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Show BEHIND ENEMY LINES BY VAUGHN ELLSWORTH PAGE 11 UNI WUiricitititititycyKic'k'fticiticic'kicitititititititititicitititiciticititit -rsrn J SPF-CIA- L COLLECTIONS it it Independent The Constitution, Liberty, Morality, and Truth pdicotedTo rtriric'tcir'fricirfti(ttriririr'kirk'kiciriciriciciricitiririr'r'iiHr'r'tr'ir'&'ir4r'ir'ir Vol. 8, No. 38 25C Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 T STOP CARTER FROM SCRA TAX FAX No . Why the B At a nationally oroaacast news conference on June 30, 1977, President Jimmy President Carter would bombers continue, and that present would be used as their launching platforms. Carters judgment on the scrapping of the Bis subject to Congressional agreeB-- 52 unaware of a single important category in which the Soviets haven't established a significant lead over the United States. According to mid-19figures released by the Department of Defense and Inter76 national Institute of Strategic Studies, in the balance of strategic weapons, Soviet numerical superiority is substantial. The comparison with respect to Carter's President potentially deadly decision to scrap production of the 1 bomber is playing into the hands of Soviet leaders who give lip service to detente and arms limitation while continuing their arms build-u- p at home. -1 B-- offensive continental strategic ballistic missiles, U.S. 1,054, submarine-launcheU.S.S.R. Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., who retired on January 1, 1977, as the Air Forces Chief of Intelligence, was quoted in a column in the DENVER POST of January 3, as having stated: By every criterion used to measure that is, damage strategic balance throw-weigexpectancy, (payload), equivalent megatonnage, or technology' William Loeb, publisher of the MANCHESTER (N.H.) UNION LEADER, put And Paul Scott waterway. Washington: A little noticed speech by Dr. Romulo Escobar Delivered 57 Oakland Avenue Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 SieondChfsPMtagi Pddat Odt Lca City. Utsh the Panamian National Assembly on address by Dr. shows that the of the neutrality the agreement by different than that being presented by President Carter and hsi chief foreign policy advisers. The best example of this involves the all important issue of whether the Treaty gives the U.S. the right to intervene in case the Canal is attacked or forced to shut down. Panama claims there is no right of U.S. intervention with Dr. Bethancourt, head of Panamanian August 19, the that negotiated the Panama cobar clearly Canal Treaty, raises some serious interpretation questions about future U.S. rights provisions of Panama is far UTAH INDEPENDENT before Es-tea- m Escobar saying: This is the reality of the facts, that with the neutrality pact, we are not giving the U.S. the right to intervention. What we are giving is an assurance that the Canal will be permanently neutral, that we are not going to close the Canal so that their ships will not go through or that this ship will not go through, or this other ship. This interpretation of the neutrality provisions flatly contradicts President Carter and his advisers in their claim that the terms of the Treaty insure the right of U.S. to intervene to defend the Canal if necessary. Dr. Escobars speech also casts a dark cloud over the President's contention that the Treaty insures expeditious passage warships and a flat guarantee by Panama that the Canal will never be closed. In listing major concessions made to Panama by the Carter of U.S.- - during the negotiations. Dr. Escobar reported that the U.S. asked for preferential right of way for U.S. warships in time of warand in time of peace but Panama refused. The U.S. then changed its position, according . to Dr. Escobar, and asked for preferential treatment in time of war only. Panama again rejected this suggestion and the U.S. requested expeditious passage of its ma bal- d submarine-launche- d ge The mid-19- balance of 76 strategic weapons: interceptor S. 315, U.S.S.R. 2,600; missiles, U.S. 0, U.S.S.R. U defensive aircraft, surface-to-a- ir 12,000; anti- - Continycd on page 6 u The U.S. originally proposed a bilateral declaration between Panama and the U.S. to declare the neutrality of the Canal with the U.S. as guarantor of the neutrality. Panama opposed this proposal and the U.S. withdrew the idea of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. as guarantor. At the outset of the negotiations, the U.S. proposed that Panama be obliged to keep the Canal permanently open and neutral. Panama vigorously opposed keeping it open case of natural causes (an earthquake), and temporary' causes (a landslide) and in case the Canal was not making money. The U.S. accepted the first two reasons, but in the case of the third proposal the U.S. proposed Panama ask for funds from the U.S. Panama opposed this and the U.S. agreed to eliminate the article about keeping the Canal open, thus eliminating that obligation for Panama. THE NEUTRALITY PACT The U.S. originally proposed that the Neutrality Pact be between Panama and the U.S. and no one else. Panama vigorously opposed this proposal. The U.S. changed the proposal to be only between the U.S. and members of the Organization of American States. warships. Panama then countered with a proposal that warships ofall nations (including Russia and Cuba) be treated equally and the U.S. agreed. Thus, the U.S. ended up with no preferential rights. SECRET U.S. CONCESIn addition to this U.S. SIONS backdown. Dr. Escobars highly revealing speech highlighted a number of other major concessions made by the U.S. during the secret negotiations, none of which have been denied by the Carter administration. Most important of these are as follows: The U.S. originally proposed a military pact that would operate after the year 2,000. Panama opposed this proposal and Panama opposed this U.S. negotiators on direction from arrangement, claiming that all the White House withdrew the countries of the world including nations that any communist proposal. U.S.-Pana- inter- cruise missiles, U.S. 0,U.S.S.R. mobile 314; intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), U.S.0, U.S.S.R. 7. long-ran- ht to protect and defend the strategic 1,500; 421, U.S.S.R. 825; U Bv weapons: listic missiles, U.S. 656, U.S.S.R. 850; strategic heavy and medium bombers, U.S. GROWING SOVIET SUPERIORITY weakened. BOMBER! 1 am I ap- - ill B-- 153 parently prefer to put his trust in the Russians and in their Communist allies all over the world rather than to protect the American people- regardless of cost. In a press release on July 2, Congressman Steve Symms charged: B-- ment. Commenting on Carters announcement, PRESS the CHATTANOOGA NEWS-FRE- E .had this to say: President Jimmy Carter, whose record of surrender to Communists throughout the world is lengthening, has now announced to the world that American air power for peace and defense and deterrence of war for the next quarter of a century is going to be J HE essential to our national security. it this way: Carter announced that ' we should not continue with production of the 1 bomber. Instead, he said, development of cruise missiles -- - small, pilotless jet planes --w- is l T September 22, 1977 wished, including Cuba, should be invited to join the pact. The U.S. backed down and agreed to Panamas demand. At the start of negotiations, the U.S. proposed a bilateral declaration of neutrality be for the Panama Canal only. Panama opposed and said that neutrality had to be for the whole country of Panama including the Panama Canal. The U .S. then agreed to this demand. One of the most significant concessions made by the Carter administration dealt with the original U.S. proposal that neutrality be upheld in all circumstances. Significantly, Panama opposed t his saying that it would not uphold the neutrality of the Canal in case of internal disorder in Panama or in the case of a third country attacking the Canal. This position caused the U.S. to withdraw its proposal to avoid a provision saying Panama would not uphold the neutrality in case of internal disorder in Panama. Because of the new light that the explosive Escobar speech sheds onthese and other concessions made by the U.S., Senate opponents of the T reaty are planning to use it in the coming debate to try to defeat its ratification. The longer we dwell on our misfortunes, the greater is their power to harm us. |