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Show FRIDAY, JANUARY 11, 1974 THE DAILY RECOftD PAGE EIGHT In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah Constitution. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH Petitioner Richard Fitzwater was paroled from a sentence to the Utah State Prison on October 14, 1969. On February 25, 1971, petitioner was arrested for violations of the terms of his parole. Petitioner was informed in writing of the particulars of the claimed violations which were to the effect that he had been charged with a felony in the Salt Lake City Court on or about September 12, 1970, and with having been charged with a second felony .on January 10, 1971. Written notice of the time and place of the hearing before the Board of Pardons was given the petitioner. Hearing was had before' the Board of Pardons, on March 10, 1971, at which time the petitioner was represented by counsel. During the hearing the petitioner admitted the violations charged against him and the board determined that the petitioner had in fact violated his parole and revoked the same. 00O00 Ernest Jiminez, Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 13221 Lynn R. Brown Salt Lake Legal Defenders Counsel! v. John W. Turner, Warden, Utah State Prison, Defendant and Respondent. Richard Fitzwater, Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 13235 FILED v. January 3, 1974 John W. Turner, Warden, Utah State Prison, Defendant and Respondent. Counsel L. M. Cummings, Clerk Vernon B. Romney L. Wilkinson t TUCKETT. Justicty 1181(1 R88611 The above entitled matters were tried separately in the district court but they have been consolidated on appeal for the reason that there is a similarity of the problems involved in each case. The plaintiffs filed separate petitions for writs of habeas corpus seeking release from the Utah State It is the contention of the plaintiffs and appellants here that being charged in the courts with the commission of other felonies was not a suffi- -, cient basis for revocation of their paroles. They urge here that until such charges have been pursued to conclusion and that either a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty is entered they are entitled to a presumption of innocence. Prior decisions of this court have announced the rule that the mere fact there has been an accusation of crime should not give rise to a presumption adverse to one charged with a criminal offense. 1 We, however, have not held that the Board of Pardons may not make its own independent investigation as to the violations of parole charged against a parolee. The plaintiffs here rely on the case of Morrissey v. Brewer2 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1972. That case was decided after the hearings by the Board of Pardons we are concerned with in these matters. The ruling in that case was not retro active. Prison. Decision of the court below is affirmed. Prior to May 15, 1969, Ernest Jiminez was granted a parole from a sentence he was then serving in the Utah State Prison. He was arrested on January 29, 1970, for violation of the terms of his parole. Jiminez was given written notice of the time and place of the hearing before the Board of Pardons to determine whether or not he had violated his parole. The notice served upon Jiminez also set forth the alleged violations of the terms of his probation and the terms of agreement he had signed with the Board of Pardons at the time he was released on parole. The accusations against Jiminez alleged that two complaints had been filed against him, each of which charged him with a commission of a felony. He was also charged with having left the state of Utah without the permission of his parole officer and for associating with known felons. Jiminez appeared before the Board of Pardons on February 4, 1970, at which time he was represented by counsel. During the hearing Jiminez admitted the accusations against him and that he had violated the terms of his parole. The district court found that Jiminez had violated the terms of his parole and the revocation of the parole by the Board of Pardons was within the Board's authority. The court further concluded that the revocation was lawful and that the petitioner had not been denied due process of equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Clifford Prisbrey, Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 13372 FILED v. Utah State Welfare, aka Division of Family Services, Defendant and Respondent. January 3, 1974 L. M. Cummings, Clerk Mr. Prisbrey appeals from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. He himself in this matter represents and stated to us that he was unable to interest counsel in his case. His complaint apparently is based upon his claim that the defendant "for the past ten (10) years or so has continually the upon trespassed plaintiff's constitutional rights, violated his divorce decree, and has tried to provoke the plaintiff into violating said decree ..." then sets forth his grievances to the effect that in Counaeli v. Thtr 1962 the defendant VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall ft McCarthy No. 13391 David E Salisbury FILED Dwight B. Williams January State Tax Commission of Utah. Counaeli Defendant. TUCKETT, Vernon B. Romney 0. Blaine Davis Gregory D. Farley 3, 1974 L. M. Cummings, Clerk Justice: This is an original proceed' jg to review a decision of the Tax Commission assessing a deficiency against the plaintiff for corporation franchise ux'.'s for the year 1971. The matter was heard by the Commission on March 28, 1973, and thereafter a decision was made sustaining the franchise tax deficiency against the plaintiff, Th plaintiff was chartered in 1963 as a national banking association the laws of the United States. The plaintiff conducted a banking business through December 31, 1971, when the plaintiff terminated its business, distributed all of its assets in complete liquidation and surrendered its banking charter. For each of the years beginning with 1963 and ending with the year 1970, plaintiff filed its franchise tax returns and paid its taxes on a current yrarly basis. The plaintiff did not file a tax return for 1971, nor has it paid th' tax on the income earned during that year. It was the plaintiff's contention bflore the Tax Commission that it was not obligated to pay the franchise taxes for that year since the plaintiff ceased to exist prior to the end of that year. undr The plaintiff makes the same claim here. Prior acts of Congress have granted to the states the right to tax the shares of national banking associations located within national banks the limits of the states. The pertinent parts of R.S. 5219, 12 U.S.C. , Section 548, read as follows: on Jr., Chief Justice F. Henri Henriod, Justice A. H. Ellett, Justice J. Allan Crockett, Justice Blaine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P. 2d 554; Brimhall v. Turner,' Utah 2d 321. 2. 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484. .. 3. M'Clary v. California Adult Authority, California Dept. of Corrections, ann F. ?t 11?? gave a grant and aided plaintiff's wife to enter a college before she was legally divorced, and because of the assistance given his wife he was forced into a divorce settlement. 1. 28 Other complaints are made of activity of the defendant during the years and 1964 including charging him by a criminal complaint of "wilful failure to provide. " He also claims that from January, 1972, to February, 1973, the defendant invaded "his privacy of his peaceful home by making false demands, threats and charges that are contrary to his divorce decree. " 1963 It is difficult for one with no legal training to understand the ruling of a court to the effect that he has not stated a legal claim when he has put forth his best efforts in stating what his grievances are. The fact that they are not compensable under the law, or that sovereign immunity prevents recovery thereon, or that the statute of limitations acts as a bar to his desires is each a matter which he deems to be unfair and unjust. The complaint was properly dismissed upon grounds above enumerated. Granite National Bank, Plaintiff, E. R. Callister, He prayed for $250,000 general damages, and special damages for loss of time and abuse upon him in a like sum. ELLETT. Justice! He WE CONCUR: The judgment is affirmed. No costs are awarded. The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associations located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the tax-- i able income of an owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4) according to or measured by their net income, provided the following conditions are complied with: 1. (a) The imposition by any State of any one of the above four forms of taxation shall be in lieu of the others, except as hereinafter provided in subdivision (c) of this clause. (c) In case of a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of an association, the taxing State may, except in case of a tax or net income, include the entire net income received from all sources, but the rate shall not be higher than the rate assessed upon other financial corporations nor higher than the highest of the rates assessed by the taxing State upon mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations doing business within its limits: ... The pertinent provisions of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which were in effect at the time plaintiff ceased doing business are as follows: Rate and base of tax -- - As to national banks. Every national bank or national banking association located within this state shall annually pay to the state a tax equal to six per cent of its net income for the next preceding taxable year, computed and allocated to this state in the manner hereinafter provided. 59-13- -2. |