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Show PAGE the Dimmitt case now become apparent in the instant action. If a city court jurisdiction to try a juvenile for a traffic offense, logically, it has the power impose sentence, which may include confinement in jail fox a period of six xnlhs. The Juvenile Court Act of 1 (6 f. Chapter 10, Title 65, U. C. A. 1953, as tended 1965, expresses a clear legislative intention that a child 16 years or 21 Utah 2d 257, 444 261-26- 2, P. 2d 461 (1968). Defendants assert that at no time did Mr. Teerlink testily that he was authorized by Mr. Holbrook to fill in the note as he did. Defendants, therefore, conclude that this change in the time of payment constitutes a material alteration of an instrument as provided in Sec. U.C.A. 1953, repealed 1965. Since the parties entered into this transaction prior to midnight on December 31, 1965, the Negotiable Instruments Law, Chapter 1, Title 44, U.C.A. 1953, repealed 1965, is applicable. older may not be confired in a jail or other place of confinement for adults without an express order of the juvenile court, which shall specify the reasons therefor, Section unless the child ia being held for criminal proceedings pursuant to Section in which case, he may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults charged with a 2 crime, Section Sec. 55-10-- provides: 92 A sheriff, warder, or other official in charge of a fa nr for other the of detention adult cility offenders jail rr persons charged with crime, shall immediately nctif the juvenile court when a child who is or appears to he under eighteen yrarr of age is received at the facility, and shall make xrra.rgfTner.ts for the transfer of the child to a detention facility, unless otherwise ordered by the, juvenile court; provided that this shall not apply to a child who is brought to the adult facility under order of the juvenile court to be held for criminal proceedings in the dis- trict court under section 55-10-- time Sec. The time or place of payment; or or ad&tion which alters the effect of rrpect; Is a material alteration. -- - 3 4 In Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Strealy the court compared 14 and 125 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and observed: In order to resolve the seeming conflict between Sections and 125 it is necessary to become involved in semantics. Section 125 talks only of "changes" and "additions" which constitute a material alteration. Section 14 deals with "completions" by filling up blank spaces left in the instrument. In construing this language it appears probable that the Legislature intended "changes" to mean the marking out, erasing, detaching, or writing over of parts of an already completed instrument, and the word "addition" to mean the insertion of a new clause or wordWe believe that Section ing where no blank is provided 125 is not applicable to completing a note by filling in of blanks. 14 86 Company, Plaintiff and Respondent, U.C.A. 1953, repealed 1965, provided: 27, cl-an- 2. Sec. concerns persons 14 years or older, who have allegedly committed an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult. n 44-1-1- Or any other the instrument in any This cause should be reversed and remanded to the district court with an order to grant the writ of habeas corpus. Doxey-Layto- .... (3) The foregoing provision constitutes a legislative mandate that a juvenile shall not be detained in jail ox an adult facility without an order of the juvenile court. The opinion of the majority of this court is completely inconsistent with this provision. The official in charge of the jail is confronted with a dilemma; on the one hand, the city court has ordered confinement of the prisoner in the jail; on the other hand, the jailer is ordered by statutory mandate to arrange a transfer of the child, unless otherwise ordered by the juvenile court. It is inconceivable that on the tenuous grounds propounded by the majority, a legislative intention, expressed in mandatory terms, could be nullified. 55-10-- U.C.A. 1953, repealed 1965, provided: 5, Any alteration which changes: Emphasis added. 86, 44-1-1- Where an instrument is wanting in any material particular the person in possession thereof has prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank papex delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accoxdance with the authority given and within a reasonable 2 55-10-- 86, Section MONDAY. JANUARY 11, 1971 THE DAILY RECORD six .... No. 12021 FILED v. January Brigham G. Holbrook ar.d Betty Holbrook, his wife, Defendants and Appellants. CALLISTER, 6, 1971 L. M. Cummings, Clerk Chief Justice; Defendants appeal from a decree of foreclosure on a real estate mortgage securing an indebtedness of $116, 329. 55, which the trial court found due and owing to plaintiff. Defendants have resided out of Utah for many years, while employed the federal government. In 1963, they procured a building site in Salt Lake by City and determined to construct an apartment house. Defendants contacted to secure a loan of $120,000 at 6 plaintiff, a mortgage-broke- r, interest. Plaintiff was represented by its loan officer, Mr. Teerlink, in this transaction. There is a marked divergence in the testimony of the opposing parties. At the conclusion of the trial, the court stated that it was ruling totally against the defendants. 20-ye- ar Mr. Holbrook testified that sometime in September of 1963, he and his wife signed in blank a mortgage note and mortgage, which he delivered to Mr. Teerlink. lie claimed that Mr. Teerlink had informed him that long-terfinancing with Mutual of New York had been arranged. Mr. Holbrook insisted that all vital points, such as interest rate, commission, term and amount of the loan, had been settled; yet he signed blank documents. Shortly after signing the papers, Mr. Holbrook departed for Mexico City. He testified that he first learned that he had not received long-terfinancing in Ocrober of 1964. The testimony of Mrs. Holbrook was similar to her husband's. m m Mr. Teerlink testifird that plaintiff loans funds but sells the paper to banks or insurance companies. In this particular instance, plaintiff issued a one-yeconstruction loan commitment prior to obtaining a take-oloan. He explained that during the negotiations, the parties had discussed a loan. However, Mr. Holbrook was anxious to commence construction, and plaintiff had been unable to procure a commitment; so plaintiff made a construction loan to defendants. Mr. Teerlink testified temporary one-yehe had mad it that clear, .rior to Mr. Holbrook's departure, that there was no permanent financing. ar ut 20-ye- ar ar Mr. Teerlink testified that on November 18, 1963, the date of the note, Mrs. Holbrook brought the note and mortgage upoq which Mr. Holbrook's name had previously been signed to plaintiff's office. At this time, Mr. Teerlink filled in the blinks including the following terms: Payable in full oil or before November 18, 1964. tion mortgage note only. 70A-10-10- U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1965. substantially identical to Sec. 1, This provision is ments Law, Unifor i 3. This provision is Act. 4. 163 Tex. 36, 350 2. ... It is undisputed that the defendants subsequently executed four shortterm renewal notes, each granting an extension of timer for payment. Furthermore, each of the renewals was dated November 18, 1963, and each was completed with all of its terms, prior to defendants affixing their signatures. On appeal, defendants urge that they are entitled to reformation of the note to conform with the terns and conditions of the agreement between the mortgage, and that the decree and judgment of parties, namely, a the trial court should be reversed. of the Negotiable Instru- identical to Sec. 125, Negotiable Instruments Law, Uniform S.W. 2d 914 (1961). In order to harmonize these two sections of the Negotiable Instruments Act, we must say that the filling in of blank spaces is not an alteration; therefore, in cases involving the filling in of blanks left in negotiable instruments, Section 14 must be applied. Defendants have vigorously asserted that Mr. Holbrook did not authorize Mr. Teerlink to insert the date of payment in the blank. The court responded to a similar argument in Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Strealy6 as follows: The testimony that the respondent did not give Glenn express authority to fill in the note amounts to no more than evidence that there was no agreement with reference to the filling in of the place of payment in the blank space. This is . . . not sufficient to rebut the authority given by the statute to the possessor of the note. It can only be overcome by evidence of an express agreement as to a particular place of payment, or that no place shall be filled in. 5, Sec. U.C.A. 1953, repealed 1965, conferred upon Mr. Teerto whom link, possession of the note was delivered, authority to complete the blanks in the mortgage note. This statutory presumption can only be rebutted by proof that the paper was not completed in accordance with the authority granted by express agreement. However, in the instant action, the question of whether there was an express agreement, which limited Mr. Teerlink's authority to fill in the time of payment to a period specified, became irrelevant by the subsequent action of the Holbrooks. The defendants, by their own admission, executed four extensions of the original note, after they had actual knowledge of the term of payment. Thus defendants indicated their ratification of the manner in which Mr. Teerlink had completed the note. 44-1-1- Judgment of the trial court is affirmed; costs are awarded to plaintiff. WE CONCUR: R. L. Tuckett, Justice ar F. Henri Henriod, Justice J. Allan Crockett, Justice Ellett, J. , does not participate herein. 5. Also see Plescia v. Humphries, 121 Utah 355, 241 P. 2d 1124 (1952). 6. Note 4, supra, at p. 919 of 350 S. W. 2d. 7. See Peters 8c Whalen, Inc. v. Ware, 4 Misc. 2d 789, 162 N. Y.S. 2d 951 (1956). i 1 14 Act. Construc- Mr. Teerlink testified that he and Mrs. Holbrook reviewed the terms, and then she signed the documents; these facts she denies. 20-ye- 1. i K |