Show 41 11 AIR ee fo 41 M BY general X I 1 T J pershing in W k 7 wr occupied a line gressmire Gress nire wood along the river g giong lied to progress V ve e a jn n gaining the J e ats of fosse hect atlie the following 1 tb ao aid 1 having been lo 10 r f 0 aired and thirty ter the australian bained a line just tr somme tile the three ts were in reserve during is the one hundred st infantry was relieved ving advanced over three ered erect heavy casualties 0 the british front sun esen besent t tit at thirty third titters luar quarters lu arters near neap MoIl lens i the occasion of the visit 1 urge ago who was then etien visiting general miss lind had prend we both spent the night t evening general bell re of the participation ps Is with the british said a had been urgently re unit they had find acquitted rell 10 a bestows bestons decorations Decor attona august 12 to to selected men of the Alv division islon who lind had accent attacks of the brit oon after his arrival the general bliss and me to ere lio lie presented me with eros ross of the order of the stowed the order of st st george on general presentations were inie king simply handed the lie bus in turn nt at tit the e same I 1 44 turg a appreciation re clil t ton of american aviles r ance nee we ave then liscom pit cited the king to the place where the men were assent bled for the ceremony lie ile wits gracious in his compliments as lie pinned the decorations on our men find and the recipients were extremely et remely proud CHAPTER LV the final decision that the first american army would undertake the reduction of the st Ail litel salient as ap its ita first operation was transmitted to army headquarters august 10 anti and tile the army staff immediately began the der of plans for the concen colleen of the necessary troops for its execution it was certain the psychological et feet on the enemy of our success in this first operation by the american army as well as on the allies our own troops and out one people at home would be of great importance the attack roust therefore not only succeed but a serious hostile reaction must be made impossible the headquarters of the first army were removed to Neur chateau be tween august angust 11 and 10 16 the special army troops assembled north of Glia chateau thierry were moved moed eastward ayd during the khe same period composition of first army the following corps and divisions were placed at the disposal or of abe first army fox for the st oper operation atlon and their condition may be summarized as follows tile the first and second divisions were excellent as to training equipment and morale they hall had attacked july 38 in tile the Sots drive the third fourth twenty sixth anti and forty second divisions were ere of tine fine morale and considerable expert ence ns is they had fought in the defense about clip can thierry and in the advance toward the vesle river the ninth and ninetieth divisions were going through their sector training on the front between toul toni and the Alos mosella elit river and the lie fifth and thirty fifth divisions were taking tailing their sector training in tile the the thirty third seventy eighth eightieth and eighty second divisions lind been beca training behind the british front one brigade of the thirty third having had front line service with the british and the ninety first division had bad never been in the front line and hall received less than four weeks training in france misleading the germans the consIder considerable abla circulation of troops in tile the st mihiel fel area naturally attracted the attention of the people and of the off leers and soldiers although cautioned against such discussion cus sion the probability of an amerlean attack on the salient was discussed here and there to divert the alie attention from our real objective object he it was necessary first to create some uncertainty in the minds of our own troops the rumor rume waa therefore started A around offensive of mu alanl icona d tile alie J of ielo 0 ike n ill if lunil as a was as sent bent efort ort at tit the e ril instructions iral r ral build bunav y corn com i ti corps to proceed to pvn n litif ted staff anil and pre ire re detailed plans for an offensive olTen she wl etli tit the object f seizing mulhouse and tile the heights to the southeast nil eventually establishing our line a long tile milne in the letter vt of alons seven divisions were mertio mentioned ned as having been designated for the attack und and three oliree officers olli cura from t cl of these units were detailed to delort to general bundy to assist in the tie ile was directed to expedite the t hi wot weib k of preparation its as the movement ni would probably begin september septa iber 8 under my personal con command imand an littick by tile the prune french tenth army begun august 20 29 1018 1918 was as un der taken to force the retirement of the enemy from tile lie vesle tind alcile rivers on its relief from the vesle august 7 the thirty second division alaan was vaa assigned to the tenth army anny nil and entered the line august 28 undertaking a series of fortresses around toul we e hit had three divisions in line nn the south face of the lie fector but tile the mass of our battle troops would not take anke over oer tile lie trenches until the night before t th b e attack foch h springs surprise august ao 30 the lay day I 1 assumed coin miina of the sector marshal I 1 bodi oc i by li general Vey gand ills his chief of staff tame came to iny residence tit nl bligny ligny en harrods and after the lle usual exchange of greetin g I 1 presented tin in entirely new plan f for r tile use of the american army the nil arshal began egan by sayla g that the gernian ur artilles tilles were lit in more or less disorder from lom recent antik ks by the allies ant that we m fiust list not allow 10 v thein tu to and that the british would continue their in the direction of and st rt quen quell tin und the lie french bourd toward mesnil then much to rny my Aur surprise prise tie lie proposed that tile objectives thes in ill tile alie st operation he be restricted and tile lie attack ninde ande on tile southern face only and tant upon its completion two other operations he be undertaken by combined Ani erivin and french a number of our divisions dils lons going under unde r I 1 rench french command pershing insists on U 8 army I 1 repented repeated what I 1 had often st said aid that the american government anti and people expected tile the army to net as a unit and not he be dispersed in this way S X I 1 Z 1 Z k V v A Y their way into a farmstead local operations in which gains were made in the face of very heavy ore fire ravines and numerous eaves caves in the region provided ideal cover for the defending troops the general attack of the army tile the following lowing fal day met but slight success the enemy resisting desperately along his entire front but on the by u I 1 lank flank attack from the south tile the thirty second division captured ju vigny pushing a small salient into the germau german lines hard figh fightlin tin continued august 31 but by the end of tile day the thirty second had reached the important soissons st SL quentin quentan road where it was relieved september 2 the thirty second division had advanced nearly three miles and lie its success contributed greatly to the forced withdrawal of tile the german line to tile the ainne aisne river pershing takes over sector As prearranged between general and myself the sector from clort sur belile east of the closelle selle river to watronville ville north of les Esp arges forty two miles in extent then occupied by the entire french eighth army and a part of tile french second army was transferred to my com commandos command mandon on august 30 the front included the st salient which was between these points and embraced the permanent I 1 pointed out that each time we were about to complete the organization of our army some proposition like this was presented to prevent it the discussion was somewhat heated and much of it was carried on so rapidly that it could not be translated ile he continued to reiterate his demands for the adoption of his plan but I 1 had bad learned that it was necessary to be very firm in dealing with him find and I 1 finally filially said in effect marshal foch you havoc no authority as allied commander in chief to call upon me to yield eld up my command of the american army to have it scattered among the allied forces where it will not be an american army tit nt all lie ile was apparently surprised tit at my resentment of tits his attempt to confine american effort to subordinate 1 roles and said 1 I must insist upon the ar to winch which I 1 replied as we both rose loti may insist nil all you please but I 1 decline absolutely to agree to your plan while our army will tight light wherever you may fully decide it will not fight tiglia except its as an amerlean american army if lie said lie he wits was disposed to do what he could toward forming an american army ile he then picked up its ills maps and papers and left very pale and ap patently parent ly exhausted saying nt at the door as he handed me tile the memorandum ot of lit his I 1 proposal that lie he thought that thai after careful study I 1 should arrive at the same conclusion lie had agreement Is ie reached my chief of if staff G general acan drew ew and cliplef of if operations fox 4 inner were sent to confer with wey annd v and september r I 1 and returned to agny ugny en with wort burd that marshal idich desired to see general petain and roe me tile following day ilo t oring to tallis lit headquarters ad quarters with boyd and de enches we found Mc Audrew and conner had preceded as and utter lunch we went to bombon opening tile the conference foch referred to the note he had handed gnp A august u SO 30 and to my reply and asked in my y observations stating my attitude on tile desirability of carrying carry lif out vigorous offensives to the fullest possible extent I 1 explained that it if it s should hould be deemed necessary to abandon the alie st project in order to begin the larger offensive which was understood to ile he west of the house I 1 would abide by ills his decision in tile lie ei ensuing lulng discussion while there was considerable sparring it was agreed the american Americ tin army should 0 cerato as it a unit under its own commander como on oil the meuse argonne fl front ont marshal foch concluded that the late date for the operation should be postponed so we could first carry out the limited tilled attack at st Alth lel we abnal ly readied reached the definite understand ing that lifter after st mihiel our first army should prepare to begin this second offensive not later thau than september 25 CHAPTER the first army attacked yesterday and tile reduction of the st Alili mihiel fel salient Is complete rends reads my diary of september 13 written at en Bar barrels rols our troops behaved splendidly mhd secretary of war visited two corps headquarters 4 returned to bligny ligny much delighted nt at our ur success Illet aln and I 1 went to the town of st mihiel today and were warmly greeted by the people tills Is my birthday mid and a very happy one the attack 0 of f the infantry on the southern face of the st mihiel salient started at five in the morning and before that I 1 went with several staff officers to old fort gironville Gir onville situated on a commanding height overlooking the battlefield from the south the secondary attack on the west was launched at 8 a m as an element of surprise for artillery preparation there here weather gives advantage A drizzling rain and mist inist prevented us from getting a clear view but the progress of our troops could be followed by the barrage which preceded them heavy rain rail the night of september 1112 11 12 tile the weather lier gave us tin an advantage as the mist partly screened our advance from the enemy overcome entanglements Entangle ments thanks to the thorough preparation beforehand the wire entanglements entangle ments were more easily overcome than we had expected expect trained teams of pioneers and engineers gi with bangalore torpedoes wire cutters find and axes assisted in opening gaps in tile masses of barbed wire covering the german positions the leading troops themselves carried along rolls of chicken wire which was thrown across entanglements entangle ments here and there forming a kind of bridge for the infantry in all theli offensives the allies had spent days destroying entanglements entangle ments with artillery fire or had used a large number of heavy tanks but we had only a few light tanks ineffective for such work the fact that we had smothered the enemy artillery was an alf advantage as jt enabled the leading waves deliberately to do their work without serious loss the quick passage through these en tang lemen ts by our troops ext cited no little surprise among the he french who sent a large number of officers and mori 1 ld officers to st mihiel several days clays later to see how it had been done one of those off officers leers after his reconnaissance remarked in all seriousness that the Aine ricans had the over frenchmen because of their long legs and large feet TO BE CONTINUED verclus 11 plan of attack of first army sept 12 1918 1 alii ump off line mori morning fang sept 12 th so C b onville F front ron t tines lines sept lah and sept lath amy boundary x corps boundary arrows indicate direction and weight of attack arabic numerals indicate divisions roman numerals indicate corps 0 5 to 10 we mile de A 1 L CO C A I 1 jr vigneulles Vigne ulles em bercou rt b PT 0 r rca 11 aes benj M b ch i ft I 1 lb CZ no sard iv X as 1 0 9 r 2 0 0 s I 1 Z 1 pont 5 a Mousso ous an nl urney limey wy ea 1 11 seicheprey Prey pre |