Show ge general 7 0 L ah S X story oi on f thle the A E 16 F 49 copyright opy right 1931 in all countries by the north A merlc rl ara eo nw New newspaper poper paper alliance world wold rights right reserve re cl ds fly af general X jd adding ding the S scandinavian Co production lo in ahl flolo w of apar prohibited da J IV continued deemed to me then that if this e of civilization engaged in the atlon of innocent and unarmed mostly women and cn an could be brought home to all reason would be forced upon and governments where too their passions and ambitions as control i result of the german clerman successes t the french something akin to lc ic prevailed in paris probably ion on people left during the spring here bere was grave apprehension the officials lest the city be plans were made to remove vern ment to bordeaux and we ves were prepared to remove our CHAPTER second division slon assumed the ofa june 0 1918 and began a so se attacks which culminated some beeks later in the capture of the erman positions in the bois de a by its marine brigade and or of by its reg regular u lar brigade fighting during most of this pens peas of peculiar intensity the D n lines were favorably located ini anding ground and were made ornilda ble by the extensive use bine alne guns especially in belleau ie initial advance Harb harbordt ma captured bouresches Boure bou reaches and regular brigade took triangle nd md bols bois de la in barette during mt it few days our troops piecemeal june 15 the sev infantry third division arrived the marine brigade enin the wood this regiment rethe brigade on that date and brines were rested cpr a week they again entered the line t stubborn resistance they the enemy from the wood june regulars capture vaux the regular brigade conits attacks intermittently and with great dash captured vaux e bols bois de la roche the opera i t the division in this vicinity radically at an end when the nes lies were stabilized on the high captured from the enemy casualties to in the division were BOO more than 1000 1600 prisoners from the enemy gains by the second division won with little aid on either y the french units which were wem i 1 poor and were made an enemy determined to crush crash ray riy american effort the sue this division and of the first allily and the third on the following as they did the lie crisis 27 4 were loudly acclaimed by tell and for the time being had stimulating effect upon french the transfer of activities t to front nort northeast of parts paris in to build up an american ear akiens amiens had become and as I 1 had offered general the services of our divisions er r they night might be needed it now A d possible to form at least a nd lid possibly an arm army y somewhere he morne salient i divisions R relieve elleve french d suggested that we should ther divisions to join the see sec 1 4 third for that purpose and gly the twenty sixth and cond were relieved from the front and five amerl ismons from the british area to be bd sent to that ector to relieve french divi the assembly of bour four am amerl eri ismons in aid of the french on ont would more than offset cent losses I 1 al petain Iet in his letter accept gfrer off er said in part ls st express my dc deep ep gratitude prompt and very important are re bringing in the pre present sent the american troops already in 16 the battle are the anant Imi imitation ration of the whole feretich french the power oy ot the th effort which antry Is at present showing it ats the resolute and generous with which you enter the i Is for the allaer and rand r am above prance a comfort in in the lines through which we ve ire are and a pledge of hope for the at if paris should fall ig g the suggestion with general vl without lOut further discussion I 1 to paris jur june e 8 I 1 morning I 1 called on pr premier I 1 eau and on that morning the hase base of the great german of etaetel et artel between Mont didler olse reports indicated that ln meeting eteng confide considerable rable success ming ing this to at Clemenc clemenceau ead bill to what he thought would esula if farls should fall fail manceau llen cean eau replied that he and A d george had considered that 4 and had readied reached the cou they couill do everything in aver r to save parts paris but if it I 1 lost they woula go on fight i carls Is r france rance he added te e prunce Is civilization on As I 1 was leaving lie he clime came to the door with me and I 1 sald said it may not lo 10 look ok encouraging just now but we are certain to win in tile the end ile he clung to my mj hand and in a tone that showed the utmost solicitude tude lie replied do you really think that I 1 am glad to bear you say it this was the first aind only time that I 1 ever sensed any misgiving in the mind of this resolute man notwithstanding our occasional rather heated discussions on tile hie use to be made of american troops I 1 admired him greatly it always seemed to me he represented the true spirit of confidence fi and courage of tile the french people I 1 then motored to general fochs headquarters at Boin bombon bointon bon we corl considered sll my proposal to form fin an american corps near chateau Clia Th thierry lerry to which lie he readily agreed lie ile spoke especially of the ine fine work of our troops I 1 asked how a german drive which threatened or perhaps captured paris would affect the armies and the people ills reply was almost word for word like M they had find evidently discussed the possibility of losing paris he too was certain tile the armies would go on with tile the war foch spoke so positively and with such evident feeling that I 1 wits was moved to get up and shake his hand concentrate west of marne mainc meanwhile the fourth and twenty eighth divisions en route from the british front to the northeast of france were stopped at general genera focha request in the vicinity of all lers Cott erets the object being to concentrate cen several of our divisions ou on the west of the marne salient primarily as a precaution against adoth er german offensive there but ultimately for possible use on the offensive the second third twenty sixth and forty second were in that area and with the fourth and twenty eighth there was a force equivalent to twelve tw elve french divisions although some of these units were without artillery an encouraging circumstance at the moment was the success of the french in holding von butlers Hut lers attack on the boyon noyon front tills this fourth phase of the german offensive was fin effort not only to widen the vulnerable marne pocket but to secure the railway between Com Compel and sols sons and open the way to paris the anniversary of the arrival ot of our advance contingent in france was the occasion of many congratulations on an the part of the french CHAPTER the demands for american divisions were pressing the first second and third had already become actively engaged the first firs being slated to go to the reserve near the chateau thierry salient when relieved from Cant cantieny cantigny igny the second was still in 13 line at belleau wood and the till third d south of the marne general foch had asked for five of the divis divisions lons recently arrived that were training with the british of these the fourth and twenty while en route to the quiet vo ages sector to relieve french divisions had been diverted to trie reserve near the western face of the marne salient the thirty fifth moved to the v ln ity of depinal and the sevat Sev tt seventh was about to enter the trenches in 10 the baccarat baccara t sector to replace the F forty ty second which was to reinforce gou army east of rh elms the eighty second had started for the toul sec bior to relieve the teeney sixth which in turn was soon to relieve tile the second thus there were three american dl di visions in quiet sectors and seven either in ID them the battle battie line or held field in ea cadt diness ness to meet any eventuality eventual it which might result from further activity of the germans in the great brent wedge they had bad daiv driven i en biow toward 1 ard parts british the british were displeased at the transfer of our division from their area claiming priority to retain thein by reson reison of having brought them over oer when general foch inquired of tile the condIt conditions tons under which these troops were serving with tho the british my reply made it clear that he had entire authority to direct where they aliey should go in tile the emer emergency geney as without it tile theory of a supreme coin mail roand would fall the rapid succession of german offensives oTe nales had seriously crippled the allies and not only materially reduced their powers of resistance but had depressed their morale and caused the darkest misgivings amoni tarm m they grew more and more fearful lest th the enemy might still have hae untold reserves ready to swell ills his forces that the morale of the allies wits was low wits was shown by tile the conclusions of of their soldiers returning from the front to the rest areas reports from the british front were no better their troops continuously told our men who were with them for training that we had come too late and that our entry into the battle would only postpone allied defeat this attitude seemed so BO alarming g that thai I 1 took steps to prevent such a spirit from affecting our army by promptly prompt lV reporting tile facts to allied authora authorities tho the presence of such sentiments sentiment was another important reason for opposing any form of amalgamation vastness of request unrealized far short had we fallen of the expectations of the preceding november when foch general robertson of the british and I 1 had joined in nn fin urgent appeal for twenty four trained american divisions by the following june it Is small wonder that the allies were now so insistent in urging increased and continuous shipments of men trained or untrained so serious was the situation regarded that it was no longer a demand for twenty four divisions but tor for one hundred it Is probable that the vastness of this request was not fully realized or else the allec had greatly exaggerated ideas of our power of accomplishment surprising as it actually proved to be A brief calculation of these h ese demands of 0 the prime ministers showed that they were asking more than combatant troops by the following spring which augmented by those required tor for tile the services ot of supply con ively calculated for a well bal alced force situated in i foreign country under the circumstances that surrounded us would amount at least to men the american combatant force would thus have equaled divisions of the allies and their apprehension may be imagined lula aneo when ie e realize that this was greater by one fourth than the combined allied armies of 0 divisions v then on the western wester front saw as limit although no such number as ar this could b have ave been considered feasible as it Is nil unlikely likely that it could have been either transported equipped or supplied it was necessary in view of the situation to lay jay plans for bring bringing lag over all we could after giving the question careful study it seemed to me that men would be the limit we could hope to reach by the spring of 1019 1010 tills this roughly would provide at least sixty six or possibly over seventy copi balant divisions the rest being necessary for foe the noncombatant service As A we bad hitherto herto made estimates esil mates based upon a total force of men it 1 imperative that calay inc w a saul te abou should lj be made on the ducre lu crea and that work everywhere in the A E 11 1 1 should now have that end in view A cable I 1 sent juno june 1 21 I set forth the reasons for fixing the e program for tho the future definitely at WO men ns as a minimum muni and urged upon the war department the utmost effort to meet our immediate requirements for the expansion of port facilities and railroads A detailed study of the troop shipments und and tonnage required was included include my cable closed the there Is nothing so dreadfully important as winning this war and everi ever possible resource should be made im available mr secretary the question Is so vital to our country countr and tho the necessity of winning the war Is if so great that there la Is no limit to which we should not go to carry out the plan palan I 1 have outlined for the next ten months and we must be prepared to carry it on still further after that at the same rate or maybe taster fuster 11 CHAPTER the thirty second thirty fifth forty second and seventy seventh divisions were now lit in training under tinder the rece recently fitly organized third corps especial effort was war being made to hasten their preparation in both staff and line in anticipation of an early call for more serious service I 1 inspected these tron troops trollis lis june 1022 1922 10 19 22 1018 1918 and my impressions were favorable although a number of officers were found unfamiliar with the prin caples of tactical leadership in such hastily trained units tills wits was hardly surprising especially in view of the known defects of the instruction at home many were found with but slight nil of the natural defensive of a given position sonic battalion and even regimental coni com mandera had find not thought to ascertain tile tha exact location of their front lines and of course had failed to work out the details of preparation against a n possible attack my predilection for detailed instruction in minor tactics growing out of ray my personal supervision of training 11 in both small and large units led mp DIP quickly to discover my diary notes the establishment of the military board of supply at this time june 22 1018 it was expected to study questions of supply and adopt proper measures for the co ordination of 0 allied resources and utilities col charles G dawes who had charge in a more adre limited sphere of the ordination coordination co of our own supply departments was detailed de tolled as the american member of 0 the board lauds lauda courage of negro troops cables from the war department june 22 stated that tiie the colored people it t home were being told that negro soldiers in france were always placed in the most dangerous positions being sacrificed to save white troops and were often left on the field to die without medical attention it was not difficult to guess the origin of this athla sort LOCATION AMERICAN DIVISIONS 30 3 i JULY U lly Is 1918 pres 0 baclene BaC 81 fene efine international bruxelles D Bru ti numerals indicate divisions circled numera nu lr thase tass not in line V 10 a M 0 50 MILES IN 4 10 kilometers S ft kras 0 1 G 1 I 1 33 N k 0 amiens akiens f gf quentin L t ba 1 1 cherbourg Cher bourg bours sedan gaj t sons 2 0 ims 2 GERMAN Y CO 4 42 verdun edun metz meau 28 c chilon k pr paris bar 0 vuc az ayi N v 77 6 nau beau a E nal COW to chacma n IV C E mul I 1 S tours of propaganda As a matter of facts fact none of these troops had bad been in line except in quiet sectors those I 1 had recently seen were in tane filp spirits and seemed keip keep for active service the only colored combat troops in france were those of the ninety sec ond division then in a quiet sector in the and the four infantry regiments of the ninety third each attached to ton a french division several individuals serving with the french had bad already received itne croix tie de guerre for conduct in raids clemenceau Clemenc cau at chaumont prime minister clemenceau general foch and M andre tardley Tard leu with generals and mordaca Mor dacy camo came to chaumont june 23 1918 for a conference abnee on the inc increase of american man in a n power M Clemence aus popularity in france was probably of ai its height As this wits was his first visit to chaumont Chan mont the people turned i out en masse crowded into the pla m and gave haru a routing welcome |