OCR Text |
Show Washington. I doubt that there is any phase or function of government govern-ment that is less Our Foreign understood by the Policy people at large than questions or actions relating to foreign policy. It is easy to understand why this is so. American foreign policy, like the foreign policy of every other nation, is closely akin to patchwork. It cannot be otherwise because of the very nature of the matters to be dealt with officially. Foreign policy, indeed, is one thing to which President Presi-dent Roosevelt's oft-quoted statement state-ment about his decisions resembling those of a football quarterback can be most properly applied. It is a day-to-day treatment with new decisions de-cisions as changes come in the international in-ternational play. This brings us to the President's Chicago speech and the announcement announce-ment by the State depart yient of American conclusions that Japan is the aggressor in China. Of course, all persons who have read anything about the Sino-Japanese war knew long ago that the Japs were conducting con-ducting a raid on China. Officials of the government knew it also, but there is a difference and must be a difference in the methods employed by individuals as distinct from those employed by a nation which represents repre-sents all of its individual citizens. Time had to elapse, therefore, before be-fore our government or any other could say definitely and publicly that Japan was seeking to acquire new territory by theft and seizure. Many observers and many individuals in-dividuals have indicated their surprise sur-prise at the President's speech which, by the way, was the most distinct pronouncement of any that he has ever made. There was likewise like-wise surprise when the secretary of state, Mr. Hull, gave the press his statement condemning Japanese aggression" ag-gression" even though the statement should have been anticipated after Mr. Roosevelt's Chicago speech and after word had come from Geneva that the League of Nations appeared unanimous in the same conclusion. The reason that I say there should have Oeen no surprise concerning the finO position which our government govern-ment has taken traces back to the administration of President Hoover and Henry L. Stimson, then secretary secre-tary of state. It was at that time that a fundamental change took place in our foreign policy but it was not a change that appeared to be sensational at the moment. In other words, the position which Mr. Hoover and Mr. Stimson took- at that time was overlooked because there was no real crisis to attract attention to American policy. What that change in policy did is plain now. It was the beginning of the end of the isolationist program which followed the bitter controversy contro-versy over President Wilson's proposal pro-posal that the United States affiliate with the League of Nations and adhere ad-here to all phases of the program embodied in the league covenant. The reaction against Mr. Wilson's plan was violent and carried us to the other extreme so much so that for a number of years we were a lone wolf among nations in fact as well as in name. The one thing that really represents repre-sents an important change of policy pol-icy that Mr. Roosevelt enunciated at Chicago is his view of neutrality. Without making any particular reference ref-erence to the neutrality statute enacted en-acted last winter under the sponsorship sponsor-ship of Senator Pittman of Nevada, Mr. Roosevelt announced without equivocation that the United States will do everything it can, short of military force, to curb the Japanese course in China. That is to say, and I believe it is accurate, we will not invoke the neutrality laws if such a course will do harm to the Chinese. Rather, the American policy pol-icy for the time being at least involves in-volves working hand in hand with other nations that may be striving to maintain international order and morality in matters in which we are directly concerned. I have been asked several times recently concerning the possibility that the United Keep Out of states may en-Far en-Far East War SSe in actual war in the Far East. I think that eventuality is very far removed. Possibilities always exist for a nation na-tion to get tangled up internationally international-ly under conditions such as obtain throughout the world today, yet I do not believe that the United States ever will do more in the Far East than exert moral pressure upon the Japs. It must not be overlooked, however, that the bulk of American Ameri-can sympathy is with the Chinese. Chi-nese. One cannot tell how far that may lead us as a nation. Nor is it possible to forecast the weight of this sympathy in an economic way. I mean by that, no one can foretell fore-tell what such a thing as a boycott of Japanese goods may mean eventually. even-tually. From all of this it must be plain that our national course in the next few months will have to be deter mined largely by the other fellow. Or, to state the proposition in another an-other way, the lengths to which the United States will go in punitive action ac-tion against Japan is likely to be determined, first, by the reaction of our own citizens to Japanese barbarism bar-barism and, second, the moves by other dominant nations of the world. Mr. Roosevelt was returning from an 8,000-mile trip when he delivered his Chicago speech. That trip was announced in advance as being for the purpose of an inspection to see how the country was taking the New Deal. That, however, was not the whole truth. Mr. Roosevelt wanted to feel the public pulse politically on the Supreme court packing proposition prop-osition and its related questions; he wanted to find out how the country felt concerning those Democrats who had opposed the court packing; he needed information about the demand de-mand for an extra session of congress con-gress to enact crop control legislation legisla-tion and, in addition, he wanted to see what the general feeling was about the Sino-Japanese war. The trip was timed admirably. It took Mr. Roosevelt away from Washington and, further, away from the red-hot cauldron resulting from the fact that Associate Justice Hugo L. Black of Alabama was a member mem-ber of the Ku Klux Klan. The information that filters back from observers aboard the President's Presi-dent's train presents something of a paradox. Almost unanimously, the observers found that Mr. Roosevelt Roose-velt was still immensely popular personally. Concerning his various programs, Including crop control legislation, the observers report that they found conditions ranging from violent opposition to plain apathy or complete lack of interest. It is a most confusing situation from a political standpoint, I have found few individuals able or willing to attempt an analysis of it. Generally Gen-erally speaking, lack of enthusiasm for a program sooner or later will kill off politically the individual who sponsors the program. Yet, no one will say, at this time at least, that such a result can be expected in Mr. Roosevelt's case. But the political effect of his Chicago Chi-cago speech must not be minimized. Whether Mr. Roosevelt so intended or not, his speech demanding that Japan respect treaties and observe the rights of other nations and his pointed criticism of policies such as those employed by Mussolini, Hitler Hit-ler and Stalin, have the effect of rallying the people behind him. Some persons who are opposed to the New Deal have been mean enough to say that Black Mr. Roosevelt took Klan Affair nis triP West m order or-der to get away from Washington until the incident involving Associate Justice Black had blown over. I do not know whether the exposure that Mr. Justice Jus-tice Black had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan alone prompted Mr. Roosevelt to leave. I repeat only what is being said. Mr. Justice Black has now taken his seat as a member of the court. He told the country in a radio speech before assuming the robes of office that he had resigned from the Klan and that, as far as he was concerned, the incident was closed. He stooped somewhat, I think, when he tried to dodge the issue by charging charg-ing that those who had exposed his Klan connections were trying to discredit dis-credit Mr. Roosevelt But, Mr.. Black is now a member of the court and I do not see what anybody can do in the way of unseating him. The reason for adverting again to the Black Klan affair is to make a prediction. That prediction is: as long as Mr. Black sits as a member of the Supreme court of the United States, he will receive repercussions of the case. I will wager now that regardless of what position Mr. Black takes in deciding any future litigation, there will be those who will point to him and remark that "he was once a member of the Ku Klux Klan." Likewise, regardless regard-less of the views or arguments he advances in any decisions rendered by the court, Mr. Black will be referred re-ferred to continuously as "the Klan member" or as "the Roosevelt liberal." lib-eral." Take it any way you like the appointment ap-pointment and the confirmation of Hugo Black as a member of the Supreme Su-preme court under the circumstances circum-stances now known and affirmed by Mr. Black himself constitutes one of the worst situations yet recorded on the appointive power of the President Presi-dent and the power of the senate to approve presidential nominations. But laying aside . all of these things, there is a real tragedy resulting re-sulting from the circumstance. If there is one branch or agency of our government in which it is necessary for the people as a whole to have faith, it is in the judiciary. I think I can foresee that the Black appointment ap-pointment and its attendant features will shake the faith of many individuals indi-viduals in courts. It ought never to have happened. Western Newspaper l.'nioo. |