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Show Fairview, Huntington Road Faces Closing The Utah Transportation Commission says it will close the Fairview-Huntirigto- n Road, unless it receives the $15,000 pledged by the Emery County Commission by Friday, Feb. 16. No matter what, the Transportation Commissioners have said that road will not be open during the winter in future years. Meeting in Salt Lake City Feb. 9, the Transportation Commission voted 2 on toe motion of Commissioner Sam Taylor, to give Emery County one week to make its token contribution to maintaining snow removal on 1 this winter. If the funds are not forthcoming, the road will be shut down as soon as possible. 1 is traveled by an estimated 300 miners who live in Sanpete County and, work in Emery County. The UtahJ U-3- 3-- U-3- U-3- Department of Transportation has, spent more than $100,000 so far this winter to keep the road open. Early, estimates are it will take more than. $200,000 for the entire year. Sanpete, County has contributed its $15,000 share' for the road maintenance. The State Legislatures Joint Appropriation Committee on Transportation and Public Safety returned to the UDOT the question of keeping the road open in winter. Earlier during the session the Committee had approved a request by Representatives Ray and John Garr Nielsen City) to keep the road (D-Fa- st open. In returning the decision to the Transportation Commission, the Committee made it clear that funding for personnel, equipment and a maintenance station on the 9,800 foot summit in Fairview Canyon would not be considered. UDOT has been concerned with operation of snow removal equipment in Fairview Canyon while excluding normal maintenance operations in the valley in Sanpete County. We just cant continue to operate the way we have because were not doing a good job either on the mountain or in the valley, said C.V. Anderson, Assistant Director of UDOT. Commissioner Clem Church added, The more I drive over that road, the more convinced I become that its not in the public interest to keep it open during the winter. Commission Chairman R. LaVaun Cox told his Commission colleagues that his interpretation of intent from members of the legislative committee was that the UDOT do the best it can with current staffing and equipment levels. The decision today ends debate which has lasted more than 18 months concerThe ning winter operations on Transportation Commission, at the request of local officials, agreed to a one-yetrial for the winter of 1977-7A strike by miners voided much of the information which was expected, but removal of snow on the Fairview-Huntingto- n road exceeded estimates by U-3- more than $100,000. Commissioners agreed again last summer that another trial, with participation from both Emery and Sanpete Counties, would be done. Commissioner Wayne Winters said: OUr commitment hinged on participation from both counties and some positive direction from the Legislature. Sanpete County came through. Still, the test is completed - Im convinced thats not a winter road. Commissioner Sam Taylor, who authored the motion which was approved by the Commission, said: We should complete this winter as best we can if Emery County decides to pitch-iBut that road should be closed down durine the winter beginning in 1979. Commissioner cnarles Ward made a motion that the road be closed down within seven days and that all main -- n. HOW CAN WE KNOW THE TRUTH IN A WORLD OF CONTRADICTIONS ? By Eugene T. Wolf and ask them People answer questions like that listed above according to their special interests; and, in this paper, I shall refer to such people as classes of users. There is both a theoretical and a practical approach that anyone addressing the question may flirt with. 1 use the term "flirt advisedly, because the subject of truth is often treated with less respect than it deserves or with such a heavy dose of qualification that its very nature is buried by the rhetoric that surrounds it. It is difficult to treat truth objectively, because, like motherhood, apple pie, and America, it is supposed to rouse positive emotional feelings, and it does. But, we ought to use the term more critically than we do. I was asked to address the subject as a teacher of philosophy; consequently, while I shall attempt to give adequate attention to the practical nature of the question, I shall concentrate on the philosophical aspects which, I think, require serious consideration. ' First of all, the title itself invites analysis. I believe that there is little likelihood of misunderstanding the phrase "world of contradictions," but more serious problems are involved in terms such as we," "know," and truth." I have no desire to make complicated what is on ihe face of it a simple subject, but it does make a great deal of difference whether the meaning of "we" is to be applied individually or collectively. It is, for example, much more easy to satisfy our requirements for resolving conflicting claims of truth if we are not required to test those claims in a marketplace of ideas. Moreover, the terms "know" and "truth" are both vague and ambiguous, and are capable of being interpreted differently by different classes of users. I am inclined to believe that the relationship between knowledge and truth is sufficiently close that if the implications of the one are sufficiently understood the meaning of the other will be more readily grasped. ' From a practical point of view, the problem of not knowing the truth in a world of contradictions need not have serious consequences, because what we satisfy ourselves with as being the truth serves to advance our interests and quench our hunger after further information sufficiently lull us into a quiescent state. Because truth submits itself to so many frames of reference owing to the vested interests of its classes of users, it has been viewed in vague terms as are "beauty, ' ' and love. ' ' I am not bothered by that. I find no more difficulty in letting truth appear in different guises than in allowing love or beauty to reveal themselves in varied aspects. As a matter of interest, there is even an advantage to such an approach, for it allows the world to appear infinitely richer and more open. Furthermore, such an approach lessens the impact of contradictions, because if one approach to the meaning of truth is unsatisfactory, another may very well work. I know, however, that many people are annoyed by such a notion, that for them truth represents what is absolute and eternal regardless of how one arrives at it. Certain problems are inherent in conceptions of absolute and eternal truth, not so much as a result of the definition of truth, but rather as a result of how the definition is applied. There are at least as many theories of truth as there are of love and beauty, and they all contribute to our understanding of truth without telling us what truth is. Having a variety of approaches to the question of truth does not, I think, fail to advance the cause of truth. The problem arises when one becomes too dogmatic or too skeptical about knowledge claims. I suspect that it is easier to be an agnostic where truth is concerned than to be a skeptic. in that to be a The trouble with skepticism is that it is of his own be have would to one thorough-goinskeptical skeptic g skepticism. Pontius Pilate recognized the problem of truth claims when he asked, What is truth? and stalked out of the room. I do not believe, however, that Pilate was expressing skepticism about the witnesses ability to define truth. What he was not interested in getting was a philosophical discussion on the various criteria for establishing truth, but rather in obtaining some way of establishing unquestionable proof concerning the guilt or innocence of Christ. Pilate's interest, in other words was practical, rather than philosophical. Put another way, the problem was not for Pilate the truth of the guilt or innocence of Christ but the resolution of conflicting claims df knowledge regarding that title guilt or innocence. The issue was precisely that suggested by the of this paper: that is, how are theoretical approaches effectively whale applied to practical problems? But, I must insist, it does make a of a difference whether we are allowed individually or collectively to know the truth in a world of contradictions. Pilate's problem was his alone, as was Abraham's as he faced the sacrifice of Isaac. If it could be argued successfully that there exists a privileged view of the world, one against which all judgments could be tested or measured, the problem of knowing truth would be largely settled. Not that we would really know the truth thereby, because a privileged view of the world would not solve the problem of what the truth is; it would it would only remove the question as being a troublesome one, because be resolved by the authority represented in the notion of a privileged view. As a matter of fact, no such yardstick as a privileged view of the world exists at least not one which all mankind accepts. Moreover, even if it did exist, it could never be proved to have consistency. And, even if it did have consistency, the problem of knowing truth would not end, because consistency, according to some theories, is not a criterion for establishing truth. At this point it may be useful to suggest that there Exists an important difference between knowing what truth is and knowing what the truth is. I may be overdue in making this distinction, and it may well be the most important thing I will have to say on the subject of truth But I think an understanding of the distinction will put us in the enviable position of resolving the problem suggested by the title of this paper. Certainly it is necessary in a discussion of this sort to distinguish between the nature of truth and the means by which we come into possession of it. be handled at the U-3- 1 discretion of the Department of Transportation. That motion lost on a 3 vote, which led .to Commissioner Taylors substitute motion which carried by a 2 vote. By motion of the Utah Transportation Commission, concerning winter the Fairview-Huntingto- n maintenance on Road: That after this year the road will not be maintained through the winter. It will be maintained the balance of this winter, subject to the receipt of the $15,000 from Emery County in this office by Feb. 16, 1979. A copy of the resolution has been sent to Roger Curtis, Chairman of the Emery County Commission. If Emery County doesnt respond, the road will be closed down. 2-- 3-- U-3- 1, Summary Production of major crops raised in Utah during 1978 increased from the previous year, according to the Utah Crop and Livestock Reporting Service. Producers who took advantage of better water supplies and used more efficient methods of applying available water made the production increases. Wheat production was 5.599.000 bushels, an increase of 19 percent from 1977. Ready To Live In 3 Beautiful New Homes in Village Green Subdivision in Salina Barley production, 7.336.000 bushels, increased 18 percent and oats, 576,000 bushels, were up 5 percent. Cora for grain production increased 24 percent to 1.440.000 bushels. All hay production was 1.886.000 tons, compared one who is now out to religious programs on the with 1,842,000 tons in 1977. sure religious messages air. Alfalfa hay accounted for carried on radio and 1.669.000 tons. Cora silage television. She is the one increased 8 production who believes that because percent to 1,136,000 tons. she lacks faith, or even Sugar beet acreage belief, in God, that doubled in 1978, that statin8 you protest any els should be " Production o hman effort remove and radio television Com- The Federal 173,000 tons a year earlier. munication Commission any Programs designed to Production of ' potatoes show in faith God Almighty has stated that it must declined 20 percent from than a or a SuPrme Being. Write 1977, mostly because of a receive million to keep today- decline in acreage. Religious Freedom Madaline OHara is at it n Shes the band who is out to wipe out all that pertains to God. Shes the one who sue- ceeded in making it illegal to read the Bible or pray in public schools. Shes the one who protested the decision of the astronauts to read the Bible in a one-ma- broadcast from the spacecraft. She is also the cen-agai- SSd Straight T alk Practical and Moral Issues This ts the seventh in a series of eight articles by Snow College and the Utah Endowment for the Humanities. The articles are being used by students at Snow as discussion material for a Philosophy class The public is invited to attend these discussions free of charge on Thursday evenings at 7 30 p m in the Little Theater in the Noyes Building These articles will precede the discussions by one week tenance on 1978 Crop Any dictionary worth consulting will list a half dozen applications of the word in its definitions of truth; but, because definitions are not theories, we must proceed in our search for the meaning of truth from definitions to theories some dozen of them which have been advanced to establish the criteria for truth. The most compelling reason I can advance for proceeding along these lines is that we shall by doing so enlarge our understanding of the connection that exists between the theoretical and practical nature of truth. First, is it possible to arrive at a definition of truth which can be readily understood and accepted? I think that such a definition is possible: Truth may be said to be the conformity between what is asserted or conceptualized and what is. Truth, then, is a relationship between intellection and being. I think that most people agree that there is some connection between truth and knowledge as these terms are employed in the question, "How can we know the truth in a world of contradictions? What we know is related to what we consider true. That may be another way of saying that a true judgment is one that corresponds to reality. A true judgment or statement is one that describes (agrees with) or refers to (predicates truth about) a state of affairs that is as described. Now in the definitions of truth rendered by a respectable dictionary, various applications of the definition I have given above can be found: the idea of conformity between mind and object is discernible in the definition of truth as fidelity to an original or standard; it is discernible in the definition of truth as reality or actuality, although here the idea of conformity is implied rather than stated; it is discernible in the definiton of truth as a statement proved to be true or accepted as true (truthfulness); it is discernible in the definiton of truth as sincerity, honesty, integrity. What all these definitions of truth have in common, then, is the idea of conformity or relationship. In other words, it takes " two to make truth. h Truth involves statements and beliefs and their relationship to objects. The same may be said of error. When a speaker has reason to believe that his statements refer concisely to his beliefs about a subject, he may be said to be speaking the truth. That conformity is what makes statements true. If a person knowingly misrepresents his statements about a subject, he has created an untruth, a lie. Now we generally know when statements correspond to our beliefs, but we have more difficulty in knowing when our beliefs conform to reality. It would appear logical that a statement about the world rendered in English and the same statement rendered in French might yield different views of the world. And yet both statements could be regarded as true because each would conform to.the speaker's beliefs about the world. To repeat: When a conformity between statements and beliefs exists, truth exists. When conformity between beliefs and reality exists, truth exists. We have very little trouble ascertaining truth of the first kind. We may experience a great deal of trouble in knowing truth of the second kind. Why? Well, for one thing, though it might be argued that without language or beliefs which are derived from language truth would not amount to much, language creates a strong barrier to the knowledge of reality. I would agree that most of our notions about truth are undifferentiated. These notions extend from our ideas about particular things to our ideas about the universal quality of things. Because of my notions about individual men, I fall into generalizations about mankind. Furthermore, if I have no notions about how particular things are in the world I can have no notion of truth. If I tried to argue I can have no notion of truth. If I tried to argue for absolute or universal truth, I would be arguing for the existence of things that are not in the world. Yet I could not successfully have a notion of such ideas of universal or absolute truth that was not differentiated. That is, my notion of such a truth would depend on my understanding of how things are in the world. Looked at another way, 4 2 6 doesn't tell me how things are in the world; and, since numbers do not exist in .the universe, they cannot be said to represent the truth about the universe. Like numbers the word truth is a symbol which helps us interpret our experiences. From the standpoint of formal logic, there is a logical necessity which directs our evaluation of propositions (statements) as true or false, but with regard to the practical errors which I might fall into or the false opinions I might hold, the necessity is lacking. For example, if This suggests that it is true that 2 4 6. then it is false that the truth of logic is found in method rather than in content. But a true opinion is not the same thing as a true proposition and a false opinion is not the same thing as a false proposition. False opinion, not generated necessarily, seems to have its roots in the volitional, affective aspects of our nature, rather than in the cognitive aspects. It might be useful to return to the subject of this paper to determine whether we are yet in a position to provide an answer. How can we know the truth in a world of contradictions? The answer is, we cannot, not individually, not collectively. And the reason for this is that truth is a a word used to represent a relationship, a satisfactory relationship conformity between our statements and our beliefs and between our beliefs and reality (objectsevents). We can never have absolute certainty of that conformity, because there is no single statement or fact in the universe about which we can have absolute certainty. At best, truth represents probability, although that probability may in many cases be strong enough to give emphatic direction to our lives. We are not, however, disinterested spectators, but participants in our world of experiences; as a result, we seem to embody truth rather than to know it. By the time we are in a position to ask questions about truth, we have taken a position concerning it. It appears to me that because of our interest rather than our disinterest, truth theories are advanced to satisfy divergent needs. Or more to the point, tests for truth may be explained by classes of users. But all arguments for truth are not tests for truth. For example, many people find truth in instinct. Many find it in custom. Many argue that tradition contains truth. Some say truth exists in those cases where all mankind agree. Some check truth by their feelings, some by sensory experience. Many are sure that intuition leads to truth. Many others are certain that truth is vested in revelation, in authority. Now truth might very well reside in all of these theories, but not one of them can test truth. It is generally conceded that three methods exist for testing truth: The correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatic theory. Like the theories that precede them, these latter three have reference to classes of users. Let us examine each of them briefly in order to understand the advantages and disadvantages of each as a test for truth. First, the correspondence theory of truth asserts that truth is simply a portrayal of facts as they are. One may speak of this as a known 246. conformity between the mind and its object. Examples are: 1. This map corresponds to the geographical area it represents. - rttr 2. 2 2 4 3. Water freezes at 32 fahrenheit at sea level. 4. Every member of the United States Supreme Court has been a man. 5. The Book War and Peace is in the library. Error, on this view, would be giving belief to ideas which do not correspond to reality. Now, assuredly much of what we believe to be true is based on correspondences, and we do not have trouble establishing (or testing) the validity of many of them. But the correspondence theory of truth assumes that we know not only our interpretations of things but how they are apart from the way we interpret them. Yet we know only our experiences. It is impossible to compare ideas, which are a part of experience, with any reality that exists apart from our experience of it. In other words, ideas cannot be compared with things, only with other ideas. An idea must do more than agree with a fact. The intent of the subject must be taken into account. One of the chief contributions made by the act of the mind is giving unity to our life. Simple correspondences fail to do that. It can be conceded, of course, that there may be a high degree of correspondence between an idea and its object. To the extent the correspondence satisfies us we call it true. If the correspondence test false. It is apparent, of course, that to apply fails, we call the the correspondence test the objects and events about which statements are made must be available for verification. Next, let us consider the coherence theory as a test for truth. The coherence theory asserts systematic consistency between parts and is true if it harmonizes with other known facts the whole. A which have already been accepted as true. -Examples are: 1 . Caesar lived before Marcus Aurelius. 2. The earth circles the sun. 3. Rainbow trout have been discovered in the Great Salt Lake. John Simpers is guilty of murder. Error, on this view, would be identifying parts which do not harmonize with other parts. Surely it is natural to believe a judgment to be true if it is not contradicted by another judgment in the system. The more connections that are found the better. Verification consists in establishing judgments that are coherently connected with the system of belief we have established. But there is no distinction using the coherence test between consistent truth and consistent error. Many rejected systems were built on which is really true may coherence, such as the Ptolemaic. A be rejected because it fails to cohere with other beliefs we hold about the system, beliefs which are really false. Many reject the coherence test because it makes truth relative, waiting for all the facts to be known. The third theory for testing truth is known as pragmatism. This theory argues that truth is a mode of action suited to some more or less defined end. In other words, what works is true. Practical consequences are the test for truth. The basis for this test lies in the acceptance of reality as being in a state of flux. For this reason becoming takes on greater importance than being. Because of the changing reality truth is relative. Things are never true in themselves, but only in reference to the existential context in which ideas and events are experienced. Examples are: 1. She loves me. 2. I have $300. 3. The stove is hot. 4. It's a nice day today. Error, on this view, would be the failure to consider consequences. Pragmatism is a highly subjective test of truth, more so than the correspondence or the coherence test. It has the effect of suggesting that people make truth. What is satisfying to human nature as a whole is true, but what satisfies me with respect to my desires, my purposes, like the marksman is also true. Error is an experienced fact of life Failure is seen as natural an event as success. missing the bull's-eyThe pragmatic test works well for us in daily life. It is the test we apply in solving daily problems, such as my cars failure to start or my televisions failure to produce a picture or sound. We seem on the view of this test to have a personal stake in truth simply because what works is true. Now it has been suggested that a paradox exists for the pragmatic test of truth that does not exist for the other tests. For a belief to work on pragmatic grounds it must be believed on the basis of correspondence. I cannot believe that something .will turn out to be true unless I believe in the correspondence between my idea and its object. The theory then is one of operational ocrrespondence. But it must be pointed out, I think, that many ideas are not testable in terms of results; or, if they are, they are testable in different ways, such as by different people at the same time or by the same person at different times. And because of the correspondence theory that underlies the pragmatic test, the truth of pragmatism may be said to be true in advance . If that is the case , the working out of experiences to be true does not explain why they are true. It may further be argued that untrue ideas may produce results that appear to be satisfactory, but in the long run do not work out to my best interests. Some ideas, of course, are not pragmatically verifiable. I cannot, for example, test your idea by means of my idea of it. What we seem to be left with in this review of tests for truth is the recognition that what may be accepted on the basis of one may be rejected on the basis of another. This leads us to the conclusion that no test for truth can give us absolute assurance of any Our ideas must compete in the marketplace of ideas; and, in that competition, who will win? Well, as is the case in any shopping expedition, ' the buyer will walk away with the product that suits his fancy. Caveat emptor. Let the buyer beware. How can we know the truth in a world of contradictions? The answer can be supplied only in relation to our reasons for asking it. This means, I suppose, that the answer is embodied in the classes of users for whom any question about truth takes on a special significance. Only in terms of our special interests can we be satisfied that the conformity between most of our ideas and reality has become known. 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