Show beneral ca lowral VON L W JM cej s storm 0 of t the As A E cis F I 1 V fo 1931 in all 11 ll countries 16 th norm american paper All allback bace world r orld uy iju lilt ill the th scandinavian y A production 1 a in whole aholo or la in part prohibited jonn john J pershing nl n l service e CHAPTER XI continued tho the attack of tile second french army although made astride the mouse river was directed principally against hill mort homme and both famous in the sanu of 1916 to destroy the wire entanglements entangle ments find anil demolish trenches as it tion against heavy losses the assault was preceded by tour four days dais continuous bombardment and relatively tile the amount of arill artillery ry ammunition expended e exceeded ceedee trial that of any previous anh its value b beang e na as I 1 remember it some borne tho the proportion of the artillery force na as compared to the infantry in fit this thin battle was mas as aa eleven to ten tile fir frig attained such precision find and volume that mhd io troops in the for forward lyard were submerged ond and the attacking infantry reached most of its objectives by full the lie first flay day making rin nn advance of ivo five and capturing prisoners tito the sector where the french attach took place was to have a peculiar in terest for pie me before tile end of the war my afy headquarters as of the first army one year later mccu pl pled edthe the building in n bouilly souilly Sou llly illy then lien used by major general le and the line reached by troops trompa in tile tho battle became our jump off line in tho the meuse argonne battle in fact every foot of tile ground covered cohered in tills inspection with general retain became associated later wath americas cai greatest effort in the war detains Pet alna ains contact valuable after visiting the french installations and tile manifold activities carried on behind tills front with the shift Ing masses of combat troops and the thousands engaged in the services of supply and transportation it seemed quite improbable that we should be able to marshal a sufficient army in d time to replace the french on tills this front before 1010 1910 ifould I 1 found it most agreeable as aa welt well as instructive to be with retain in this intimate way and have nn an opportunity to hour bear something of ills fits expert once ills discussion of tile the defense of verdun in which ho fie played fin in imbor trint tant part beig bet g second in command was ans especially entertaining As we drove drova about li ho e spoke of tile the courage coura gt of lils his troops and of tile the tremendous 16 llos losses seEf they had lie ile points pointe A out the vast of road work including tho the vote sacree front from biar IP le pue to verdun rebuilt under lit hi direction fo for r tile tho constant movements of large lare bodies of tr troops oops and supplies necessary to maintain thed tho defense etense in lighter vein ills hla comments on french politicians during tills trip were amusing if not always complimentary nod and he congratulated tile me many times on being so far removed from political interference one afternoon the conversation drifted to ing land and he asked me ino how many times I 1 tied had sat for my portrait alt times already I 1 said tile the last one which was very good was done by a distinguished artist by the name of jonas Un english glish jonah fur for 1 11 lustra tion immediately he said dont let them publish it I 1 dont do iti every i officer whose portrait by jonas has appeared in ili that journal has bl been een re from ills his command not that I 1 am superstitious quite the contrary but I 1 immediately forbade the ahe publication of the portrait and to this day it has never appeared builds up french morale front from the time of Nl Ni velles failure in april the depression in tile drench annlis had and boon so grent that Iet aln whom leoin he fie handled will lui luisito lItO patience and tact CHAPTER XII in view of tile gravity of our ton nage situation it was highly lindor tout tant that it be brought forcibly to them the attention of tile the allies apropos tile the approaching inter allied conference on oil chipping pIng I 1 cabled washington august 23 1017 1917 in part as follows 11 the british and especially ther the french rench have reached absolute limit of mail bian power and an any augment augmentation ailon their military force cannot be expected ln ini pera operative lve tive hasten our organization and training so that we will have the troops contemplated your project in europe for active service by may alay or 01 juno june military tary activities of allies on oil land should be strongly reinforced by corn coni billed navies and destruction dubont bases accomplished it if possible high british army off officers leers confidential cl condemn walting waiting policy british fidmik tilty in view of gravity of ship ping question recommend our govern ment client insist upon aggressive pulley policy by combined and amerlean Ameil Amer leun can navies 11 our position in this war veu acri strong allies now fully nize dependence upon our operation cooperation co and we need not liesl tate demand both aggressive naval policy and full share shipping i american mer acan representative shipping conference be instructed accordingly U 8 advised on Powder Needa Needs meanwhile a study by a joint french arid and american commission of tile the question of production of powders and explosives in france showed allowed that tile the greater part of the raw materi materials alki must be imported and that due to the shipping situation france in decent 1 her or would produce only about half of the current output it was apparent therefore that to avoid calamity th united states must not only furnish W A oia qa N t 14 01 X V k yanks yank learning to use the bayonet who succeed him hall had been content simply to hold tho the trenches and no frach offensive operation ot of consequence had been attempted until ahli one from the moment of hla his assign ment vetale began to build up the shattered tattered at morale of his armies nud and p probably Eo bably no other officer lit in france could have perfo performed the task so well immense success suc cesa in the ue kle bense 0 Verd verdun had won for hlin the confidence ot the army and the court coun try and yet be remained the same lodest unassuming character consist consi st at fi 4 and conservative ale perli alm abier than any other understood up the t ot of the MCI french told loi L powder arid and explosives for all of 0 its own forces but must supply about halt half the french requirements and the war department was so advised by tills this arrangement a large saving of 0 tonnage would be effected as aa the weight of raw materials was ten tv to wenty twenty times that of the finished prod duct As aa nitrates for the manufacture of powder arid and explosives had to be imported from chill tile the hazard to shipping would be reduced by avoiding lie he long haul to france millions of dollars were expended in the construe tion of plants at homo home in an attempt to produce nitrates but none had been turned out before tho the end of tile the war dawes made supply chief in view of the uncertainty of obtain ing frig more than a limited amount of ocetta tonnage it was natural that we ve should procure abroad as largo large a pro portion of supplies as possible and our supply department began at once to make inquiries fo meet tile the demand deman dk for construction material subsistence stores and engineering equipment many sources of general supply had find been developed by tho the french arid and we soon found ourselves not only lit in coul coin petition with them and the british but our different departments also began to bid against each other to my mind the solution seemed to be merely a d matter of ordination coordination co therefore I 1 established a purchasing board to consist of one or more representatives senta tives of each service making purchases of any sort including the red hed cross and X Y al 0 A col charles 0 dawes seventeenth entee nth engineers well known na its it man inan of large business experience wits was appointed etl its a the fiend or of tills this board the members of which were to meet together anil and make known their respective needs and thu then agree hmong among themselves as to where and by which department part ment such buch purchase was to aw made thus mutually assisting instead ot of with each other under the arrangement eo co with tile the french was established and the agency y became increasingly effect effective lye in han adling our procurement activities depend on an french R R s tile the use of railways for tile the movement ot of troops and supplies had never before attained any such lucli proportions rs in tho the world war and ther there was service e except sea apiou upon nu i which we placed greater dependence tor for our success I 1 it t was waa apparent that we could not depend on the fierch without great risk of failure at a critical moment and it was evident that if vae wo expected the maximum efficiency in if atila service we must provide our own personnel as well as additional locomotives and cars all to be as far as aa practicable under american management with tills this plan to view commendable pom gom progress had been mado made toward both procurement and organization by colonel taylor and complete estimates for rolling stock and construction at ports terminals and yards including an accurate survey of building and equipment requirements had been made under his direction by maj W 3 allgus formerly vice president of the now new york central afterward a colonel who had been a member of the board these estimates without change served as a permanent gulde for railway construction plans and material of transportation corps corp As aa ordinate coordinate co with tile the procurement and maintenance of material anti and equipment we were confronted with all the e vital question bof of organization for operation and management hut but we had find no in the lie regular iser service vc of elent experience in railway management to insure success therefore tho the evident course to pursue to which the precedent of both british and french pointed the alie way was to create a transportation corps immediately 0 1 1 X 1 y gen W W atterbury under tinder the direction of some man of outstanding reputation in the rall railroad rodd world in accordance with tile the principle of obtaining tile the most competent men for important pott positions lons the following cable was sent july 20 29 alave ilave made thorough study of railroad situation land and am convinced thit that operation of railroads roust must be under man with large experience in managing in railroads at home successful handling our railroad lines so fin important porta it that ablest men in country should be selected after almost disastrous results with inexperienced military nion men running railroads british selected ablest man could find to have charge transport transportation atlon question hero here mainly one of physical operation and management in intimate relation with french who retain general control which la is necessary to handle ordinary commercial traffic trade Oti question estion of railroad transportation of course involves equipment maintenance and now new construction tit nt front as army advances and should be practically independent department al though nominally under engineers kallman chosen should be sent here without delay together with three or four able assistants of his own selection later on it la Is believed these men should be given appropriate military rank in ili reply the war department recommended om W W Y atterbury then general manager and now president of the I pennsylvania railroad for the place and I 1 immediately requested that he be sent to france CHAPTER XIII kill the most important question that confronted us lit in thy the preparation of our forces or of citizen sold soldiery lery for efti clent service wits training except for tile spanish war nearly twenty years before combat ex es peri ence of the regular iii my lini had leen been limited to tile the independent action of minor commands in the philippines and to two expeditions into mexico text each with forces smaller than a mod I 1 ern american 1 division I Iv Islon tito the world war involved the ban tiling or of musses where even it 11 div division islon wn ans relatively 1 I small unit it wits was one thin thins tt tc ciol call or men to the he colors and little another thins thing to transform teni cn inta an or instructed army capable of weeti jig abid holding its own in battle against the best trained force tn in ku fu rope with three years actual war experience Ier peri lence ence to its credit A general scheme of schools for the A E F was prepared by tile the operations and training sl section but in order that tills this instruction should be as corn com pleta and uniform ns as possible and tit at the same time be coordinated co with other activities I 1 declared that train ing should be handled by officers who could devote their entire time to it an ali additional section of the headquarters staff therefore was estall established saied callei called the lie training section to function under tinder my personal direction As chief of tills this section col paul it klalo malono ne wl was 5 chosen with col 11 B fiske a as s his assistant the british mett iuds of tea teaching colln trench warfare to me very verv strongly they tacit their men to 0 o lie be aggressive and under undertook wok tu to pi perfect them lit in hand to hand fighting with bayonet gre grenade in i de arid and dagger A certain alli junt t tills this kind of was wag necessary eMiry ty astl stimulate the ciorca of troops by giving them confidence in their own personal prowess through the kindness of sir douglas haig we were fortunato fortun nto fite early in our experience to have assigned to us gen clen it 11 II K butler and other officers of the british arbyto army to assist in this individual training latee on several french and british officers also came to lecture at a number of our schools we ve found diff difficulty leutty however in list using ag these allied aillem instructors lit in that the french and to a large extent the british had practically settled down to the conviction flint developments develop menta since 1014 bad tile the principles of wa warfare both field that new conditions imposed by trench fighting had rendered previous conceptions of training more or less obsolete and that preparation for open warfare no longer arwas was necessary french publications and manuals were generally in accord with tills theory it if the french doctrine efad prevailed our instruction would have been limited to a brief period of training for trench A new army brought up entirely on such principles would have been seriously handicapped without the protection of the trenches it would pro probably babli have lacked the aggressiveness gressi veness to break through the ene eine mys lines and the knowledge of how to carry on oil thereafter it was evident that tile the victory could not be wun won by tins tile costly process of attrition brition tri tion but that we should have to drive the enemy out into the open and engage him in a war of movement instruction st in open warfare was based upon individual find and group initiative resourcefulness and tactical judgment w which litch were of equal advantage in trench warfare therefore we took decided issue with tile the allies arid without mcgl neglecting act thorough p preparations i rel in ration s for trench warfare undertook to train mainly for open warfare with the object from froin the start of vigorously forcing the offensive rifle practice urged intimately connected with the thea ques tion of training for open |