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Show THE DAILY PAGE FOUR IICOID FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1974 In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah See Neil v. Royce, 101 Utah 181. 120 P. 2d 327, 331; Greener v. Greener, Utah 571, 212 P. 2d 194; that where the contents of a document does not represent the true intent of the parties it may be reformed,' see our recent . P. 2d Utah 2d case of Intermountain Farmers Assn. v. Ptart, (Oct. 31, 1973). As to correction of deeds showing true intent sre Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940; Thornloy Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey. etal., 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. . . .inequity cases the 5. Utah Const. , Art. VIII, Sec. 9, provides that . . on of law be and both fact. ''; see Nok.'s v. Cont. Mm. appeal may questions & Mil. Co., 6 Utah 2d 177," 308 P. 2d 954. 6. See Allen V. Allen, 109 Utah 99, lb5 P, 2d 872; Weise v. Wo: so, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P. 2d 504; McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d 1066. 7. See statement of the court through Justice Ellett in Weise v. Weise, footnote 6 above. In support of the argument that the funds are part of Anna's estate the plaintiff stress es these facts: That the money originally all belonged lo Anna; that the passbook and certificate of deposit remained in Anna's possession until just before she went to the hospital; that Joyce never assorted ownership of the funds until after'Anna'tt death; and that she acknowledged that it was her intent to use the funds to provide for Anna's needs. It is not to be questioned that if there appears to be some basis for an equitable attack upon the contract, as discussed above, these are circumstances which may be considered in determining the true status of the funds. But we do not see any one of them, nor all of them together, as necessarily inconsistent with Anna's intention and desire, as shown by the written documents, thai Joyce be endowed with joint ownership with right of survivorship. This seems especially true of the certificate. 4. Leland S. McCullough, Executor of the Estate of Anna Sofia Olofson, Plaintiff and Respondent, 116 No. 13231 FILED v. January 22, 1974 11 Joyce Wasserback, Defendant and Appellant. CROCKETT, L. M. Cummings, Clerk Justice: Plaintiff aft executor for Anna Sofia Olofson sues the latter' s sister (half sister) Joyce Wasserback for the proceeds of a joint savings account and a certificate of deposit. The district court adopted the view that the joint ownership status had been used as a convenience only; and that the defendant owned no interest in thr. funds. Defendant appeals. Anna Olofson was 81 years old when she died on November 26, 1971. It is apparent that there had been a sisterly relationship between Anna and defendant Joyce. On July 14, 1967, four years prior to her death, the $9,000 certificate of deposit had been purchased in the joint names of Anna Olofson and Joyce Wasserback, payable to either. A year later, on July 15, 1968, a joint savings account in the amount of $7, 1 16. 59 was opened in Walker Bank with the usual provisions as to ownership with rights of withdraw 1 by either, and of survivorship. On November 15, 1971, Anna was ill and taken to the hospital. Before going she had turned over possession of the passbook and the certificate of deposit to Joyce. With Anna's knowledge and approval Joyce withdrew the savings account and placed it in a checking account in her own name; and proceeded to write checks thereon to pay Anna's bills and take care of her needs. By the terms of Anna's will she left her property, including an apartment house, to her son, Roy Erick Olofson, or in the event of his prior death, which has occurred, to his four children (her grandchildren); and as residuary legatees they would take the funds in controversy here, if they are part of the estate. joint-tenan- cy We can see no possible justification for saying that it was ''solely for convenience" in handling Anna's money to put it jointly in Joyce:.s name four years prior to going to the hospital, or to turn possession over to Joyce. The bank account of over $7,000 was more than enough to meet any then anticipated needs. Thus any idea that the delivery of the certificate was "for convenience & only" was clearly mistaken. With only minor and uncont r oiling differences, the same reasoning applies to the passbook joint account which had existed for three years prior to the time Anna became ill and went to the hospital. , There seem to be ever recurring controversies over the rights of It undoubtedly would be too naive survivors in jointly held bank accounts. to expect to discover a formula which would put at rest all such controversies, present and future. Nevertheless, this does not discourage courts from trying to devise rules for the application of principles of equity and justice in such disputes with such definiteness as can be achieved. The principal difficulty in writing any simple and definitive rule which will fit all cases is that the complexities of human life and personalities are such that no two fact situations are exactly alike. But they usually can be found as tending to fall into one of ' two general but contrasting patterns. is also merit to defendant's argument that turning them over a a syndrome of reasons, including gratitude, joint' bank account with the actual desire and intent oi endowing X with and right of survivorship in the the demise of A, and the problem of care and attention no longer funds. After exists, others come forward to make Their claims. In situations 'tending to that Joyce reciprocated her sisterly devotion and expressed her intention to use the money to take care of Anna's needs, should be regarded as providing a basis for depriving her of her joint ownership in the money with which her sister had endowed her. Now, Mrs. Wasserback, also at the Olof son's death you delivered to or Mrs. time, subsequent to me also some other funds, did you not? Plaintiff's Counsel: E. g. , Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P. 2d 715; Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P. 2d 179; Hobbs v. Fenton, 25 Utahtfd 206, 479 P. 2d 472; Beehive Stale Bank v. Rosequist,' 26 Utah 2d 62, 484 P. 2d 1188; Hardy v. Hendrickson. 27 Utah 2d 251. 495 P. 2d 28. fit into this general pattern it is obvious that a trial court's sense of fairness ' and human decency does and should impel him to tend to favor the caring person X, and to reject attacks upon his surviving ownership in the joint A. Yes, sir. Q. And I think at that time you delivered to me $51. 00 in cash which consisted of 8 silver half dollars, 72 silver dimes, 20 silver dollars, 90 cents in nickels and dimes and five-cepieces, and 3 quarters. Does that sound about right? nt A. account. are Yes, sir. Q. And how did you come into possession of those items? some contrasting situations where one's sense of justice is affected differently. Elderly person B is also in need of attention and care. But there may be no genuinely caring person to whom B actually desires to give joint ownership of his bank account. In any event, for his own reasons, and perhaps for a combination of them, his true desire is to retain ownership himself. But solely because of necessity andor convenience in handling his money and affairs, and with that definite understanding, he creates a joint account with someone else (usually a family member) Y; and it also quite often appears in such a situation that there is some indication of avarice of varying hues in the survivor Y. In cases which tend to fit into this latter pattern it is but natural and proper that the same sense of justice and human decency both does and should impel the court to be more inclined to grant equitable relief from enforcement of her before she, went to the hospital indicates recognition of the joint ownership and right of survivorship. Neither the fact that the money originally belonged to Anna, nor that this arrangement was a desirable and convenient thing for her, nor . But it must be realized that there to Related to the observation just made and having a significant bearing on the conclusion we have reached, is our impression of Joyce Wasserback: as to her concern for her sister, and in the. apparent honesty of her conduct and in her testimony, an example of which is: An elderly person, call him A, is increasingly in need of attention and care. Someone, call him X, (usually a family member) is sensitive of his needs and assumes some responsibility of filling them. As part of the total circumstances, and perhaps ior love and convenience, A creates If there is merit to plaintiff's argument that Anna's keeping possession of the passbook and certificate shows an intention to retain ownership, there ' A. Well, in .cleaning her apartment. Q. And you found those and you delivered those- to me'.' - 8. Comparison will show that this contrasts with the case of Hardy v. Hendrickson, footnote 1 above, where this court sustained findings that a joint account was for convenience only; and that it is more closely analogous as to facts, and the applicable principles of law, as set forth in Hobbs v. Foiiton, footnote 1 : over to the executor. the contract. Notwithstanding what has been Baid above, there are some basic propositions that apply in disputes as to the ownership of such joint account iunds. The joint deposit card which the parties have signed is a contract between themselves, and also with the bank. It has the same status and is entitled io the same binding effect as any other contract, nothing more and nothing Jess. As the contract states, the bank is exonerated if it pays out funds on the. signature of either; and between the joint account holders, the contract is binding and effective in creating an ownership in joint tenancy, with right of survivorship; and in the event of the death of one, the survivor becomes the sole owner of the funds. However, inasmuch as such a contract is no more and no less sacrosanct than any other, it is subject to attack' by showing that because of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity that in equity and in good conscience it should not be enforced. But as in the case with any written document which has been duly executed, it is entitled to the presumptions of validity, and its effect can be overcome only by c.lr?ar and convincing evidence. But it is also true that Joyce claimed that her sister Anna had given her joint ownership of the funds in controversy here, and refused to turn them The problem as to whether the effect of the joint accounts should be overcome must be determined upon a consideration of the whole evidence. In so viewing it we do not see anything that is necessarily inconsistent with Anna's intention as shown by the documents: to invest her sister Joyce with and right of survivorship in these funds; and we see very ' the little substance to anything in the evidence that points to the contrary. Accordingly, it is our conclusion that there is no clear and convincing evidence to overcome the effect of these joint accounts. Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for defendant. ' considering whether that standard of proof has been met we keep in equity in which this court may review the facts, prerogatives indulged the trial court; that even in equity cases his findings and judgment will not be disturbed unless the evidence Jearly preponderates against them and a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought. ( But if these are seen to exist, this court may make its own findings and judgment to supersede those, of the trial court. 7 2. fjf. First Security Hank v. Dcmins, Il.irdy v. Hendrw. kson, see notr '. Ibid. 1 above. 10 Costs to defendant (appellant). I CONCUR: In in mind that this is a case yet do not lose sight of the 0 R. L. Tuckett, 'Justice CALLISTER. Chief Justice: (Concurring) I concur in result for reasons Bet forth in the main opinion in Hobbs v. Felton, 25 Utah 2d 206, 479 P. 2d 472 (1971). HENRIOD, Utah 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 97, and Justice, concurs in result, ELLETT, Justice, does not participate herein. |