Show general Perching j aning an to ing 49 9 S X X story ty of the A E I 1 V W 0 X copyright 1931 in by the North amerl by vassi general oan can newspaper alliance world rights brel rr ved el In ludins the scandinavian lit reproduction epro in whole abo ff or in part prohibited service john J JF pershing X CHAPTER 11 II continued the secretary of war much to tie he disappointment of colonel roosevelt wisely made an adverse decision in hla his case which wits was confirmed by the president it was evident that both mr wilson and secretary baker were looking for trained leaders and were determined determine to avold avoid the embarrass bent ament president lincoln experienced in them the civil war when lie he was more or less driven to III 1111 ninny high positions with political appointees who in the end had tp to he be replaced by nien men trained in the military profess profession lon Roosevel ts plea for sons the following letter from colont colonti I If roosevelt loosevelt dated may 17 1017 1917 will how ashow tits his own one fine attitude my aly dear general pershing 1 I very heartily congratulate you and especially the people of the united states upon your selection to lend lead the expeditionary lorce force to the front when I 1 was endeavoring to persuade the tie secretary of war to permit we me to raise a division or two of volunteers I 1 stated that if you or some men like you were to command the he expeditionary force I 1 could raise the hie divisions divis lons without trouble 1 I write you now to request tha my two sons theodore roosevelt tr jr aged twenty seven and bald B roosevelt aged twenty three both ot or harvard be allowed 0 to o t c nilst as privates with you to KO 90 over ever with the first troops the fortner former Is a major and the latter it captain in the officers reserve arps corps they tire are at plattsburg Platts burg for their third summer my dah own belief Is that competent men of their standing and tank runk can gain very little from a third summer at plattsburg Platts burg and that they should be utilized n as j officers even it if only as second ile lieutenants but they are keenly to see service and it they serve under you at the front slid and are not killed they will be far better able to instruct the draft army next fall or next winter or whenever they are sent home than they will be after spending the summer tit at Platts plattsburg burg the president has announce announced il that only regular officers are to go you and if this Is to be the invariable rule then I 1 apply on behalf of my iny two sons that they may serve under you as enlisted men to go to the front with the first arst troops droops sent over trusting to hear that this request has been granted I 1 am ain with great respect very sincerely yours THEODORE ROOSEVELT 11 S if I 1 were physically nt fit instead of old and heavy and stiff steffi I 1 should myself ask to go under you in any capacity down to and including a sergeant but at my age and con condition diton I 1 suppose lint flint I 1 could not do worl ork you would consider ons lder worth while in the fighting line my iny only line in a lower grade than brigade commander CHAPTER III our deplorable situation as to mu aulont was fully discussed at a conference cun called by secretary of war maker may alay 10 it was brought out that we had for foe assue not in the lianda of troops fewer than alian springfield rifles caliber 30 only a few more than light field guns three inch and heavy field guns As aa it was impossible because of manufacturing difficulties for our factories to turn out enough springfield within a reasonable time the secretary decided to adopt the enfield ville line for our infantry it was then being manufactured for the british in large quantities at private factories in our country and a slight modification of the chamber only was wag necessary to make it fit our ammunition the total production of this rifle exceeded 2 during the war As to machine guns it was reported to the lie conference that we li had ad a few less than 1500 and these were offous of four types congress in 1910 had appio appropriated for machine guns iut but the war department had not derided definitely to adopt any particular one for our army although an order imd had been placed late in 1010 for n quantity of the lie heavy vickers maxims short on ammunition of artillery except for the three luch inch we did not have enough to provide more than nine hours sup blip ply even for the limited number of guns on linail firing tit nt the rate ardt used use in laying down barrage for tin an In infantry attack the rhe situation at unit time ns as to aviation wits such that hint every american ought to feel deeply chagrined to u it ft iiren boned of 05 G and about 1000 men inen in the nir service section of the signal SIKH corps there were 35 ollI cers who could fly with the exception of live or six off leem none or of thou could imp aliet the requirements of modern battle con x y 1 4 t i T i IA col theodore roosevelt editions lions and none had any technical experience per lence with aircraft guns bombs bombi or bombing devices we had some fifty live five training planes unes in various conditions of usefulness ful iness ness all entirely without war equip betit of these planes it Is amusing now to recall that the national advis ory committee for aeronautics which had been conducting nn an alleged eclen title study of the problem of light advised that fifty one were obsolete and four others obsolescent we could not have put a single squadron in the field although it was estimated that we should eventually need at least squadrons each to be composed on the average of some 24 off leers men and 18 IS planes he be sides a large reserve of 0 planes for replacements among other subjects considered with the secretary wits was the assembly for training of the national guard and the men to come la in under the draft in lieu of any previous plans the se secretary creary contemplated the construction of df cantonments canton ments in different parts of the country and may 7 the com mantling manding generals of the several de apartments part ments were directed to select sites ahtes the actual construction of canton mei ments ants was not begun until nearly three months after we were in the way war and so great was the task of erecting buildings and putting in water works and sewers that some ninety days more elapsed by the time these centers ce titers of instruction were ready to receive troops thus it was with some exceptions practically six months before beford the training of our army was under way even then several of these camps were not favorably located and training was seriously handicapped during the fall and winter months rivalry for our troops about tills this time the allies brought up the question of utilizing our men to build up their armies As we shall see the subject nrose arose from time to time in one form or another and wo we had to fight against it until the end or of the war both the french and british missions under mi al rene vivinne and arthur 0 balfour Ba four respectively then in our country were very keen to have us consent to fill up the ranks of their armies with americans I 1 was decidedly against our bacorn egl e ei X Z P 1 t y y li A i A 3 fl I 1 p fa k f ar as ma j I 1 1 y fe troops of first division leaving mexican border for new york ik w tac tonii iny ing a recruiting agency fur for either the french or british find and at that titue thue this was the attitude of the war department anit apartment part ment also while fully realizing the it was definitely understood der stood between the secretary of war und me ine that we should proceed to or gancz our own units from top to bottom und build n distinctive army of our own us its rapidly na its possible the evident rivalry between the british and french for control and ti use tire re of our forces even before we lind had an army in the field confirmed my iny impression that those two governments were not working entirely in harmony As to their ar armies niles it had been apparent for some time that there was a lack of operation cooperation co between then them their efforts were often separate and distinct that Is first one and then the other would attack friends sought to go along although it was not generally known that I 1 was to go abroad there was a alood of applications to accompany me ine one of them was it a personal appeal f for or service in any capacity by my old friend robert bacon who had been ambassador to france lie ile had already given valuable aid to the allied cause and because of his intimate knowledge of the french people and his tact fact and discretion I 1 wits was glad to have film A few days before ny my departure while nt at lunch at the metropolitan club with charles K N I 1 magoon ex gov arnor of culm cuba charles G dawes joined us the three of us ua had been friends in the days when we were together a at t lincoln neb magoon and dawes as young lawyers the latter with n decided talent for business and I 1 its as military instructor at the state university dawes was an applicant for a commission in one of the engineer regiments then being organized under the direction of samuel felton from volunteers utie erR with experience in railroading and wanted me to help him get the appointment I 1 asked him whether tre hb know knew anything about engineering anti and he said that when a youth he hail had carried a chain a mouth month or so tor for a survey surveyor r in ohio in was not much impressed with hig as an engineer or as n prospective military possibility but I 1 did have knowledge of his business ability and experience and knew lie he be valuable to in sonio boia tion requiring hla his qualifications BO so BOI I spoke to the secretary of war in hla behalf requests froin from national guard boffl cers and from governors for the early acceptance of their state units liter silly poured into the war department the clamor became so general and so insistent that the secretary of war ivar happily conceived the idea of forming a composite division to include troops troop from every state in the union I 1 thought the suggestion a good one anti and gave it my hearty indorsement endorsement Indor this was afie origin of the forty second rainbow division which was later to distinguish itself in several engagements sly my first and my only meet meeting ing with president wilson until after the armistice occurred may alay 24 1017 1917 when I 1 called on him with secretary of war baker after some con conversation w with ith mr baker on shipping mr air wilson turned to roe me general we are giving you some difficult tasks these days said the president perhaps so I 1 replied but that Is what we are trained to expect mr president dent the president then mentioned my experience in mexico and inquired about my acquaintance with france I 1 had expected him to say something about the part our army should play in the war var but he said nothing promised full support upon leaving I 1 said mr president I 1 appreciate the honor you have conferred upon me by the assignment you have given me and I 1 realize the responsibilities it I 1 ties it entails but you ca can count upon the best that la Is in me to this the president replied replie df i general you were chosen entirety entirely upon your record and I 1 have evary every confidence that you will succeed eucce ed you shall have my full support The President then asked me to con vey to the icing of great britain and to the president ent of france tits his gret greet ings and best basi wishes his manner was cordial with his poise and his ale air of determination nis his assurance of confidence tn in me was gratifying but in the difficult situations that arose later the manner of alding aiding tile the allies he wa was inclined to yield to the persistent im of the allied representatives ltv in washington I 1 in the actual conduct of operations I 1 1 I 1 was given entire freedom and in 1 this respect was to enjoy an experience unique in the history of american wars letter making him chief may alay 27 1017 the day before iwas to salt sail from new york secretary baker sent me a letter of instructions concerning my command C and duties in europe which id quoted tn in full the president directs direct fi me to t communicate to you I 1 ia 1 l rc 11 1 the president designates you to co command all the land alie forces of alio united milled states operating tit in continental antl in the lie united kingdom of great real britain and ireland including tiny any part of the anni ine corps may lie he detached for service there with the army from froin your coni coin fire are excepted the military attaches and others of the army jaho aho vho uny may be on duty directly with our our several embassies 2 T you will proceed with ith your staff to I lurose upon arrival in orent areat britain france or any other of the countries tit nt war with the imperial german ler nian government you will ot at once place yourself tn in communication muni cation with the american embassy ind and through its agency with tho the authorities of any country to which the alio forces of the united states may inny b lie sent 3 you tire invested with the authority and duties devolved by the law regulations regula tlona orders nud and cu customs of the united states upon the commander of nu an army in the lie held field in time of war find and with the authority and duties in like manner devolved upon department commanders in pence anti and war including the special authorities a and duties assigned to the lie commander of the philippine department in so far as the same are applicable to the particular circumstances of your command U S forces forca separate 4 1 you will establish after consultation sul tation with the french war wa r all necess necessary irry bases lines of depots etc and make all the Inel incidental dental arrange ments essential to active part lel pation at the front 15 B in ralli military tary operations against the imperial german go government V you are directed to vo io operate ate with forces of the other countries employed against that enemy but in so doing the underlying idea most be kept apt in view that the forces of the united states are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces the identity of which must he be preserved abis fundamental rule Is subject to such minor excel tlona in dar circumstances as your judgment may inny approve the decision as to when your command or any of its parts aarts Is ready for action Is conf confided laed to you and you will exercise full discretion tn in determining the manner oi of operation cooperation co but until the forces of tho the united states ore are in your judgment sufficiently strong to warrant as an independent command it la Is understood der stood that you will operate cooperate co L as a component of w whatever I 1 in t evet army araby you may be assigned to b by y the e french government G you will keep tho the depart ment fully advised of nil all that con eans SW command and your recommendations Q V A a t charles 0 dawes in war wap time freely and directly to the department and in general you are vested with all necessary author ity to carry on the war vigorously in harmony with the spirit of these instructions and toward a victorious conclusion signed NEWTON D BAKER party salle sails in secrecy T on the date of my sailing may 28 I 1 pl ruy nty party assembled at ars s island newyork New York all had baa anen i I 1 instructed acted to proceed with the uti utmost 0 st sar secrecy aey even wearing civilian clothes until they A vera ere a board aboard the atie steamship baltic although we ourselves stole silently out brut through the fog and down dowd the bay the large number of quartermasters and other off officers leers stationed near york dashing around in uniform rather ostentatiously that |