Show general fal eirsa m 40 ng as cap countree countr n le by the th no north 1 I h A orl newspaper New paper alliance world id r sh 1 tory hilory of the ith A 0 jud E r fo served including vin R reproduction the I 1 in whole who or in by gen boha in 1 PCs service CHAPTER XV continued it thus appeared quite clear that the french were so intent on their plan that premier clemenceau Clemenc enu presumed to cable washington us as to how our units were to be handled upon the receipt of the cable from washington about the disagreement between petain and myself I 1 wrote at once to M clemenceau quoting the cable and adding may I 1 rot not suggest to you mr president the inexpediency of eating such matters to washington by cable these questions must nil all be settled here eventually on their merits through friendly conference between general retain petain and myself and cables of this sort are very likely I 1 fear to convey the impression of serious sei bei rious disagreement between us when su such ell Is not the case I 1 Clemence aus auls reply AI reply translated into english follows sly IMY dear general I 1 hasten without losing a moment to reply to your letter dated january 5 1918 1018 1 I found myself in tile the position of cabling to the ambassador of arun france e at washington because the two contradictory responses which I 1 had received from general petain and from yourself when you did me the lionor honor of calling on me obliged me in the interests of the common cause to seek nil an arbitration between the two commanders in chief 1 I need not conceal that I 1 placed full confidence in the american government with regard to this however wever it was rot not to the american government in lit that I 1 addressed myself I 1 cabled to the ambassador of france which was my right and my duty in order to give him directions tor for the conversations which might take place either with the secretary of war or with the president of the united states it might very well line have happened that later on I 1 should have addressed the american government but I 1 insist on this point that I 1 have done nothing of uie sort I 1 had not authorized the ambassador of france to read all or part of my dispatch to the secretary of war I 1 regret that lie he did so but I 1 do not disavow anything that I 1 wrote 1 I am giving you here the explanation which I 1 owe you and I 1 aai am going to exercise all the patience of which I 1 am capable in awaiting the good news that the american coni commander mander and the french commander have finally agreed on a question which way may be vital to the outcome of the war Clemence aus motive questioned As the french were dead set on getting gettin gour our troops under sunder their control it la Is more than probable that the trench french premier feeling that their plans were not working out sought to create some distrust in the minds ot of our administration at washington against my management of things in order to pave tile the way for insisting that we were entirely wrong in pot nor consenting to amalgamation however at later meetings with clemenceau and retain petain the alleged differences were seemingly settled amicably ably as indicated in my cable of january I 1 14 4 which follows for chief of have now definite understanding with french satisfactory to them and to me that our divisions now in france shall complete their training na as already be begun gun in the future divisions arrived arriving g in zone of french armies are to have period of training with french each regiment in a french division when sufficiently experienced by training in a quiet sector with french our divisions are to be united under their own commander und and will be placed in the line in our own sector CHAPTER the necessity for controlling the use of strong drink among our troops had been brought forcibly to my attention through the ease with which alcoholic beverages could be obtained the use of light wines as a part of the french ration was simply the continuance in the army of the universal versa custom of the people of having wine with their meals the wines and beer were not so BO objectionable but strong alco alcoholic holle spirits were regarded by the french themselves as dangerous and were prohibited for their troops but the prohibition was not well enforced outside the zone of the armies tile the problem of preventing our troops tram from drinking the stronger liquors was waa difficult especially at the ports of entry E efforts to obtain enforcement through conferences with local authorities and through agreements with the port and district officials were made from time to time but with little result I 1 finally appe appealed filed to prime minister tor for support but he would only counsel local officials as he be did not wish to declare a state of siege martial law in the end it was necessary to take lake the matter in our own hands and declare every bar and restaurant where the heavy liquor was sold as off limits for our troops our were directed to ghe gase their personal attention to the enforcement of this order vice in army denied about this time a cable was to re calved from washington that some publication at home had maile made it a sweeping charge of both immorality and drunkenness against our men no such statement could be based base on fact nor could it serve sene any purpose except to cause unnecessary anxiety to pur par enta und and relatives and perhaps sails fy on the part of some settle one an un worthy desire for sensation in reply I 1 cabled in part as follows there lias has never been a similar shullar body of men to lend lead as clean lles ilves as as aa our american soldiers lit in france Fr they have entered tills this war ar with the highest devotion to duty and with no other idea than to perform these duties in the most efficient manner possible enga engaged ed in healthy interesting ex e lit in the open air with simple diet officers and men like trained I 1 ia ar lord northcliffe athletes are ready for their task forbidden the alie use of strong drink and protected by stringent regulations against other evils and supported by their own moral courage their gloo behavior Is the subject of most fa 01 able comment especially by ay our allies american mothers may rest assured that their sons are a credit to them and the nation seek more chaplains my aly diary notes the following paris thursday jan 10 1018 uve appointed maj robert bacon to be colonel and A D 0 J on my staff bishop bishof gwynne deputy chaplain general british army and bishop brent were my guests at chaumont ou on A monday londay on tuesday brent and I 1 discussed increase in number of chaplains which we both favor bishop breut brent had been selected by me for appointment as clin chaplain plain with a view to his being the chief of the chaplain corps which it was planned to organize tile the bishop did not approve of this idea and in deference to his opinion and upon till his suggestion a permanent executive committee of chaplains was appointed to study the problems involved and make recommendations direct to me from time to time bishop gwynne of the british forces explained their system the methods of administration and the control and direct lov of chaplains work from which we adopted such features as were applicable to our service custom in our army it arising rising front from tack lack of appreciation of the usefulness of chaplains had relegated them as a class to the status of handy men wh who 0 were detailed to write up boards of survey or run libraries aviation questions den demanded landed attention for in no other service was so evident and so difficult cult to overcome apparently there thera was ear earnest riest effort at home but it was too often misdirected on the part of tile the allies especially the french fience lack of mechanics and delay in pro picturing euring motors and material such as spruce had find given a setback due to these conditions anil their own increased programs the french fien l and also the It italians allans were unable to take more than it a small pro pin portion of our hi ying ing carlets cadets who were on the ground and who under agreement were to be instructed by bv them about tills this tyrue the contract tor for planes we had in august was formally abrogated the french government being unable to meet its conditions due to the delay in receipt of machine tools and raw materials from the united states a possibility which had bad been forecast in my cables to tile the war department in its stead we later made an I 1 H whereby hereby wo w shout should d be dependent upon the allotment that might he be made ug accord ing to the number of divisions we might have in P fiance rance harly early in december I 1 signed an agreement with lord Northe northcliffe liffe of the british air board that we e should send enlisted men to E and maintain that number in training in their aircraft factories and air service stations tills this plan proved to he be beneficial to both sides as tar far as carried oat but especially to ourselves in providing us with trained men and saving us the necessity of establishing extra schools for teaching th them ourselves duo due to tile the non shIpment of air personnel from home we lacked lacke d of reaching the number specified and later the need tor for line troops prevented our completing the number british wanted U 8 meth mem when general robertson came for the conference regarding the shipment of troops for training with the british as mentioned in my diary we began to discuss the details of the disposition to be made of our forces which might be brought over in british shipping it was found that general eral Kobert sons proposal was practically the same as the one submitted to E al house through tit lloyd george lie he wanted to brang our in fantry and machine gun units by battalions on only ly and pointed out how much more expeditiously this would meet the shortage of men in the british army than to ship whole divisions with all their equipment and stores lie ile believed that the british government would take the task of releasing temporarily some shipping engaged in carrying food and raw materials it if america could see tier her way to provide the men although he said it could not well undertake the transi trans por tatton tation of complete divisions as not enough men would be brought over in this manner to justify the great risks involved in other words the british had bad the shipping to transport american battalions on condition that they would serve in the british BrItIs Ij armlee aimle however na as general Kobert sons proposal would enable us to increase our strength more rapidly my preliminary cable to washington reporting the conference recommended that it be given consideration and in view of our national attitude regarding service with another army that if approved the plan should be regarded as a temporary tempo iary measure to meet an emergency that as soon as possible the remaining troops of our dIvIs divisions lons thus temporarily broken up should he be brought over and the units reas sein bled that division brigade ani and regimental commanders arid and their r taff start be sent with their infantry for training with the corresponding arit ish units and that the infantry be taken faken from those divisions that would not otherwise be transported until after june CHAPTER every one in authority realized that all ro sources the allies could muster would he be required to meet successfully the grent great offensive of tile the central powers expected in the spring but to use them effectively close co operation cooperation among commanders would he be impera the with tills this in mind I 1 proposed to premier clemenceau Clemenc enu that tile the corn coal menders manders lit in chief and chiefs of stuff ket get together to examine the situation and if possible determine it general program of combined action il at clemenceau Clenie neau tit nt once approved tile the suggestion it was also favorably r rf calved by general foch who lio it will be recalled was calef of ohp french general stuff staff I 1 proposed that tile the meeting be held tit lit roy lay headquarters but the french selected I etain S G 11 Q at the meeting january 24 1018 robertson for the british scolie first and suggested at n general statement Us as to 1 mutual support between allied armies 2 situation as to reserve 9 3 question of troops in italy 4 situation as to the of the Ampt american lean army and facilities given it in france petain favored defensive general petain thought that for the present the allies would be forced to remain on the defensive because of lack of men lie ile said the french army had ninety seven divisions with an infantry strength of from to men each some thirty odd of these divisions being in reserve and the rest in the trenches besides eight cavelry divisions two of which were dismounted e d and six mounted all divisions he fie thought could he be kept up until april it if there should he be no fighting but later inter on even without a battle lie he would have to break up five divisions to maintain the others ot liers the six mounted cavalry divisions would have to be reduced to four and before the end of the year the total force would have to be reduced by twenty divisions foch was for counteroffensive general foch declared that the best means of halting a strong hid and persistent offensive was a powerful counteroffensive biren sive the german offensive at verdun was stopped not by our resistance there but by our offensive on tile the soro sam me in 1010 1916 11 said general foch such an operation to Is possible only when foreseen and prepared beforehand la in planning the counteroffensive I 1 think that the entire front must be considered as a whole and not the french as one part and the british as another the plan must envisage them together preparing for offensive action on a common battlefield with all the forces at their disposal 11 general robertson Il expressed accord with foch but he did not see eee where or with what means such an offensive could be executed and stated that the war could not be won by remaining on the defensive give us back the troops from sa donika and we will commence offensives said general haig we were not speaking of of offensives but of general foch replied general robertson Il remarked that of course the french and british could reinforce each other and make coun ter attacks and then asked could they do more than that not without the americans general retain petain answered him dependent upon U S general robertson Il then sald said 1 I 1 think our only hope lies in american reserves and lie he wanted to hear bear from me TO BIC BE CONTINUED ENGLAND LOCATION AMERICAN DIVISIONS MARCH j cypres ypres preg bruxelles 0 8 ettleline att leline international ady ao A numerals indicate DvIs divisions ions i 1 lille circled numera numerals lr tho afis not in lne lioe 0 sp so MILES 1 0 so kilometers arraco 0 i lot allens t quentin LUMM sedan i sons reims GERMANY metz 2 M I 1 cawon paris bar fe duc 1 47 0 nanc neu abeau depinal alm r chaimo to 0 C mul bus |