Show Se merali q dallace 8 story of flae A ea 0 copyright 1931 1 all countries by the north amerl by generth c a a N e alliance world rights reserved I 1 n c 1 u d in ag the scand anavian Re product on in whole or in part prohibited service CHAPTER continued As tl e s tuition in wl ich v e found ourselves regard ng artillery ammini tion was approach approaching ang a crisis it became necessary to lay the whole ques tion before the file munitions 4 board after a full investigation of their resources both the french an I 1 british concluded that ti ey could un f bertal e to meet our re quiren ants with ith the distinct understanding that their plants must be greatly increased in i P lacity and that we should furnish r raw w materials promptly the late gen tasker 11 bliss chiet of the alar department general staff represented us in the allied conference and reported results and a agreements ree ments reached he had brought the latest data from home and his knowledge concerning steel and mun eions enabled him to give valuable ass stance to my chief of ordnance in our efforts to find a solution to the difficult munitions problem A letter from secretary of N war var baker dated september 10 had only recently been received and gave gane me we an idea of some of his problems in part he wrote as follows I 1 am especially concerned tl it it our troops should not be in actu al at fighting in france until thea the are tl ti ere in such numbers and have hav male such thorough preparation tl at tt air first appearance will be anoura en encourage oura ng both to their own ovin morale and to the spirit of our people here I 1 think it goes without saving that the germai 9 will make a very special effort to arile strike swiftly and strongly against any part of the line which we undertake to defend in order to be able to report to their people encourage about our participation and also with the object of discouraging our sold ers and our people as much as possible in the matter of selecting corps and division commanders I 1 constantly feel that I 1 ought to have your advice and judgment from all tl ti at you have eald said supplemented by all I 1 have learned elsewhere the need for youn young and physically strong men Is apparent and I 1 am perfectly will ng to go anc limit in meeting this i 1 rement it will of course necessitate pass ing over a substantial number of our older generals who are very eager to go to france and who ho in their own ideas and that of the country have certain right to be preferred but tl ti air occupation here in the training of troops Is of course a valuable con trib ution to the cause and wl enever I 1 can feel sure in tl ti e selection of the younger man that he actually has the capacity to den develop elop to a clent ex tent to justify his being preferred to a it man of greater experience I 1 shall not hes tate mob klizing of army delayed in view of the emergency that was so clearly set forth by tl it e joffre and balfour in solons wl en they visited the united states and which was con firmed after my arrival in france an I 1 reported with ith all emphasis I 1 have hane never been able to understand the un no necessary delay caused by waiting six months for the construction of large cantonments beaole calling out mea men and assembling tl em for training of course it was particularly urgent flat tl at the specialists and laborers need ed in france to build up our facil facilities itle should have haie been provided as fast as s they could be i employed but nothing should have postponed the im mediate mobilization of the combat units of the regular army and the na lional guard CHAPTER tl TI e units of the twenty s rth dl vision maj gen clarence edwards commanding command ng bean to arrive tie tl e lat at ter part of september continued dur ing october and the early part of no vember and were mere now assembled in the billeting area near Neut Neuf chateau I 1 inspected the d N vision islon non Novem deml lei ei 11 II 1917 and found tl it e vano varlo is or presented a very cred t able appearance ile 1 e off officers cers seemed alert and mil tary and the personnel looked strong and ii vigorous orous tl TI e r in st ruction had been carried out under the direction of brigada er general traub oneff one of tl e brigade commanders and seemed to be well advanced the probable situation as ag to man power in which tl e all es would find themselves in the spring was causing much solicitude the germans had captured riga in september keren heren sky s power was at an end and tl P bolshevik government was mas established with I 1 lenin enin and in control the situation was as such that russia had become entirely negligible as far as assistance to the allies was con berned an analysis of the possible streng ti i of the contestants showed that ger many would be able to spare pare a consid erable number of divisors divis divi sons ons from the russian front careful study by mv my staff in operation cooperation with the albel all e i staffs had led to the conclusion that her total number in tl ti e west by spring would be as miny as not counting the possie lity of the added strength of forty eight divisions from austria tl TI e greatest number the all es could muster accod d ng to estimates would be dh Is ot s counting two ameri arnert tin i n iti ili 13 1 could not be counted on to do more than barely aid ld her own even with the help of the eleven allie I 1 divis ons tl en on that front other american divis ons might pos sibly be in europe by may 1 it if they should arrive accord ng to schedule which was doubtful but they would be too late to participate in the expected early spring campaign at tl ti e low rate ot of arrival we ve should not have more tl an I 1 alt alf of the twenty one dl di visions promised by the war depart ment ready for serece sen ice by june outcome depended on amenta ameri a in tl Is war where the bittle battle lines extended across entire countries and in which the of the appo cents were about equal the aspect largely resolved itself into a consideration of the number and loca alon of din divisions ismons on eitl er side 1 tahe he situation was of such a character thil it was a q which side could provide the superiority of forces net essary to success in other words the outcome would depend upon the nuni num ber her of troops that america could send over oner all eyes were on the eastern front to allied statesmen the collapse of russia meant poss ble grav grai e political consequences to ta tie e allied command fers it forecast the release of division sand the increase in the enemy s ranks in belgium and northern france to a prel tl at could not be overcome to us it indicated a race between america e bet bea effort to pour our fighting men into france and germany germanys s best deter mi min atlon nation to crush the all es t afore our out sold ers could arrive in sufficient num bers hers to dominate the battlefield faced defeat with all es our estimates of the shipping foi troops and supplies as set forth in the plan by which a due prop proportion option of combat and line of communication troops were to form such increment of s x d visions would require by june 1 for the shipment of twenty four di dl visions a total of over 2 tons io no one seemed to know where we wc were to obtain the 14 tons f shipping in add alon to the COO tons we were vere then supposed to be using it appeared almost certain tt if en that should d befall the allied armies that under these cond lions we would have to go down with tl ti em I 1 always felt certain however that tonnage could be found for our pur pose if it the necessary preg pressure sure were exerted to force ft it into use appeals were made continuously and persis 1 70 9 3 N 1 va ix aan 1 M aw A X TV wl I 1 J 7 4 07 4 general pershing V s ts the king and queen ot of beig belg im lm bently in an effort to get action on tt ti Is vital question but several months month elapsed before it really came taken as a vlode the apparently slow ess of air preparation in europe also caused considerable ad verse comment it not d amona among the allies inquiries were made dl erectly by tl e military and civil officials as to why we did not move more rapidly to which the reply was as al at ways lack of shipp ng new brit sh offensive immobilized by the mud of flanders where here brit sh attacks had continued intermittently from the end of july to the in addle of Noi november ember with rati raft er excess excessive lve losses the british command er in chief turned to a more souti erly portion of h s I 1 ne for the final offen sive of tl it e year cl oos ng tl it e cam bral brat front on v m h ch eh to launch tl ti e ef fort careful pre ons include ng n tle tl e concentration of an unusual num ber her of tanks wire made to insure a break tl ti rough tl e enemy s defenses the tanks and the infantry to make an opening through which the cavalry was to pass and attack the flanks of the enemy then french troops held in read ness in the vicinity were to follow As to the question of command of these combined forces when both should become engaged I 1 it was to be left to the senior general officer in the vicinity who in be either french or brit sh sli in going over oner these plans it seemed to me that tl e r idea of securing to operation after the french should begin bartic pation was rather vague during the day we first went to visit general byng command ng the third am arn y who explained further details of the attack and the progress already n ade ile and his chief of staff were busy recel receiving Ning news aiom the front and felt that all was vv as going well british victory spurs all es tl TI e attack was made on a six mile front and the british hid had the addan tage from tl it e outset the sudden de bouch ment of the long line of tanks closely followed by the infantry all without the usual warning of long pre artillery bombardment corn COW surprised the germans the tani tant s broke m wide ide gaps in the wire and subdued tl it e mad mael ine gun nests al at ling the infantry through the defenses with a minimum of loss the front was rather narrow con si dering the depth of the objectives A maximum gain of some four and a half miles was secured the first day and a greater result was prevented it was as said by a serious check to tt tie e tanks at for some reason or other the french were not called li it to action but presumably it was because the british cavalry which was to precede them could not go fori forward vird as planned the off offensive enslie continued tw fr two or three days longer with varying success it was ho however Niever a decided victory and chile not as great as the BrIt british Ih ex pecked it gave encouragement to the all es on the western front and no doubt helped to offset temporarily tie tl depress ng effect of the serious defeat recently sustained by tl tt e italian army CHAPTER an kmer american ican miss on headed by col P al house arrived in france lowarl the end of november for an conference other members of tie tl e mission were ere admiral NN S benson denson cen tasi er H bliss ch eh ef of staff ocar T crosby tor for the treasury de pirt ment N ance mccormick chair man of the war trade board lain badge br dge colby slipping sh aping board bo ird alonzo G 0 taylor thomas N perkins war mar in lus tries and taul laid cravath As the representatives of d efferent nat onal ties gi gathered in paris recent reports of decreasing losses of ocean ocein tonnage and greater destruction of german submarines with prospects ts of still faither improvement seemed to give ghe more of 1 hopefulness in ue tie gen eral s tuat on an I 1 all ed spirits were at revived the brit sh I 1 ad won at and were biking satisfactory pr grass ress in bleir tl air advance on jerusalem which it vi as aid would be fac by tl ti e use of their ne nev v base at jaffa tie tte ital ans seemed to have recovered rec overe I 1 their morale to a limited extent with the stiffening of their I 1 nes by british and friench divi divisions ions and had success fully held tl ti e r own aga ast the aus trian attack on the I 1 bave not the least hopff it th ng m was as the step just taken toward un ty of coin cow mand in the creation of the subren e war mar council but the decisive factor in the vi folole I 1 ole s tuat on if it could be utilized in linie wis the tre tremendous econom cal cat and pha physical pomp er of if tte e un ted led states 10 lo make that abill able before it was too late wis tl e problem upon the solution of wl ch eh depended the cuc success cess of tie tl e allie 1 cause would the allies see it and would they work together to solve it when all were seated around the table in the assen bly room at tl e min astry of foreign affairs prime minis ter clemenceau who presided spoke briefly setting forth the importance of the gathering and the necessity of translating the noble spirit of the allt ance into action lo no 10 attempts at ora tory were la in evidence nor was vas there prolonged discourse on any subject naturally tatu rally questions concerning avail able man power slipping munitions and supplies were mentioned but only in a general way the conference d d little more than agree that tl e study of the various subjects sl be left to committees composed of representatives it IN ads as very clear that everybody was looking to america to provide the add lional man pow er needed deeded to give the all es none was mas more ea eaga r to increase our forces than our solves but on my pirt part every possible argument to procure shipping had been preen presented ted to the allies and to our IN var ar department so when the confer ence urged the expedition of our forces it made the strongest kind of a case in favor fanor of immediate increase of allied aid in tonnage for some time reliance upon the allies for any considerable amount of tonnage had seemed almost in vain and it looked as though we should have to depend upon our own limited resources for or most of it the british were giving some as assistance istance in the transportation of men american ships had carried up to november vember Iso 1 and the british 54 tol 7 the results of the british success at camarat were not to be permanent as the germans quickly retaliated gen eral von yon marwitz hastily assembled a force of some fifteen dehls ons and november vember Io 30 suddenly launched a vio lent counterattack the british were short of reserves and before non on mar witz was stopped his troops 1 lad 1 re gained most of the lost ground it was mas in this operation that a de tach ment of our eleventh regiment of engineers became engaged while ing with the british the men to the number of were at work in the Cauz Gauz acourt railway yard when the germans attacked one officer and nine men were wounded and the de tich ment mith withdrew drew they were mere then gli en arms and dougi t with the brit ish war council meets again the second conference of the su preme war council was held lit at N ver er sallies december 1 our re represent presenta thes til es political and military at this meeting were mr house and general bliss respectively at the opening sess on M clemenceau drew attention to tl e general situation referring elpe dally to the collapse of russia the probable release of enemy troops from that front the adverse situation in italy the depletion of allied man power and the reliance of the allies on american assistance tl TI e premier enjoined the military representatives to bear in mind that their function Is to advise the su preme war var council as a whole and not merely as representatives of their r respective spec tive on the council and that they should view the problems confronting them not from a nt but from that of the allies as a whole tt TI e military at this conference were instructed to examine the in libary situation and report their decoma as to the future plan of operations to study |