Show beasa story i the hub As ae E ra JK 0 X 1931 in countries by the north aberl irb by Ger 0 N alliance world rights right reserve felted ds X en including ding the tie 5 reproduction in whole I 1 X orl part prohibited service soliel aff afe CHAPTER continued situation in which wo found As A tile the ourselves regarding artillery ammuel sn approaching a crisis lt it be was 09 aie necessary to lay tile the whole ques came munitions the before board von lard after a full investigation of their S resources both the french and concluded that they could un gb british brit require requirements menis with dermake hike to meet our distinct understanding that their the ants roust must be greatly increased increased in er P city cd and that we should furnish alv arlala als promptly the late gen tasker H U bliss ahlet department general staff of the war represented us in the allied conference md and reported results and agreements reached cached lie he had brought the latest tola ata from home and hla his knowledge concerning steel and munitions enabled bedl to give valuable assistance to my chief of ordnance in our efforts to find solution to the difficult munitions problem A letter from secretary of war baker dated september 10 had only recently been received and gave roe me an a idea 0 of f 60 some me of his problems 11 in part art lie wro wrote t e its as follows q 1 I am especially concerned that our troops should not be engaged in actu al il fighting in france until they are there here in such auch numbers and have made wh fuch thorough preparation that their appearance will be encouraging doth to their own morale and to the spirit of our people here I 1 think it that the germans yea oes without saying rill ill make a very special effort to strike swiftly and strongly against any part art of the line which we undertake to 0 o defend in order to be able to report ort to their people encouragingly bout our participation and also with he object of discouraging our soldiers ind and our people as much as possible in the matter of selecting corps ind and division commanders I 1 constantly feel eel that I 1 ought to ha have ye your advice ind judgment anent from all that you have said aid supplemented by all I 1 have earned elsewhere the need for young nd ind physically strong men Is apparent nd ind I 1 am perfectly willing to go any amit in meeting this requirement at it will of course necessitate pass ing ng over a substantial number of our lder ider generals who are very eager to go 0 o to france and who in their own ideas deas and that of the country have certain right to be preferred but their heir occupation here in the training of if troops Is of course a valuable contribution trib ution to the cause arid and whenever I 1 canteel can feel sure in the selection of the younger io unger wan man that he actually has the capacity to develop to a sufficient clent to justify ills his being preferred to a raan aan of greater experience I 1 shall not hesitate ate mobilizing of army delayed in view of the alie emergency that was so 0 o clearl clearly y set forth by the joffre and balfour missions when they visited the jilted states and and which was con ormed after my arrival in france and sported with all emphasis i I 1 have ever been able to understand the unnecessary ec delay caused by waiting six months for the construction of large antOli ments before calling out men wa ind d assembling them for training 0 courie it was particularly urgent hat bat the specialists and laborers need d in france to build up our fac facilities littles hould have bae been provided as fast as hey could bo be profitably employed but lothling should lave have postponed postpone I 1 d tile the ini mediate mobilization of the combat aits nits of the regular army and the na lonal guard CHAP CHAPTER TElf the units of the twenty sixth dl islon ion maj gen clarence edwards oa manding began to arrive the later part ot of september continued dur ng october and jle fhe early part of no en iber and were now assembled in the e billeting area near Neuf chateau I 1 inspected the division Ro november vember 1 1917 1911 and found the various or presented a very credit bi oe e appearance the officers seemed lert t and id military and the alio personnel aked strong and vigorous their in truc ruction tiOn had bad been carried out under he e direction of brigadier general raub one of the brigade commanders and nd seemed tobe to be welt well advanced the probable situation as to man in which the allies would find heni lem selves in the spring was causa causing ng auch solicitude the germans had bad stured riga in september kerena kepena E Ws power was at an end and tho 01 gov government was established with th lenin and in control he ie situation was such that russia ad lu become acome entirely negligible as far as assistance 0 0 the allies was con arned an 11 analysis of the possible strength of t the e contestants showed that ger nany y would be able to spare a conald erable ie number of divisions from the issaan front careful study by my in in operation cooperation co with the allied rs had it led d to the conclusion that er r total number in tile the west by spring mould d be as I 1 not counting count ln he e possibility Y of tile the added strength f lorty forty eight divisions from austria he e grea greatest test number tile the allies could lister apt according B to estimates would e lw GO visions divisions counting two amerl an idill ionly y could tot nut be counted on to more re than barely hold her own even with the help of tile the eleven allice divisions then on that front other american divisions might pos sibly be in europe by MRY may 1 if they the should arrive according to schedule which was doubtful but they hey would be too late to participate in tile the expected early spring campaign at the low rate of arrival we should not have more than half of tile the twenty one dl di visions promised by the war department rendy ready for service sen ice by june outcome depended on america in this war where the battle lines extended across entire countries coun tiles and in which the qualities of the appo were about equal the aspect largely resolved itself into a consideration of the number and loca tion of divisions on either side the situation was of such a character thal thai it was a question which side could provide the superiority of forces nev nee essary to success in other words tile the outcome would depend upon tile alio nuni mini her of troops that america could semi over all eyes were on the eastern front to allied statesmen the collapse of russia meant possible grave grac political consequences to the allied command ers it forecast tile the release of apprel divisions and tile the increase in the enemy ranks in belgium and northern france to a preponderance that could not be overcome to us it indicated a race between americas best effort to pour our lighting fighting men into france and Germ germans anys best deter mi nation to crush the allies before our soldiers could arrive arrhe in sufficient num bers to dominate the battle battlefield flold faced defeat with allies our estimates of tile the shipping foi troops and supplies as set forth in the plan by which a due proportion of combat and line of communication troops were to form such increment of six divisions would require by june 1 for the shipment of twenty four dl visions a total of over tons no one seemed to know where we wc were to obtain the tons of if shipping in addition to the COO 00 tons we were then supposed to be using it appeared almost certain then that should disaster befall the allied armies that under these conditions we would have to go down with them I 1 always felt certain however that tonnage could be found for our purpose it if the necessary pressure were exerted to force it into use appeals were made continuously and persis bently in an effort boget to get action on tills this vital question but several months elapsed before it really came taken as a whole d the ie apparently apparent lv slow progress of our preparation in europe also caused considerable adverse comment if not dismay among the allies inquiries were made dl erectly by tile unitary and civil officials as to why we did not move more rapidly to which the reply was always lack of shipping new british offensive offense ve immobilized bythe mud of flanders flander where british attacks h biad ad continued intermittently from the end ciul of july to the middle of november with rather excessive losses the british commander in chief turned to it a ni more ore souther 6 portion of his line for tile the final coffell bave of the year choosy choosing n tile C cam am bral front on which to launch the of et fort careful preparations including the concentin con concentration centi aaion of an unusual num her of tanks were made to insure a break through the enemy Is defenses the tanks and abild the infantry were to make an opening through w which aich the th cavalry was to pass and attack ti the fl aliks iks of the enemy then french troops held in rea readi delss ss in the vicinity were to follow As to the question of command of these combined forces forcer when both should become engaged it was to be left to the ho senior general alcor in tile tho vicinity who might be elther either french or british in going over these plans it seemed to me that their idea of securing coop operation cooperation co op c rat on after the french should be begin in part lel cl was as rather vague ngue during tile lie day wo we first went to visit lilt general ing commanding the third aminy who iho explained further details of the attack and the progress already alre ady mud made lie he and his chief of staff were busy receiving news from the front find and felt that till all was ns going well british victory spurs allies the attack was made on a six mlle front and the british had tho the addan tage ago from tile the outset tho the sudden bouch ment of tile tho long line of tanks closely followed by the infantry all tile usual earning lug of long pro artillery bombardment completely surprised the germans the tanks broke li oke wide gaps in the wire and subdued tho the machine gun nests aiding the infantry through the defenses with a minimum of loss the front was rather narrow considering si the depth of tho the objectives A MaNin lual gain of f somo som 0 tour four a and nd a half miles was secured the first day and a greater result was prevented it was said by a serious check to ahe the tanks at for some reason or other the french were not called into action but presumably it was because tho the british cavalry which was vins to precede them could not go forward as planned the offensive continued for two or three days longer with ft ath varying success it was however a decided victory and while not as great as the british expected it gave gae encouragement to the allies on oil the western front and no doubt helped to offset temporarily the depressing effect of the serious defeat recently sustained by the italian army CHAPTER an american mission headed by col n E M house arrived in franco france toward the end of november for an Inte rallie I 1 conference other members of tile mission were admiral W S benson gen tasker 11 bliss chief of staff oscar T crosby for the treasury department part ment vance mccormick McCorm lck chairman of tile alie war trade board baan bridge colby shipping board alonzo 0 taylor thomas N perking ns war industries dus tries and paul cravath Cr As the representatives represent athes of different nationalities gathered in paris recent reports of decreasing losses of ocean tonnage and greater destruction of german submarines with prospects ot of still further improvement seemed to give more of hopefulness in the general situation and allied spirits were somewhat revived the british had won at cambrai and were making satisfactory progress in their advance on jerusalem which it was said would be facilitated by the use of their new base at jaffa the italians seemed to havil have reen recovered vered their morale to a limited extent will tile the stiffening of their lines by british and french divisions and had successfully held their own against the austrian attack on the not the least hopeful tiling was the step just taken toward unity of coln command in the crea creation tion of tile the cu prenie war council but the decisive factor if it could bo be in the w whole hole situation utilized in time was the tremendous economical and physical power of ill the united states to make that available before it was too late was the problem upon tile the solution tirl of which 11 depended the success of the alit allied e 1 I cause would the allies see it ant and would they work together to solve 10 tested coated around the when n all were table in the absei assembly ay iy room at the min astry of foreign affairs rs prime irline alin ter clem clemenceau enchau who presided spoke briefly setting forth tile lie Import importance anc of tho gathering and tile tho necessity of translating tho the spirit of the alie nillance alliance into notion action no attempts nt at oratory were in evidence nor was there prolonged discourse on tiny any subject naturally questions concerning mall u tillable at lo nion man power shipping munitions and supplies were mentioned but only in a general way the conference did little more than agree norfe that tho the study of the various subjects should bo be left to committees com composed posca of representatives it was very clear that everybody was looking to america to provide we the additional man power needed to give the allies superiority none was more eager to increase our forces than our solves but on my part every possible argument to procure shipping had been presented to the allies and to our war department so when the conference urged the tha expedition of our forces it made the strongest kind of a caso case in favor of immediate increase of allied old aid in tonnage for some time reliance upon the allies for any considerable amount of tonnage had bad seemed almost in vain and it looked as though we should have to depend upon our own limited resources for most of it IL the british were giving some assistance in the transportation of men american ships had carried up to november 1 and the british the results of the british success at were not to bo be permanent as the germans quickly retaliated general yon von marwitz hastily assembled a force of some fifteen divisions division and november SO 80 suddenly laun clied a violent counterattack the british were short of reserves and before von marwitz was stopped his troops had regained most of the lost ground it was in tills this operation that a detachment ta tach ment of our eleventh regiment of engineers became engaged while serving with the british the men to the number of were at work in the Gauz acourt railway yard when the germans attacked attached one officer and nine men were wounded and the detachment tach ment withdrew they were then given arms arma and fought with tho the british war council meets again the second conference of the supreme war council was heli held at versailles december 1 our representatives political and military nt at this meeting were mr house alouse and general bliss respectively at the tha opening session bl clemenceau Clemenc cau drew attention to the general situation referring especially to tile tho of russia the pr probable 0 bab 10 release of enemy troops from that front the adverse situation in italy the depletion depiction ot of allied man power and the reliance of the allies on american assistance the premier enjoined the military representatives to bear in mind that their function Is to advise the supreme war council as 1113 a whole who leand and not merely as representatives of their respective spec tive nations on the council and that they should view the problems confronting them |