Show Axe i eceil nerol Perli laici north am american by the kit alt tory of AM alae A E F we boand world arved ld d In 1 including right avian reproduction too r ah la in whole or in part prohibited se sei hervle I 1 SMARTER XIV in armane t 14 my request to wash ington for an experienced man to take charge harg e of rail transportation W AV attebury Ater bury general manager ot of the pennsylvania railroad arrived tit in trance france and reported to me september 1 WIT at Atter burys suggestion a cable hassent was sent requesting certain men to fill important positions in the organization the list included J A general manager of the long island railroad for general manager with V t AL bunting as business manager 11 II C as engineer for construction and J G rogers rs as deputy tile the railway problem was tar far from easy and many the obstacles to be overcome botti in our own and ln n the french services successful management would have been very doubtful as practicable and aviation was organized and maintained as a distinct force to ordinate coordinate co our training with that at stamp home geri gen L kenly was sent over the latter hitter part of august and was appointed chief of avin aviation tion in the A B E P t colonel michell who had succeeded major dodd the first calef of aviation was given jurisdiction over aviation in the zone of advance major bolling was wag placed lit in charge of aviation in the zoned one of tile the interior and soon succeeded in securing a better belter operation cooperation co through an aircraft board tile the next nett essential step was tile the training ining of airplane pilots and accordingly arrangements were made for our monto mento enter lying flying schools in Jn angland gland prance ranee and italy after they had passed their preliminary tests nt at home vacancies canches weri bel d for us in the schools Z V building in france used as school for officers of the A E P F tinder brider a leader aleader without Atter burys patience ability and force of character visits to our training areas by the french off official lelal and otherwise had b become rather frequent breque nt one of the visitors 31 georges clemenceau Clemenc enu who always remained a i power even when not in any official position clemenceau was riot not then prime minister called nt at the headquarters of the first division accompanied by General tie de castelnau the commander of the group of armies with which it was serving clemenceau urges action in the course of the tha conversation with general sibert the division commander al clemenceau CIemence au with considerable emphasis urged that our troops be put into the line without delay it was explained Piali fed to him by general de Cast lenau that as soon as they were sufficiently advanced the troops of the division were to replaced be placed lf by brigades with the french in a quiet sector near Lu huneville neville 51 clemenceau CIemence au went on to say pay that america had now been in n tife war several months and the french people were were wondering when they expected to take nil an active part ile he said that the french army was exhausted hausted es by the war and that its morale was poor he Insist insisted then as lie he did with even greater vehemence later on in an official capacity that it was not so much a question of troops being ready as it was of giving relief itoi joithe the allies although the division was only partially trained it could have been used in ad an emergency but there was nothing threatening in the situation at that time and no suggestion had been made that it should go into the line for serious work the failure of our aviation bureau to keep abreast of airplane development in the contending armies cost us serious delay with a lack of data in the beginning little progress had been made at home on our aviation pr program at the end office of five months mo nilis fruitless efforts to describe mechanical construction and give definite information concerning production and otherwise oher wIse reach decisions by cable prompted washington to send a special mission to france IF rance of which maj it II C bolling boiling was the head through his ability and expert knowledge lie rendered exceptional service in operating cooperating co with those in control of allied aviation and in furnishing the he necessary technical ln anfor for motion mation upon which to base fiction action sit at home the investigation un made by his mission confirmed the view that our manufacturers could not begin to furnish planes before the summer of 1018 1918 pershing lna orders planes after inquiry as to french capacity to turn out planes I 1 mode made a contract with the air ministry late in august committing us to an expenditure of for planes find and engines to be delivered us as rapidly as possible nt at intervals before the first of june 1016 1918 on condition that we should provide certain tools and raw materials to m make ake a contract to 16 pay such an amount appeared somewhat bold but under the circumstances someone some one had to take the in providing planes needed at once for the development of our air force As aviation av lation was in no sense sene sen e a logical branch of the signal corps tile the two were separated lit in the A 11 r I 1 4 as soon but we were unable to take full advantage of tills this opportunity tor for aral training fling because of the delay in sending over flyers ho weyer ye we proceeded with the establishment of our own training centers the first arst of which located at issoudun was planned for a capacity of pilots by spring use of gas new problem the use of poisonous gases in warfare had been discussed at the hague conference in 1809 1800 with the result that several Bev cral nations pledged themselves against tile the employment of projectiles jec tiles the only object of which was to give forth suffocating or poisonous gosea gases tills this action hod had created a feeling of security regarding such n possibility albi lity germany had subscribed bed to the I 1 agreement and when her armies disregarded this pledge and became the first to use gas shells the impression was waa that they had now thrown every consideration of humanity to the winds this action by the enemy forced the allies to adopt tills this weapon themselves as a of self protection from froal that time on the employment of gas became common to nil all combatants the use of gas tn in warfare presented nn an entirely ney new problem to us and tile the organization of a service to han handle dle it demanded immediate attention the alie first arst plan of them the yar war department provided that the engineers should devise and handle the mechanical features and the medical department the chemical but tills soon proved to be impractical and it became evident that as we and maintained at the beginning a separate service would be necessary Alean meanwhile while application was made for a complete chemical laboratory to be shipped to france for use mainly in investigation as supplementary to similar work in the states ras gas pervice service established considerable information information concerning gases and the organization of gas troops had been gathered by my staly staff and on august 18 col amos A pries fries was designated ns as chief of the gas service lie made some furth further r of the subject in the british and french armies find as a result an order issued september 3 established a department known tit at that time as the gas service were at once begun to discover new gases and devise improvements prove ments in gas maiks to save tonnage and avoid the dangers of explosion in transit it yaa vas decided after consultation with the tees ices to request the shipment from the states of the basic elements and manufacture the chemical products in prance france after thorough tests of different types of gas masks we adopted the box bos respirator used by the british and a preliminary purchase of 1000 Xi was made to meet immediate demands for tor training with the development of trench weapons and special tactical methods of defense never tied had the offensive been more costly in human life than in this war the ingenuity of the allies was put to the test to devise new engines of war that would make the attack possible without excessive losses while life tank which was simply an armored caterpillar trat ln motor car was favored by many ceris as nn nid to advancing infantry this opinion ophelon wits was by no means nu unanimous our invests gat gallons ions however led to the conclusions that we should accept allied experience peri per lence ence anti also adopt the tank ns as a weapon CHAPTER XV I 1 received ninny many reminders ephem ber 13 that another birthday had come cattle including a surprise party by my staff that evening As tills was exactly three months after I 1 had readied reached parts paris the time seemed to be passing very rapidly with little apparent apparent progress against t the 11 e day when an american army should be on the front line the importance of shipping for america was beginning to be considered in allied circles I 1 received a letter from general robertson Iloh Roh ertson british chief of staff who spoke of their increasing losses and of his regarding tile the voyage of our trpo across the atlantic As to tonnage P tor for us lie sold said it wits was entirely between great britain and ourselves as none of the other allies could furnish any to speak of on tot top of tills in III conference n few days later with lord derby tile the british minister of war I 1 was told that his government could not be counted on to furnish us with ships as aa transports the substance of general robert kobert sons letter was cabled to io ashington lV suggesting the importance of taking advantage of the opportunity offered to obtain additional shipping A few days later we were told that needful arrangements for transatlantic transports were being made by the still shipping board gloomy tame for allies afflec there Ther ewas waa little in the general situation to give comfort to the allies losses by the british through continuing operations were wera still grow growing ing there no longer remained any doubt as to dussias Rus sias rate fate and it was consequently certain that german troops on that front would be released for service in the west under the circumstances the tired allied people were easily influenced by rumors tile the popes proposal issued in august started some talk of peace but as it failed to condemn germanos germanys Germ Germa anys nyls violation of treaties and her inhuman submarine warfare war faie the note did not make a favorable impression on the allies in fact it if was criticized in terms that were not at nil all moderate the various replies from the different governments did however arouse some hope which was altogether unwarranted by the real attitude of the belligerent powers on either side the discussion was unfortunate because the fr french e people not realizing ahat that peace was improbable lost some of their courage and the depression from tills this and other factors caused uneasiness among both civil and aid military le leaders aaers from our sources of information which included the intelligence bureaus of the allied armies we got the impression that austria bulgaria and turkey would make peace on any reasonable terms if they could do so visits artillery school the military post of le valdahon Val VaI dahon beai the swiss border used by us as a for our field artillery was one of several which had been kindly set apart for americana in different parts or of france the others were at coat guldan and alfucon BIeu con near st SL Naz nazaire alre and at bouge and la Cor corneau near bordeaux and also at saumur and angers with a school for heavy artillery at Bla malily illy southeast of rheims nh elnis the school nt Val valdahon Vald nhon dahon was then under the direction of BrI brigadier gadler general march an energetic and alert commander at the time of ray my visit the fifth sixth and seventh regiments reg 1 l comprising tile lie field artillery brigade of tile the first division were there for training As to the signal corps and its pr progress oga colonel russell before leaving washington had ordered a large con of for both telegraph and telephone serl sen ices ces hat but so far none had been received except what was sent with us on oil the battle finding it necessary to estah establish lish our own service in ill parts paris where the city system was almost ug useless eless we were fortunately ale able at once to obtain enough material for the purpose lu ill en gland annl france the signal corps had of course to antici anticipate the hie necessary in lit battle batile therefore clafin definite i tte de wort wen required dionte loiue time tn in ad vanco vance tia its to spheres of operations actions at ions tons of material most of which except wire wits was obtained lit in arance france and any amount of labor wits was used in tile the actual insinuation the main telephone and telegraph lines in proximity to the alie actual battle area were when practicable laid underground to prevent destruction one of tile the crying needs needa when ution we once begin began to apse use pur our own ildea wua was for experienced operators lif instead stend of trying to train men of tile he signal corps I 1 requested that a number of experienced telephone girls who alio could speak french be sent overl over and eventually we had about gir girls Is on tills this duty no civil telephone service that ever cattle came under my observation excelled tile the perfection of our system after it was well established the telephone girls in the A K N F took grea great t pat pains its and id pride in n their work and did it with satisfaction to nil all the hospital problem the ined medical icat departments plans constantly received my careful attention through frequent conferences with the chief surgeon colonel bradley and hla his assistant colonel ireland our lem em of handling the he sick and wounded was more than that of nt any of the allies as we had no civil hospitals of our own available full provi provision therefore had to be made for hospital accommodations lit in france as only convalescents manifestly unfit for further service could ho be sent home the early esti estimates mafes submitted in august based upon a small force of men called tor for beds eds tn in permanent or temporary hospitals and plans for expansion were in liand hand to keep pace with tile the expected requirements of 0 our armies once they should become engaged while this beginning appeared quite liberal yet it was calculated to meet further demands of tile the immediate future all the facilities through france were available for the french yet they had find so many sick and wounded that their hospital resources were pretty welt well exhausted As there seemed to bo be only a few ings that could bo be assigned to Us we had to plan considerable new construe con construction struL tills this required additional labor and material both of which were scarce and although there was wag some delay we managed by persistent effort to keep pace with requirements danger of coal shortage the destruction by the german army of the mines of northern franco fiance had forced the importation from england of a large proportion of the coal needed for various purposes in both france and italy lack of cross chan nel tonnage had produced a serious situation and tile the danger of coal shortage during the approaching winter gave us much concern italy was even worse off due to the greater dIstance dl from the source of supply the outcome of our efforts with tho the verja very effective assistance of admiral mayo was that some colliers col llera one of which was already at brest were ordered into service for immediate use and these were supplemented later by f |