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Show THE CITIZEN May, 1919, the supreme council of the allied and associated powers, the United States not participating, awarded to Japan a mandatc'C over all the German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator. As Yap was one of these possessions it became the mandate property of Japan if the supreme councils transfer was valid. President Wilson and Secretary Colby contested the validity of the transfer solely on the ground that there had been a verbal understanding to exempt Yap from the application of any transfer relating to the other German possessions north of the equator. The original agreement for the transfer of the possessions north of the equator was between Great Britain and Japan and was one of those secret treaties our associates did not tell us about until we had won the war for them. Great Britain and Japan wished to make the transfer absolutely in accordance with the terms of the secret understanding, but President Wilson proposed that some of the possessions transferred by Germany to the principal allied and associated powers should be administered by what he called mandates. These mandates wrere divided into three classes. Under a C mandate the power holding the territory was to have rigid exclusive rights even as against the other allied powers and, strange to say, these exclusive rights were confirmed on the initiative of Colonel House. Thus, by the blundering of the Democratic delegates, Japan obtained possession of all the islands north of the equator and was awarded a C mandate. Wheil, therefore, President Wilson tried to rescue Yap from Japans grip he was told that his verbal reservations had not been accepted by the supreme council, that Japan was the rightful administrator, of Yap and being an administrator with the full rights of a C mandate, she could refuse other powers equal rights with reference to Yap. When Secretary Hughes came into office lie immediately chose a firmer foundation. He pointed out that in the treaty of Versailles all German possessions were transferred to the principal allied and associated powers, that each of these powers, of which the United States certainly was one, had a right in each and every German possession. Therefore, that right could be transferred only by the power holding the right. Inasmuch as the United States had never surrendered its right in the Island of Yap that right never had passed from its possession. Thus it is that the United States asserts a right not only to Yap but to all the German colonies not yet allocated with its consent. It is manifest that this contention places a wholly new con struction on mandates. If our title docs not pass away unless specially surrender the right it is equally manifest that we havti right to Yap which has not been surrendered. As no treaty has ever been concluded with the United StaJ du relating to the Island of Yap, Mr. Hughes said, and as no has ever been authorized to cede or surrender the right or interest! oU the United States in the island, this government must insist ul s has not lost its right or interest as it existed prior to any action of supreme council or of the League of Nations, and cannot recognize allocation of the island or the validity of the mandate to Japan. If, therefore, the island was never legally allocated to Japan mandate cannot be valid. The insistence of Japan that she has a right to exclude the Uni effects disastrous States from Yap is apt to have Japan. We arc not alluding to war, although it may become n sary for the United States to seize Yap, but to the immigration tion. The exclusion issue raised by California is becoming more clear understood in the eastern states which arc growing more and mujo tl sympathetic with the stand taken by the people of California. ft autocratic attitude of Japan regarding Yap has opened the eyesfls the uninformed. It should persuade them that a country as grtlUpP as the United States ought to be as firm and courageous as a poiJwl of the calibre of Japan, while carefully avoiding Japans autocrat methods. Time was when the eastern states wrcrc inclined to side Japan against one of the states of the union. The eastern peop did not realize, for example, that the Japanese are permitted to mai; tain a dual citizenship wherever they go; that they are supposed st to be soldiers of Nippon and are required to do military service fl' their country whenever they arc called to the colors. Japan lias juJ told her subjects in our Philippine islands that they must return their native land for military service. The Japanese do not wa: citizenship in our country and only 114 of them became citizens unde the act of 1918. We believe that our people will come more and more to the vie that the United States, and not Japan, should dictate how mar Japanese subjects arc to be allowed to enter this country and t what terms. We believe that our people soon will be demanding tl absolute exclusion of all Japanese except those who come to us tourists, students, merchants, or diplomatic envoys. . i til far-reachi- ng qi vr. BRITISH LABOR LACKS COURAGE OF ITS PRINCIPLES Labor thought that Britain and capital was volunteers. Labor, for power and the Triple it would trv conclusions with capital in Great terrified, appealing to the army, the navy and a moment, was intoxicated with its sense of Alliance made a threat that scared all the patriots of Great Britain into a state of A day later labor had lost its courage and its cohesion. It did not stand together. It was swimming on bladders like the little wanton boys of whom Shakespeare tells us. But labors highblown pride broke under it and left it to the mercy of a rude stream. The Triple Alliance suddenly became afraid of its own shadow. Was it possible that it could defeat government and capital all at one blow? And if so. what then? old-fashion- ed semi-paralysi- s. In Russia the people have the courage of their convictions once in a while and march into the jaws of hell by the millions. But they have been better schooled in nihilism than the British, who trim their philosophies as carefully as they trim their hedges. The idea of resisting the ruling class was too much for the English and their heart failed. And probably it is just as well that it did. One of the labor papers, in a mournful nocturne, wails that labor has suffered the greatest defeat in all history. But if the collapse of the Triple Alliance was a failure what is or. 1 the Russian debacle? John Spargo. the socialist, has written a vhdl j book to show that it is the greatest failure in historv. .i It appears that there are quite a few entrants' in the race the greatest failure in history. Labors showdown with capital failed to materialize hccaus labor did not have faith in itself. However much it distrusted capita it could not adopt Russian inhilism as policy of hope. Russia has beer a terrible and a alcmcntablc lesson. Whenever labor works itself int such a fury that it must needs have the showdown with capita without the least delay it looks at Russia and its knees begin to shake. in Eighty years ago the Russian intellectuals were talking nihilism We do not believe in anything, they said. We do not belief the slate, or the family, or morals. art, poetry; we do nut ever The first imperative is destruction. We nu1? destroy everything and build again. And how were they to build again? They did not know. denlv the day came when they had a chance to put their nihilism to' test. With Lcninc as leader thev destroyed everything and after t; had been done Lcninc so recent dispatches tell us said he had awl1 a mistake. That was quite reasonable of him, to admit that he h believe in science. r tn 01 |