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Show MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1974 Link Trucking, Inc. , In The Supreme Court of The State of Utah whether or commodities, Plaintiff, No. 13560 v. Public Service Commission of Utah, and Dalbo, Inc. , Trans Western Tankers, Bowen Trucking Co. , Inc. and Northwestern Carriers, FILED September 26, 1974 , Allan E. Mecham, Clerk Defendants. TUCKETT, Justice: its own initiative, the Public Service Commission entered into an investigation and suspension proceeding with respect to the rates, tariffs, practices and authority of Link Trucking, Inc. , (hereinafter referred to as Link) in the transportation of bulk oil field drilling fluids. The plaintiff is here seeking a review of the proceedings and the order of the Commission. On i The Commission ordered Link to cease and desist from transporting hydrafracturing fluids, salt water brine, water and other fluids used for the purpose of drilling, completing, reworking and perpetuation of oil wells in Utah, and it also cancelled the tariff of Link for the transport of the above mentioned materials in tank vehicles. Prior to September, 1972, Link had not engaged in the transportation of drilling fluids. Thereafter Link leased equipment suitable for the purpose and commenced hauling oil field drilling fluids in bulk in November, 1972. Link continued to transport drilling fluids until shortly prior to the hearing of this matter by the Commission on May 23, 1973. . In the years prior to the occurrences now under consideration Link and its predecessors have held a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The authority granted to Link is in the following language: To operate as a common . PAGE NINE INTERMOUNTAIN COMMERCIAL RECORD carrier by motor vehicle for the transportation of general commodities except acid and petroleum products in bulk, and except commodities which by reason of their weight, size and shape require special equipment and special handling, over regular and irregular routes as follows: not bulk oil field and authority to transport general Link come fluids within The certificate exused that classification. drilling cludes authority to transport commodities "which by reason of their weight, size and shape require special equipment and special handling. " After the hearing of this matter, the Commission found that Link's authority embraces general commodities with specific exclusions and the drilling fluids are commodities which by reason of their weight, size and shape require special equipment and special handling and are consequently not embraced in Link's limited authority to transport "general commodities." The Commission concluded that Link should be ordered to cease and desist from transporting drilling fluids until such time as it has secured authority therefor. It appears that the findings of the Commission are based upon the evidence that the transportation of drill ing fluids requires the use of tank trucks equipped with special pumps. Those persons and corporations engaged in the selling of drilling fluids utilize special equipment to transport those products due to the fact that the use of standard equipment is not economically feasible. The terms "general commodities" and "property" commonly found in certificates of convenience and necessity have been delineated by the Commission in its prior decisions. No attempt has been made to define those terms so as to make them apply to all certificates generally. The scope of such authority may vary due to different conditions at the time the certificate was issued and therefor the meaning of the terms "general commodities" and "property" have been based upon the facts of each case. This court has not attempted to define those terms generally and to apply them to all certificates. In this case it appears that Link initiated a new service in the transpor- tation of drilling fluids, which was in direct competition with existing carriers. , The determination by the Commission that the authority of Link to haul general commodities did not authorize it to transport liquid drilling fluids was not unreasonable, or arbitrary and it appears to be based upon the evidence. As this court has said in prior cases, the Commission is best suited to determine what its orders mean. 2 We find no error in the decision of the Commission which would require a reversal by this court. The decision of the Public Service Commission is affirmed. No costs awarded. 1 . Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, Utah 2d 72, 368 P. 2d 590; Uintah'Freightways v. Public Service Commission, 15 Utah 2d 221, 390 P. 2d 238. The basic issue in this proceeding is the interpretation to be given Link'i 2. Reaveley v. Public Service Commission, 20 Utah 2d 237, 436 P. 2d 797. 1. . . . Transwestern General Agency, Plaintiff and Respondent, ated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: No. 13547 v. FILED Carl Morgan and Joe Campbell, September 30, 1974 dba Joe Campbell Construction Company, Defendants and Appellant. (1) The transaction of any business within this state; (2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state; Allan E. Mecham, Clerk The causing of any injury within this state whether ' tortious or by breach of warranty; The (4) ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state; Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. (3) TUCKETT, Justice: The defendant Joe Campbell appeals from an order of the district court denying his motion to quash the service of summons made upon him in the state of Idaho. On April 1, 1970, the defendant Joe Campbell requested Carl Morgan, an insurance agent in the state of Idaho, to procure for him a policy of liability insurance. Morgan contacted the plaintiff,, and the plaintiff wrote a policy of insurance affording coverage to Campbell. On August 23, 1972, the plaintiff filed this action in the district court of Salt Lake County wherein it seeks to recover the premium earned on the policy while it was in force. Summons was served upon Campbell in the state of Idaho, and upon his failure to answer a default judgment was entered against him on October 3, 1972. After the entry of judgment the defendant Campbell moved the court to quash the service of summons. On November 29, 1973, the court made and entered an order denying Campbell's motion, which order recited that the matter was argued and briefs submitted on behalf of the parties, and that the court thereafter took the matter under advisement. Prior to that order the record indicates that the motion by Campbell to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was before another division of the court which ordered that the matter be stricken for lack of prosecution when neither side appeared at a hearing on the motion. There is some confusion in the record but it would appear that the order striking the motion was not intended to dispose of the case but only to strike it from that particular calendar. The record shows that the plaintiff corporation is authorized to do business in the state of Idaho as well as in the state of Utah. Plaintiff elected to file its complaint in Utah and to serve a summons upon the defendU. C. A. 1953, ant Joe Campbell pursuant to the provisions of Section follows: as of which read pertinent parts 78-27-- a-- 24, .d No. 13624 FILED v. September 30, 1974 The Industrial Commission of Utah and Kay A. Reid, Defendants. 02, 'whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumer- a Utah corporation. The State Hafer's Inc. Fiwd, Insurance Plaintiffs, Any person, notwithstanding section 13 (6) ' However, it does not appear that the defendant Joe Campbell engaged in any business in the state of Utah other than procuring the policy of insurance from the plaintiff through his agent in the state of Idaho. This single transaction which was initiated in the state of Idaho is insufficient to meet the requirements of the statute above referred to, nor does it meet the criterea set forth in our prior decision of Hill v. Zale Corporation as to "doing business" and minimal contacts sufficient to establish a business presence in this state. The district court should have quashed the service of summons on the defendant Joe Campbell. The order of the court below denying the defendant Joe Campbell's motion to quash the service of summons is an appeal of an order even though the motion was made after the entry of judgment. 2 it is the plaintiff's contention that the defendant Joe Campbell did not take his appeal within the time specified by Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It appears that the time expired on a Saturday, and that the notice of appeal which was filed on the following Monday was in time in view of the provisions of Section 17-16- -9, C.A. 1953. This matter is reversed and remanded to the court below with directions to quash the service of summons as to the defendant Joe Campbell. The defendant Campbell is entitled to costs. U. ' 1. 2. ' Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332. State Tax Commission v. Larsen, 100 Utah 103, HOP. 2d 558. 25 car and was reimbursed for all expenses of its operation and maintenance. Preparatory to a sales trip the next day, on Sunday morning, May 31, 1970, he took the car'to the Shamrock Service Station in Magna for service; and also to repair andor adjust what is called a "Monroe -- Mat ic" overload shock absorber on one of the rear wheels. The car was placed on the rack and he himself was under it working with the shock absorber when he was injured. It is indicated that the shock absorber is what is called "spring-loaded"; Allan E. Mecham, Clerk CROCKETT, Justice: .Plaintiff, Hafer's Inc. , employer, seeks reversal of an order of the Industrial Commission awarding workman's compensation to defendant Kay A. Reid for inmries he suffered in working on one of plaintiff's automobiles which was assigned to him for use as a salesman. Hafer's is a supplier of machinery, auto parts and accessories based at Salt Lake City. It employed Mr. Reid as a traveling salesman to cover states. He was furnished a company designated parts of Utah and surrounding and that in working with it, it slipped and struck Mr. Reid a blow on the head, resulting in a subdural hemorrhage and the injuries and disability for which this award was made. Plaintiff's argument is that repairing the automobile was something not reasonably to be anticipated in the work of a salesman; that it is more dangerous and substantially increases the risk of injury; and that accordingly it should not be considered as arising out of or within the scope of his employment as required by the statute as a predicate to workman's compensation. as the plaintiff contends, that doing mechanical work on an automobile is not normally regarded as part of the duties of a salesman. Nevertheless, the scope of one's employment includes not only those things which are the direct and primary duties of the assigned job; but It is to be conceded, |