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Show MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1974 INTERMOUNTAIN COMMERCIAL RECORD PAGE NINE In The Supreme Court of The State of Utah action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment. It seems ing fraud, mistake, undue influence, with regular service of process, appropriate specificity as basis for the invocation of equity, and the rest of the trim- mings. We think the authorities cited by plaintiff, 2 on careful analysis, deal with entirely different situations not covered by the statutes and are not disposi- clear to us that the above language has to do with the attorney-clielien relationship in connection with the lawsuit, including the judgment, which in turn includes the proceeds of the judgment, - nothing more, - and does not include any right in the attorney personally to execute against any other That is the of the parties. prerogative client, and the attorney under the above section could, at best, claim some interest in the proceeds of the judgment, such as land or chattels, or by contract with his client. The record reveals no tangible proceeds received by plaintiff. Had it so revealed, the attorney could have pursued such proceeds. nt tive here. There appears to be no interdiction about reinstating the satisfaction of judgment. If it has not been done, we order the lower cotfrt to issue an order to' that effect. WE CONCUR: The above section is subservient to Rule 58B(a) which reads as follows: (a) Satisfaction by Owner or Attorney. A judgment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any or all of the judg- ment debtors, by the owner thereof, or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor where no assignment of the judgment has been filed and such attorney executes such satisfaction within(eight years after the entry of the judgment in the following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the judgment in the county where first docketed, with the date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. E, R. Callister, Jr. , Chief Justice A. II. Ellett, Justice J. Allan Crockett, Justice R. L. Tuckett, Justice In this case the plaintiff was the owner of the judgment, duly acknowledg- ing and satisfying it in the county where it was first docketed. This act became fait accompli, and could be undone only by a conventional action in equity, claim Nilene Afton Eskelson, Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 13604 FILED v. December 6, 1974 Allen C. Eskelson, Defendant and Respondent. Allan E. Mecham, Clerk TUCKETT. Justice: On January 7, 1974, the plaintiff filed a motion wherein she requested that the court grant her judgment for arrearages due under a ' interest in certain shares of stock prior divorce decree, for a one-ha- lf and for attorney's fees. From an adverse decision the plaintiff appeals. The plaintiff initiated these proceedings for a divorce on May 1, and on May 22, 1972, the defendant was served with summons in 1972, the state of Nevada. Temporary order was made and entered by the court on July 20, 1972, which granted the plaintiff custody of a minor child and temporary alimony and support money. A decree was entered on August 9, 1972, which granted to the plaintiff alimony in the sum of $500 per month and $75 per month as child support. Plaintiff was also awarded the equity in the family home and other property as well as attorney's fees. On November 9, 1972, defendant moved the court to set aside the decree and to stay the running of the interlocutory period. The court entered an ex parte order extending the interlocutory provision of the decree until the further order of the court. On January 16, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing that the marriage of the parties be terminated and that other matters be held in abeyance to be disposed of at the time the court heard the defendant's motion to set aside the decree. An order based upon the stipula Mack Financial Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent 2. Jeffries v. Third Jud. Dist. Ct. , 90 Utah 525, 63 P. 2d 242 (1936); Potter v. Ajax Min. Co., 19 Utah 421, 57 P. 270. tion was made and entered on January 16, 1973. On April 30, 1973, the court made and entered an order setting aside the decree and granted to the defendant the right to answer the complaint as to all matters except the termination of the marriage. No appeal was taken to review the action of the court in that particular period. Trial was had on July 11, 1973, on the issues raised by the comand the. defendant's answer. The record indicates that during the plaint pendency of the action the defendant was disabled by reason of accidental injuries and that his income was meager. The court at the conclusion of the hearing awarded the plaintiff the custody of the minor child and the sum of $128 per month as support money, that being the sum received from Social Security for child support, the same to continue until the further order of the court. Plaintiff was awarded the family home but the defendant was awarded an equitable lien upon the property in the sum of $4, 000 to be paid upon the remarriage of the plaintiff; or when the minor child reached his majority; or upon the sale of the home by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was also awarded $1. 00 per year alimony. The other property of the parties was divided by the court. An amended decree was entered on September 18, 1973. It is the plaintiff's contention that she is entitled to judgment for the amount of temporary alimony provided for by order of the court and for the alimony provided for by the decree which was entered and which was later set aside. The court below was of the opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment for the amounts which had accumulated prior to trial on the issues. The decree on which the plaintiff bases her claims was set aside by the court and no appeal having been taken, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff's claim for arrearages in alimony and support money as well as attorneys fees is without basis in law. " I. The decision and order of the court below is affirmed. awarded. , Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. , W. J. Digby, Scott Trucking and Lcc .Scott, Defendants and Appellant. FILED costs December 6, 1974 Other than the above, the only activity of Nevada in Utah claimed by Financial is that the trucks had been driven over Utah highways. Allan E. Mecham, Clerk Financial claims, and the court held, that the activities enumerated above did constitute the doing of business so as to give the courts of Utah jurisdiction over Nevada under our long arm statute. The driving of a motor vehicle over Utah highways will give jurisdiction over a nonresident in cases where damages result therefrom, but it is not in and of itself "doing business within this state. " ELLETT, Justice: Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Nevada; appeals from an adverse judgment and particularly from a refusal of the court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over it. It is a foreign corporation, not authorized to do business in Utah. Its business is renting or leasing trucks, tractors, and trailers. The words "transaction of business within this state" are defined by our statute2 to mean "activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or 1. Sections and 25, U.C.A. 1953 (1973 Pocket Supplement). 2. Section U.C.A. 1953 (1973 Pocket Supplement). representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah. " 78-27-- 78-27-- Mack Financial Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Financial, subsidiary of Mack Trucks, Inc. , a Delaware corporation, and is authorized to do business in Utah. is a No This action was then commenced in Utah against Nevada and others. Nevada timely moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over it by the court. No. 13603 v. See Edwards v. Edwards, 182 Kan. 737, 324 P. 2d 150. 24 23, wholly-owne- d In August, 1967, and again in January, 1968, Mack This court had occasion to set forth the activity which would constitute the doing of business in Utah in the case of Hill v. Zale Corporation. 3 Trucks, Inc., sold to Nevada some trucks on conditional sales contracts. The sales were made in Denver, Colorado, and the contracts and all rights thereunder were assigned by the seller to Financial. Nevada experienced'difficulty in making payments as required by the contracts and requested an extension of time. This request was granted, and prices and terms were adjusted on a printed form which was signed by Nevada in Denver, Colorado. Nevada still had financial difficulties and made arrangements with Scott Trucking, a business entity in Boise, Idaho, to take the trucks and to assume the payments as they came due. The original conditional sales contracts forbade an assignment by Nevada without the permission of the seller or its assignee. An officer of Nevada came to Utah to request consent to the assignment. Financial made' its own investigation of Scott Trucking, prepared assignments on its own forms, took them to Boise, Idaho, to be signed by Scott Trucking, and then to Denver, Colorado, where Nevada signed. It then consented in writing to the assignments. Scott Trucking failed to make the payments as required, and Financial took possession of the trucks in Denver, Colorado. . Applying the requirements therein set forth leads us to conclude that Nevada was not doing any business in Utah which would give our courts jurisdiction over it by way of the long arm statutes. The judgment, therefore, must be and it is hereby reversed. Costs are awarded to the respondent. WE CONCUR: E. R. Callister, Jr. , Chief Justice F. Henri Henriod, Justice J. Allan Crockett, Justice R. L. Tuckett, Justice 3. 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332 (1971). .HA, fek, |