st salient which was between tl ese po ate and embraced the permanent fortresses around toul toni tt e had three divisions in line on the south face of tl e sector but the maas of our I 1 battle troops would not tale oer one ire tt trenches until the nl 1 l t before the attack foch springs surprise august 30 the day I 1 pd ed corn coin mind of the sector alar marshal bal foot foel ac compan ed by general his cl lef of stiff came to my res lence at ligny bligny en barrois and after the il cord al exchange of greetings presented an entirely new plin for the ue use of the an er can arn y tie tl e marb marchal lial bean by saying that the german arn es were tn in rn in re or less disorder aro from recent attacks by ta tie e allies and that w ve e must not allow them to reora reorganize niLe and tt at the tho brit nit would cont nue their attack in the direction of af cambrai and st quen tin and the french t ard nard mesnil FI 1 en much to my surprise I 1 e proposed that the objectives in the st al I 1 el operation be restricted and the attack made on the southern face only and that upon its completion two oti er operations be undertaken by con bained american ind french a number of our divis ons going under french command pershing ins ats on U S army I 1 repeated wl at I 1 had of often ten said tl at tt e american government and people expected the army to act as a unit and not be dispersed in tl is way 4 ilk A 1 I 01 4 N 4 4 4 their way into a farmstead I 1 pointed out th thit it eich time we ft ere i bout to c mi ml lete the orani oranti tion of our army some prop sitton ike 1 be this vas as presented to prevent it the d scission seus slon wis s mew hat heit ed and much of it was carr ed on so rabidly tait it could not be brits arii s he tie continued to reiterate chiq hl demands for the adopt n of his plan but I 1 hit hie ie le arned that it was vins nees sary to be very firm in deal ng with him and I 1 finally said in effect NI rt 1 foci foel S u haie no au an tt only as all ed commar der in chief to call upon me to bield up my corn coin mand of the army to td die e it scat tere I 1 an ong the allied forces wl I 1 ere it will w III not be an an army at fit all he ile aas fly surprised at my resents ent of his attempt to coi coz fine american effort to sub roles and said I 1 mu t ins st upon tl e ar aar gement to which I 1 replied as ve both rose I 1 ou may ins st all you please but I 1 decline absolutely to agree to bour our plan while our army will fight you may decide it will no DO fight except as an amer lean army he ile sai I 1 ie I 1 e was disposed to do what he coull coul I 1 toward f rm ng an an army he ile tt en picked up his maps I 1 mi n I 1 papers and left ery very pile and ap parent ly exhausted saying at the door doot as be he me the memorandum ul 01 his pr 1 etsal sal tl at he thought thai that after careful sauly I 1 I 1 should arrive al at the same con clust n he had agreement Is reached my ly chief of staff general nican v and clief cl cef if i f 01 s bo t ov conr er were sent to confer w fit wey gin aind d Sel september I 1 and returned rebun ed to uny en barrens with word that mar alar sl SI al foh desired to see general I 1 e rain tain and me the foll fol lowin day motoring to I 1 etain s headquarters with loyd O and de Marc enches we found ecat drew and conner had bad prece lel lei us and after lunch we went to bom bon opening the conference foch re berred to the note I 1 e had handed me au agoust 30 and to my reply and asked my f cervati ter vati ns us g my ie le on tie tt e desirae lity of carrying out dorous lt orous off offer ei sl N es to the f fullest III lest pos sil sille ae extent I 1 explained that if it should be deemed necessary necess iry to aban don clon the st project in order to the larger offensive which was understood to be west of the meuse I 1 would abide by bis his decision in the ensuing discussion while there was as considerable sparring it was as agreed the an army sh uld I 1 erate as a unit under its ow own n corn coin man ler on oil the meuse argonne tr fr nt marshal foh concluded that the I 1 te I 1 f r the operation sh uld be post boned so we could first carry out the tin ted attack at st mil AM lei we final ly react ed the definite understand ing that after st mihiel our first army sh uld prepare to begin this second offensive not later than september 25 CHAPTER tie fast aricy am attacked yesterday and the reduction of tl ti e st michlel sal ent Is con reads my diary of september 13 written at ligny bligny en barrels our troops behaved splendidly the secretary of war visited two corps I 1 ead quarte s returned to ligny bligny much deigl ted at oar success petain and I 1 went to the town of bt t michlel today and were warmly greeted by the people this Is my birtt day and a very happy one the rhe attach attack of the infantry on the southern face of the st michlel salient started at five in the morning and before that I 1 went with several staff officers to old fort rort Gir gironville onville situated on a command ng height overlooking the battlefield from the south the secondary attack on tt ti e west was launched at 8 a in as an element of surprise for artillery preparation there weather gives advantage A g rain and mist prevented us from getting a clear view but the progress of our troops could be fol I 1 1 N e I 1 by tt e barrage which preceded tt ti em ding a heavy rain fall the night of september 11 12 the weather gave us an advantage as the 1 i 1st artly screened our alvance from tie tl e enemy overcome entanglements blanks tl anks to the thorough preparation bafo eland et and the wire entanglements entangle ments were more easily o overcome than we had expected trailed trail ed teams of pioneers and find en ginders with bangalore ba bal galore torpedoes wire cutters and axes assisted in 0 opening pening gaps in the masses of barbed w wire ire covering the german position posit loi iol s the ie le d ng s tl it em selves carried a along long r M lib of chicken wire which was thrown vm across entanglements here and there forming formin a kind of bridge for tt it e infantry in all tl ei off offu ci sh es the allies had spent davs destroying entanglements with artillery fire or had used a large number of heavy tanks but we had only a few light tanks ineffective tor for such work tl TI e fact that we had si st tl pred ered the enemy artillery wis an id vantage as it enabled the leading leadin wives wines deliberately to do tl ti air work w phout serious loss the quick passage through these en tangle ments by our troops excited no little surprise among the french who sent a large number of officers and noncom n officers to st mihiel several daas later to sec see how it had bad been done one of tl ese officers after his reconnaissance remarked in all ser er husne ausness that the Amer americans lans had tie tl e a advant d v a nt ge over frenchmen because of their long legs logs and large feet TO BE CONTINUED verr L N Y plan of attack of first army sept 12 1918 1318 i x axim jump off I 1 ne morn ng sept lath a t bonville ron ville front I 1 nes sept lath and sept w t 0 0 army boundary S 9 axx al corps boundary arrows me ind cafe cate d on and we ghi of attack 5 arab c numerals ind cate D v s ons roman numerals nd cafe cate corps V 0 6 5 e 1 K 4 1 N 0 t iret S 4 loyy fa u or de dl 0 o i 04 1 jor 0 3 W i 1 V bercourt em PT chiau r ra aes i r 3 1 e l V A 3 ai 1 no sa rd 1 fj zv i go athiel 0 montsec csecs iv Z pont a mosso mosson 01 r V ta limey i I 1 e 4 chepley I 1 f 6 r r 0 ir y i L ma 4 i W wow r nf |