Show Lie beneral sioto o of the in A A E F ro copyright la in all 11 ll countries b by ibe 0 north american Nw nipper alliance world bil Ce beneral wn ii right hs reserved the scandinavian reproduction in whole orin service john j j pershing inq CHAPTER continued I 1 stated that but few of the allied authorities seemed to real ze that american participation would depend upon the amount of shipp ng available tor for the transportation of our troops and that the time when they would be needed was near at hand As there had been some reference to amalgams amal gama tion I 1 also took occasion to emphis ize the point that ne expected as a mitter matter of course that the american arny arn would have its own front as an independent foice and not be used merely as a reserve to be sent here and there one insuperable reason I 1 sat u I 1 why we could not amalgamate with the was the difference in language and I 1 added that we would not use our troops in that way at all unless it be came absolutely necessary I 1 then discussed our problems call ing attention to the delays at the french ports and our shortage of rail transportation and tousled ed on the tbt backward state of procurement of of equipment munitions and airplanes thea the all appeared surprised to learn of our d especially gei get eral foch although even as chief f the general staff he apparently could not interfere in matters handled directly by the ministry it was astonishing to find how little comprehension an aw of them had of the en amous task that confronted the americans foci said none of these questions has been referred ta me whereupon petain retain retorted that one should sl not wait until such things are brouil t to his attention but should look around and find them petain retain added at once that he would send an official to study our situation and haig later sent one of his officers who offered many sue sug gest lons ions out his dav own n ex perlene e it was the sense of the conference that every assistance should be given us in getting our troops across and all seemed fully to realize that no sue offensive could be undertaken without them bliss favors british plan s with general robert son contin ed the next day at the crillon brillon hotel in paris with general bliss present the same arguments were repeated in favor of incorporate ing american units into british divis ions and general bliss expressed him self in favor of the robertson plan I 1 was forced to declare myself then and there my stand was not quite what robertson Il had expected and tl e meet ing adjourned with the position of all concerned no longer in doubt general bliss and I 1 met later by appointment to talk the matter over be tween ourselves and if possible come to an understanding after some ds d s cession he suggested that each of us cable his views to was wasl ington and ask for a decision it was not my policy then or at any other time to put any thing up to washington that I 1 coull possibly decide myself this would have been the last thing to do in this case especially as the secretary had left in my hands the de termination as to how our troops should be employed for two men in our positions to have appealed in this way would have indicated a clash and washington had enough trouble be sides bides tte tie secretary could not possible have been sufficiently in touch with the undercurrent of these negotiations to make a wise decision so I 1 said veil well bliss do you know what would happen if we should do that we would both be relieve I 1 from further duty in france and that Is exactly what we ave should deserve we then spent some time exam the question float all angles until finally he came around to my view an and d said I 1 think you are right and I 1 shall back you up in the position yo you u have taken CHAPTER once general bliss and I 1 had reached an understanding as to our attitude toward amalgamation of our troops with the british he gave me his support in later conferences wl en ell we saw the british representatives for burtler talks at versailles january 29 1918 all their arguments were met frankly and squarely after they had present ed their case prime inister M nister I 1 loyd george asked bliss for his views to wl ich tell he replied pershing will speak for us irs and whatever he be says with regard to the disposition of the american troops will 1 I have my approval an agreen ent was then signed by mr air lloyd george general maurice and myself as set forth in the follow ing copy of the me morand im submit ted and cabled to wash agton in order to meet the s tuition is as presented by sir william robertson and find hasten the arrival and training of troops it is ased that the british government use the available sea transportation in question for bring ing over tl ti e personnel of entire divi under the following cond eions I 1 ahat the infantry and auxiliary troops of these divisions be trained with british divisors divis divi sons ons by battalions under such plan a as may be agreed upon 2 that the artillery be trained un mer ai at er iu direction in tl e use of 0 I 1 rend n nat a erial as at present 3 ra 1 al at the hiher commanders and staff officers be assigned for train ing and experience with corresponding units of the british army 4 that wt en trained these battalions be reformed into regi ments and that when the artillery is fully trained all the un ts comprising each davison divis on be united under their own officers for service 5 atiat TI at tie ile above plan be carried out ditl out interference with the plans now in operation for bringing over american forces 6 that question of supply be ar ranged by agreement between the brit and american commanders in ct cl let lef 7 that question of arms and equip ment be settled in similar manner war council meets again the supreme war council begin began its third session january 30 at the open in ing session mr floyd george made a statement in some detail of the situa tion on the billed fronts he ile spoke of the large number of casual ties the all es had suffered durin during and in a very cry pointed manner declared that the costly offensives had pro deuced no tang ble results but in stead he said the all es now found themselves short of man power at a critical period of the war his its sharp criticism was evidently directed at sir douglas haig and general robertson Robert sor but neither was given an opportunity to reply the military representatives pre dented a joint note with reference to military policy as directed at the de cember meeting and the op nion given was identical with that of the confer ence at january 24 an X 0 to 1 t W 4 A 0 pershing in tin hat also in august at the meeting in pans pars excel t that the campaign under gen eral allenby then in progress in pal estine should continue it will be re called that these two tavo informal confer ances of commanders in cl el let lef had c it eluded thit tl e allies should remain on the defensive on all fronts until tie tt e americans should arrive in sufficient force to warrant the offensive see no end of war until 1919 the joint note was approved as tl e decision of the council with the under stand ng as suggested by the french that no white troops should be sent from france to Pi lestine it wis was decad edly the opinion of at clemenceau and of all others present who expressed themselves that the war aar could not be ended until 1919 alen wl en the american irmy army it was thought would reach its maximum strength the allied forces at the moment vere superior in all active fronts ex capt in the balkans but the I 1 reel in A when alien lien completed would add sufficient strength to give the allies the advantage there also the america i strength was nos then negligible but the prospect was that we sl al out I 3 hav e a few divis ons ready for service by june and by september possibly sev lenteen or the equivalent of thirty tour four french divis oi 01 s the danger on the western front lav in the continuous increase of the ger man forces and in their ability to con cen in turn against the french and british and as beitl er had dent clent reserves of their own tt it was clear that unless some arrangement could be made between them for bet ter coord co ordination ord nation and support the war in easily be lost before the ameri amerl cans should arrive plan all ed reserve the study of this problem by th military representatives led to another joint note wl ich tell proposed a plan for the organization of a gei get eral allied reserve it provided that the british french and ital an armies sl each set apart a certa corta it number of divisions to constitute this reserve which would be called into action only in a great emergency I 1 he a scission of this quest on became acrimonious haig and petain retain both pointed out that they would be short of divisions very soon in case it f severe fighting and present ed figures on the subject tl at were very it d stubbing bing cut but the council councils s scheme was cut and dried the recommendations set forth in the note were adopted then and tl if ere by the council the general reserve was created and its control was placed under an executive war board to consist of generals koch I 1 och rei resenting the french chairman bliss the americans cadorna the italians and a british general officer to be named at this meeting mr air lloyd george georte dest designated bated gen sir henry wilson as the british representative to the very evident disappointment of general robertson who was present at the session the selection of wilson was re carded by the british high command and the war office as open disapproval of their conduct of the war winter of 1917 18 most severe it has been said that the winter of 1917 18 was the most severe of the war the cold was at times so intense as to make the generally unheated houses barns and lofts used as b fleth nearly uninhabitable the gloom of st ort days and long nights in the iso and largely depopulated french villages can hardly be described then as we have seen there was also a sa s1 s cortage of heavy winter cloth ing although frequent cables early in the fill pill had called attention to the probability of a deficiency no Is doubt the demands were ivere greater than the quartermaster department could meet but the relatively small number of troops in france going through the winter under actual war conditions should have been given first consider atlon much of the clothing that we received aein ed tor for our troops looked to be shoddy and being light and thin of course offered insufficient protection the cefic eccles were met in part bv by purchases from the british although our men did not take kindly to the te idea of wearing the uniform of adoth er nation and it was with consider able protest and chagrin that they did so until our own could be supplied to the credit of our officers and men be it said that they generally ignored adverse cond eions and barring some irritation at french methods and occa s anally at our own they kept at their tasks with commendable de tion looking back over the d efferent phases of the war I 1 regard that win ter with its difficulties difficult les anxieties and apprehension for the future as the most trying perikl perio 1 of them all CHAPTER at the ports in france the amount of freight discharged in january 1918 was more encouraging being about two fifths as much as during the preceding seven months the rate of d s charge was accelerated to some extent by the better distribution of our trans ports by the navy more construction material was being delivered where it av was as needed for port works and the fu ture was somewhat clarified in this respect by the arrival of additional log ging machinery during the month there was also an increase in creise in troop shipments including some elements of the thirty second haan s division A with ith 20 men for the service of supply bv by the end of january approximately combat troops 34 engineer troops and 61 others for the service of supply were in france albl ough promising tl it is av as only the merest start as we were still far behind our schedule it must be added however that the tru increase crease in the arrivals of men and materials remained haphazard hap haard and not at all in the proportions needed it continued apparent that my recommendations were not accepted in an altogether unhesitating spirit of helpfulness and that the serious neel for executive leadership back home had not been met my d ary notes the following chaumont monday february 18 1918 general foch and major general aisted vis ted head quarters thursday had luncheon with us u and examined the general staff organization captain todd d rector of naval construction came to confer regarding wireless Alre less stations at bordeaux left friday spent saturday and sunday visiting first division in ansauville Ans auville sector inspected in fantry in front line trenches and the artillery called on general debeney french first army returned this morning stopp ng n at aviation park Colom levies ev les pelles maj arthur I 1 age corn com manding camouflage work ex well done I 1 assed through affracourt Mir Affra acourt court to see general de Ca castelnau steinau who s higl ay iy of our troops foch cold to U S problems Preb lems As general I 1 och tl en ell chief of the french general staff had sh wn some sui sut prise v when hen at it tie e allied meeting at tit comp agne in january I 1 told of the de lays and difficulties we were having at the ports and in the operation of rail wavel i a s I 1 invited him to make a visit to my headquarters hoping to put him in touch with our activities e had already reached a state of development that confirmed the sound ness of our organization and could forecast its ability to meet all requirements I 1 went with him to the various sections section of the general staff and while he expressed no opinion about what he saw his aide and spokesman general eyland a staff officer of experience was very complimentary foch never seemed interested when I 1 talked with him of our problems and I 1 doubt whether he ever thought knew or cared much about organization or questions of transportation and supply he was essentially a student and a teacher of history and strategy treated like mendicants Mendi cants there continued to be considerable cause to find fault with the attitude and methods of french bureau officials apropos the experience of many of our officers I 1 recall that one of the most efficient on duty at a very imbor tant port once said to me general the trouble is that these dubord nite wite french officials in imme d ate charge are either so hidebound hide bound or else so conceited that it would be as easy to convince a greek statue as to make one of them understand how flow in the world it happens sir that we do so nell NN ell I 1 do not see here we vie have come miles to help them and yet we are treated like mendicants on the street corner hold bold ing a tin cup for passing pennies I 1 know sir that operation cooperation la Is necessary if we hope to win the war but it requires an excessive effort on our part with more failures than oth berwise to our cred t this was harsh comment but there were times in n the experience of most officers when it seemed to fit the case ease fairly well avell off cers found lax with reference to the inspection trip noted in my d ary I 1 had recently in specter several stations like vittel and bourbonnie Bour bonne les baing bains which were corn com banded by regular officers of whom naturally much was expected but be fore the world IN orld war our army had al at ways been more or less careless in dress and none too strict when in the field and these men were no exception to the rule even higher commanders were often found neglectful of their appearance and lax in the enforcement of disciplines but the conditions of service in france demanded more |