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Show PAGE EIGHT MONDAY, INTERMOUNTAIN COMMERCIAL RECORD APRIL 8, 1974 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH (Continued from Page 7) thereof; initead, he was involved in other delinquent behavior. The court was of .the opinion that it would be obliged to lend Salas to the industrial school. However, a representative of the school, Mr. Richeson, testified that there was little likelihood of rehabilitating the young man in one of their programs; and, assuming the facts alleged in the petition, Salas could constitute a hazard to other people at the school. "The juvenile court ruled that the foregoing factors, together with his age, established grounds for the certification of Salas. The court observed that in the past, while Salas was contacting his probation officer, he had committed other serious delinquent acts, which were indicative of his failure to assist in his own rehabilitation. The court was of the opinion that it was inappropriate at this point to send Salas to the industrial school, and if he were tried and found guilty, then the adult facilities for rehabilitation could be applied rather than the ineffective juvenile facilities.' The court stated that since the young man's best chance to be rehabilitated was through the adult system, it was to his best interest to be certified. U. C. A. 1953, as On appeal, Salas contends that Section amended 1971, is unconstitutional and denies him due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah. He urges that this statute does not establish any standards to limit or guide the juvenile court judges in the exercise of their discretion to waive jurisdiction, and the statute is therefore, void for 55-10-- ' 86, 55-10-- provides: 86, If the petition in the case of a person fourteen years of age or older alleges that he committed an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, and if the court after full in-- .. vestigation and a hearing finds that it would be contrary to the The standard of "the best interest of the child or of the public" is further wherein it is provided that the purpose of the act amplified in Section iS'to secure for each child, coming before the juvenile court, the care, guidance and discipline required to assist him to develop into a responsible citizen, and at the same time, to protect the community and its individual citizens against juvenile violence and law breaking. 55-10-- The foregoing provisions create a specific statutory standard within which the juvenile court must exercise its discretion. The juvenile judge may not arbitrarily or capriciously grant or deny certification. The legislature wisely declined to set out with particularity the innumerable factors which might promote the best interests of the child or the public or the weight or consequences to be placed on each if a conflict between the two objectives occurred. In State v. Doyal, the court responded to the same challenge as urged in the 'instant case: . . . The considerations that might so move a judge are so multifarious, however, that to test validity of legislation by an omission to list them would be almost equivalent to attempting of being upright and good. to name all Finally, Salas claims that he was not accorded the "full investigation" He asserts that the evidence adduced was required under Section insufficient to determine his individual needs. This argument is inconsistent with the Btandard set forth previously. He asserts that the court failed to accompany its waiver with a statement sufficient to indicate that the statutory requirements had been met. There is no merit to this contention. In an oral decision preceding his issuance of the formal certification order, the juvenile judge specifically set forth his reasons and the matters he considered in making his deter-- , mination. These reasons were in the record, and a summary thereof has xbeen set forth in this opinion. The statement was sufficient to demonstrate the statutory requirement of "full investigation" had been met; that the issues had been carefully considered; and that the basis for the order had sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review. '' 86. The order of the juvenile court is affirmed. 59 N. M. 4b4, 286 P. 2d 306, 310 (1955). InreF.R.W. Wise, 212 N. W. 2d 130 (1973); State v. Jimenez, 84 N. M. 335, 50 J P. 2d 315 (1972); Lewis v. State, 86 Nev. 889, 478 P. 2d 168 (1970); State v. Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 416 P. 2d 259 (1966); United States v. Caviness, (US DC DC, 1965) 239 F.Supp. 545; State v. Shipp, 59 Cal. 2d 845, 31 Cal.Rptr. 457, 382 P. 2d 577 (1963). 1. 2. , Lewis v. State, note 2, supra; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 56l, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966). L.Ed. 2d 84, 97, FILED April Wheeler Machinery Company, a corporation, 1, 1974 Allan E. Mecham, Clerk Defendant and Respondent. Mr. Hards had never seen the unit before and did not know where the switch button was. In answer to an inquiry, he had told the plaintiff and Williams that the blades should be rotated with a bar and not by the use of the motor. Even if he had known that they were intending to remove the inner bolts, he had no duty to supervise them in that work. Especially was he under no obligation to tell them not to accidentally start the motor while a hand was inside the housing. ELLETT, Justice; This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of no cause of action, notwithstanding a verdict in his favor. Since the jury found in his favor, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to his case. However, since there Is not much dispute as to the facts of this case, we are at liberty to apply the law without regard to the effect it will have on either party. . We are unable to see any negligence on the part of Mr. Hards at all and certainly none which could be attributed to Wheeler Machinery Company. Mr. Hards was sent to do the very job which plaintiff and Williams were already trying to do when he arrived. He neither solicited their help nor had any authority to employ them on behalf of his employer. The action arose out of an accident that occurred August 8, 1968, when appellant was attempting to service machinery located at a road construction site where he was working. When injured, he was an employee of Gibbons and Reed, the contractor on the job, and was being supervised by Demar W. Brimhall, a man for whom he had previously worked cally, for a period of 20 to 25 years prior to the accident. Mr. Brimhall owned, as part of his equipment, a Caterpillar electric generating set permanently housed in a mobile trailer. The diesel-drive- n generating unit had been purchased from Wheeler Machinery Company, defendant herein, D-3- Even if it be assumed that he had any authority to enlist their help, then they were engaged in the same employment, 1 and the plaintiff could not sue the defendant. 43 The trial court should have granted the respondent's motion for a directed verdict, and there was no error on the court's part in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In 1963. At the time of the accident Brimhall was employed by the Gibbons and Reed Construction Company for work at a road construction project near Snowville, Utah. Gibbons and Reed also employed Brimhall' s regular employees, including appellant and one Elmer Williams, for work on the project under Brimhall1 s supervision. Brimhall had leased his equipment to Gibbons and Reed, and it was being used on the job. The judgment is affirmed; and costs are awarded to the respondent. 1. Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P. 2d 997 (1972). 2. Section U.C.A. 1953 (Replacement Vol. 4). 35-1-- DARWIN mechanic to repair the leak. Brimhall testified that he told the plaintiff and Mr, Williams that a mechanic was coming and that they two should "get their stored supplies, and whatever they had, out of the way, and to be ready for him when he got there; 11 Mr, Williams testified, "Well, he just said that they had a man coming out from Wheeler's to put a new oil seal in the generator and he wanted us to get it separated and have it all cleaned out so's that the man could work on it. " M. BROUGH EXCAVATING CONTRACTOR, INC., RFD 1 Box 126, Tremonton, Ut 84337. Incorporators: Darwin M. Brough, RFD 1 Box 126, Tremonton, Ut LEE'S 84337; Ruth Brough, RFO 1 Box 126, Tremonton, Ut 84337; C. R. Brough, RFD 1 Box 126, Tremonto Ut 84337. To do excavation vor' for basements, sewer lines etc. Lee Read, 129 W. 200 N., St. George, Ut 84770; Ricky Read, 129 W. 200 N, , st. George, Ut 84770. To carry on a rest- CENTRAL UT. MANUFACTURING CO. , Suite 9, Four Seasons Professional Flasa, 747 E. 100 N. , St. George, Ut 84770. Incorporators: Milton Allen, Fou Season Professional Plaza, 747 E. 100 N., St. George, Ut 84770 The plaintiff testified that his instructions were "To get into the van and help Mr. Williams clean up and get started for the Wheeler's mechanic to come out and get a seal put in the generator. " Regardless of instructions, the plaintiff and Williams undertook to separate the generator from. the motor. They had removed a ring of bolts and had a chain around the generator attempting to pull it away from the motor when Mr. Hards, the mechanic, arrived. They asked him why the two units would not come apart, and he told them that there were other bolts inside the housing which must be removed first. He went to get his tools, and when he 62, NEW CORPORATIONS The generator unit began to leak oil at the front and rear crankcase and Mr. Brimhall called Wheeler Machinery Company to send a ... hous- The bolts ing feeling to ascertain if Mr, Williams had removed all bolts were only four or five inches inside the housing and could be extracted by means of a box end wrench, and it was not necessary to put one's hand inside the housing to remove them. However, the plaintiff accidentally touched the starter button on the side of the motor, causing the motor to xeyolve, and as a result of the injury plaintiff lost a hand. No. 13449 v. $'. lAv.i 63, returned shortly thereafter, the plaintiff had his hand in the hole in the Barnes, Plaintiff and Appellant, seals, This argument constitutes an attempt to impose one controlling factor on the determination of the juvenile court. It is within the discretion of the juvenile court to determine the factual matters and the weight to be accorded to them in making its decision. This argument further disregards the purposes set forth in Section that the court is to protect the community against juvenile violence and law breaking.' It was within the discretion of the juvenile court, and there is no claim of any abuse of the exercise thereof, to determine that society would be better protected by waiving jurisdiction. 3i 16 s Wayne F. 86, 55-10-- best interests of the child or of the public to retain jurisdiction, the court may enter an order certifying to that effect and directing that the child be held for criminal proceedings in the district court, . . . Emphasis added 5 55-10-- Salas urges that there was insufficient evidence to support the certification order. He reasons that an implicit requirement within the standard of the "best interest of the public" is proof that rehabilitation through accepted of proof juvenile institutions cannot be accomplished. He claims this burden Salas Since evidence. must be sustained by the state by clear and convincing is inthere that has never been confined in the industrial school, he contends sufficient evidence to support a determination that he could not have been rehabilitated within the juvenile processes. 55-10-- vagueness. Section the legislature has removed the protective AieM of the juvenile against criminal responsibility for a juvenile, who, in the opinionfactual considerThe court, would more appropriately be dealt with as an adult. ations and the weight to be accorded to them are matters left to the sound discretion of the juvenile court. The many factors which could potentially bear on the determination of what is the "best interest of the child or the public" could never be specifically identified by statute. The enactment is not unconstitutional for vagueness. 2 In section 210 E. 400 , Circleville, Ut 84723; Robert H. Teichert, 410 E. 400 N. , Circleville, Ut 84770. Encumber real and. personal Virginia Jenkins, N. . DEVELOPMENT CORP., N. 1000 84770. 202 E., St. George, Ut Incorporators: Rich- ard C. REad, 129 W. 200 N., St. George, Ut 84770; Barbara aurant business, WESTERN CHEMICAL COATING, 5585 S. 320 W., SLC INC., 84107. Incorporators: Ubes d, perkins Hillside Dr., Mur., Ut 84107; Lowell D. Perkins, 398 388 Hillside Dr., Mur., Ut 84107. Patricia Perkins, 2945 S. 300 E., SLC 84115. The manufactur- ing and wholesaling of chemical coating and thereto, all EQUIPMENT SALES, S. 150 matters related INC., 2256 Ut 84010. Bntfl, |