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Show HI HI j SINISTER SECRET COMPACTS. fHS T F Japan's sharp practices during the war had not been so sinister, H I X they would now appear comic. Like a miser, Japan sought to take H r advantage of her unfortunate partners at every opportunity. And ' . they, on their part, seemed in haste to conclude certain selfish aril ar-il rangements before the United States should be able, by participating m in the war, to call a halt or demand something for itself. H H The publication of secret treaties entered into by Japan H ; on the one hand and the entente allies on the other discloses the set- H i. tied policy of the Nipponese government to get as much as possible H ! out of the war while giving but little aid to her allies in carrying on H the conflict. H ! If the latest disclosures are accurate China was eager to associate H r herself with the allies early in the war, but was prevented by Japan. 1, China's purpose was to recover the province of Shantung stolen from l her by Germany. As Japan desired all of Germany's possessions in Asia and in the Pacific north of the equator she opposed the entry of I China into the struggle and, joining with the British in the Shantung I campaign, seized Kiao Chow for herself, v When, in November, 1915, China tried to enter the struggle at I the request of the entente powers, Japan interfered again. Ishii, the H ' ' Japanei minister of foreign affairs, said to the European ambassa- H dors in kio : "Japan could not view without apprehension the moral B R awakening of four hundred million Chinese which would result from i their entering the war." China, knowing that the Europeans were in no position to help f her, did not dare to defy Japan. Although herself one of the belligerents Arrayed against Ger- fffafftiMy. many, Japan, in effect, was playing into the hands of Germany. The best that can be said for her is that she was prudently looking out for her own interests, but one cannot help suspecting the worst. There arc obvious indications that she was preparing an alibi for use in case Germany should win. itfp When the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany Ger-many in the second month of 1917 the Nipponese saw that there had been an entire change of circumstances and that they must act accordingly. accord-ingly. Humanly speaking there was no longer a likelihood that Germany Ger-many would emerge from the conflict a victor. Hence the Japanese staked their whole fortune on the side of the allies. It was not much of a risk and Japan, at last, was in a position to enforce her demands. The opportunity she had been awaiting for two and a half years presented pre-sented itself in a most inviting aspect. And now the allies entered into a secret compact which is both comic and tragic. It is tragic in its revelation of sordid motives j comic in the miserly haste with which Japan pressed it to a conclusions Japan agreed that China should enter the war, but made a most extraordinary condition. Japan must be remunerated for allowing j China to fight on the side of the allies. She must be given the province j of Shantung and all the German dependencies north of the equator. But if the conduct of the Japanese government was extraordinary the conduct of the entente government was inexpressibly dubious. To obtain the aid of China they agreed to rob her. They agreed, in consideration con-sideration of her help, to take awuy from her the province of Shantung and give it to Japan in consideration for Japan's ceasing to be of aid to Germany. They agreed to rob China for her chivalry and pay Japan for her perfidy. ' We may take this as an example of old-world diplomacy. It may j have been unprecedented, but it was in conformity with the selfish 1 policy of European arrangements for more than a thousand years. It was good for humanity that the United States entered the war when it did. We carried into the conflict a breath of a different spirit from oversea. We dropped into the fiery crucible the transforming element of a higher ideal. However selfish our own individual lives may have been we were to Europe a saving influence in more than a mere material sense. Our ideal was bigger and better than ourselves. our-selves. It had come down to us from forefathers who had framed our government and breathed into it the hopes, the noble aspirations and the most exalted sentiments of an heroic epoch. It was expressed finely, even though inadequately, in President Wilson's admonition to the American people to "make the world safe for democracy." i & -k & |