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F e U Copyright 31 in all countries by Ly the North Ameri Amerl American 0 General BlI pc e can can ln Newspaper Alliance World rights right reserved referred Q Pa 11 including the Scandinavian Sc Reproduction In is whole 1 or In part prohibited wr u W JT 1 Jf CHAPTER C Continued As the situation in which we wo found ourselves regarding artillery artillery- ammunition ammunition tion Lion was approaching a crisis It beanie be arne anie necessary to lay lar the he whole ques ques- question tion don before the munitions board After Alter a full h Investigation of ot their resources both the French and anti British concluded that they could undertake undertake undertake un un- to meet our requirements with the tile distinct understanding that their plants must be greatly Increased in im cr- imparity S parity and that we should hould furnish raw r w materials promptly The late Gen Tasker 12 II Bliss chiet chief ef of the War Var department general staff represented us in the allied c conference and reported results and agreements reached He lie had brought the latest data from home bom and his knowledge concerning steel and munitions enabled him to give gie valuable assistance to my chief of ordnance In our efforts to find finda a 3 solution to the difficult munitions problem A A. letter from Secretary of War Baker dated 10 had only recently been received and gave me mean mein mem in m idea of some of his problems In part he wrote as follows 1 am especially concerned that our troops should not be engaged in actual actu actu- al Il fighting in France until they the are there In such numbers and have made i such uch thorough preparation that their first appearance will be encouraging both to their own morale and to the spirit of our people here I think It goes foes oes without saying that the Germans rill Till make a very special effort to swiftly and strongly against any part dart of ot the line which we undertake to o defend In order to o be able to report report re reo re- re port to their people encouragingly about our participation and also with the he object of discouraging our soldiers soldiers' and md our people as much as possible In ln the matter of ot selecting corps and end division commanders I const constantly feel eel that I ought to have bave your advice and iad judgment nent From all that you have said aid supplemented by all I have learned earned elsewhere the need for young oung and d physically strong men Is apparent end and I Iara am perfectly willing to go nn any limit in meeting this requirement It will of course necessitate l passing pass pass- ss- ss ing ng over a substantial number of at our older alder generals who are very eager to togo too go o to France and who In their own ideas deas and ani that of the country have certain ertain right to be preferred But their heir occupation here In the trai training lm of f troops Is of ot course a valuable con con contribution to the cause and when whenever I can feel sure In the selection of ot the younger man that he actually capacity to develop to a su sufficient extent extent ex ex- tent to justify his being preferred to a n aman aman man DUll man of greater experience I shall not hesitate te n M Mobilizing of Army Delayed t t In view of the emergency y that was waso fo a o clearly set forth by the Joffre Jofre and andI I Balfour missions when they the visited th the the- United States and which was confirmed confirmed con con- on- on firmed after my arrival in France and reported with all emphasis sis I have never Dever been lieen able to understand the unnecessary unnecessary un un- un- un necessary essary dela delay caused by waiting six six months for the construction of large cantonments before calling out men men and yand assembling them for training Of Ot course It was las particularly urgent that the specialists and laborers needed need need- ed in France to build up our facilities should have been provided as fast as they could be 1 employed ed but nothing should have postponed the in- in mediate mobilization mo of f the combat Units units of the regular army and the National Na- Na onal Guard CHAPTER The units of the Twenty sixth division di- di vision Islon Maj Gen Clarence Edwards Ed commanding began to arrive the late letter lat lat- ter e part of ot September continued dur- dur vember No-vember ng October nn and the early part of November No- No vember and were n now w assembled inthe in intine tine the bUl billeting t nb area near Ne eau k I inspected the division dl November 1017 and found the various or or- or I presented a very credit credit- sole appearance The officers seemed alert lert and military a and d. d the p personnel lOOked strong and vigorous Their In- In ruction had been carried out und under r the ine direction of Brigadier General raI Traul one of the b brigade cO commanders I and ana seemed to be bc well advanced The probable situation as to toman man power P er in which the allies would find themselves In fn n the spring ng was causing r much solicitude The Germans had f. f captured Riga niga in Sep September r. r I sky's ky's s 's power was was' wasat at an end and the lk government was established with Lenin and In control The had situation was su such h that Russia bec become became me entirely negligible as far as assistance nce to the ames allies was con can conAn An analysis of the possible possible strength f the contestants showed that Ger- Ger Germany many tanny enI erable W would Uld be be beable able to spare a u considerable consid- consid l number o ot of divisions from the he n. n i fr front nt Careful study by my B Blair rr In i C co co lon with the allied tI had led to to the conclusion thai that J W her total tal number In to the west by spring J the a be as many as not counting ot of Possibility of ot the added strength divisions The The 3 from Austria greatest number the allies could coui muster be to estimates would divisions ons' ons counting two Amerl F can tan 5 do de II Illy could coul could l not be counted on to tor r than barely hold her ber own even with the help of ot the eleven elee allied divisions then on that front Other American divisions might possibly possibly pos pas sibly be In Europe by May 1 It If the they should arrive according a to schedule which was doubtful but they would be too late to participate In the expected early spring campaign At the low rate of arrival we should not have ha more than half halt of the twenty one divisions divisions di dl visions promised by the War department department department depart depart- ment ready rendy for Cor service by June Outcome Depended on America In this war where th the battle lines Un-es extended across entire countries and andIn andIn In which the qualities of ot the opponents opponents opponents were about equal th the aspect largely resolved Itself Into a consideration of the number and location location loca loca- tion of divisions dl on either side The situation was of ot such a character that It was a n question which side could provide pro the superiority of forces necessary nee nel essary to success In other words the he outcome e would depend upon the nun num number ber of troops that America could send over All e eyes es were on the eastern front To allied allied- statesmen the collapse of Russia meant possible grave gra political consequences to the allied amed commanders command ers ens It forecast the release of approximately divisions and the increase in the enemy's ranks ranIs In Belgium and northern France to a preponderance that could not be overcome To us It indicated a race between Americas America's best effort to pour our fighting figl men Into France and Germanys Germany's best determination deter to crush the allies before our soldiers could arrive arrhe in sufficient num numbers numbers bers bens to dominate the battlefield d. d Faced Defeat Wi With Wi h Allies Our estimates of ot the shipping fog foi troops and supplies as set forth in the plan by which a due proportion of combat and line of communication troops were to form farm such Increment of six divisions would require b by June 1 f for for- forthe r the shipment of twenty four divisions divisions di visions a total of over o tons No one seemed to know where W wt we were to obtain the tons of shipping in In addition to the tons t ns we we ve were ere then supposed il to be using It It appeared red almost certain then that should disaster befall the allied armies that under these conditions we would have to g go down with them I always s felt certain however that tha tonnage could be found for Cor our purI purpose purpose pur pur- pose If it the necessary pressure were I exerted to force it Into use Appeals were made made continuously an and persIs I was was to be he left to the senior general officer In the vicinity who might be either F French n h or British In going over these plans It seemed d to me me that their Idea of securing operation co-operation after the French sl should begin participation pation was rather vague During the day we fir first t went to visit General Byng B ng commanding the Third army who explained further details of ot the attack and the progress already made He lie and his chief of staff were busy receiving new s news from from the front and felt that all was going well ell British Victory Spurs Allies The attack was made Imade on a n six-mile six front and the British had the advantage advantage advantage tage from Crom the the outs outset t. t The sudden de de- of t the long line line of tanks closely followed by the Infantry all nU without the usual w warning of long preliminary preliminary pre pre- artillery bombardment completely conty com com- surprised the Germans The tanks broke wide gaps in the wire and subdued the machine gun un nests aiding the Infantry th through ough the defenses with witha a 1 minimum of loss The front was rather narrow considering con conS the depth of the objectives A maximum gain of some four and a ahalt half halt mItes miles was sec secured red the first day dar I and a greater result was prevented it was said by a serious check to the tanks at For some reason or other the French were not called Into action but presumably pre pre- presumably It was because because the British cavalry which was to precede them could not go forward as planned The offensive continued for two or three days longer with Ith varying success It was vas however a decided victory and while not as great as the British ex ex- petted It gave encouragement to the allies on the western front and no doubt helped to offset lT et te temporarily the depressing effect of the serious defeat recently sustained b by the Italian army CHAPTER An American mission hend headed d by Col Cot CotI I I Il 3 M. M House arrived in France toward the end of November for an conference Other members rs of the mission were Admiral W W. S. S Benson Gen Tasker fl H. H Bliss chief of staff Oscar T. T Crosby for the Treasury department department de de- Vance McCormick l chairman chairman chairman chair chair- man of the tile war trade board board Bainbridge Bainbridge Bain Bain- bridge Colby Colb shipping board Alonzo D. D Ta Taylor lor Thomas N. N Perkins war industries in in- and Paul Cravath As the representatives of ot different nationalities gath gathered red in Paris recent reports of decreasing losses of ocean I f T TT T jj L j p r I y t K y hr t k 4 I ZW s. s a I r f i 5 t 5 d 24 A ossa cm 6 General Pershing Visits the King and Queen of Belgium in inan an effort t to get action on this vital question but several months elapsed before it really came Taken aken as a n whole the apparently in sl slow w progress of our preparation Europe also caused considerable adverse adverse ad ad- verse comment If It not dismay among the allies all es Inquiries were made di directly directly directly di- di lJ by the military and civil officials as to why we did not move more rapidly to which which- the reply was al always always always al- al ways lack ack of ot shipping f i New British Offensive Immobilized by the mud of ot Flanders Flander where British attacks had bind continued Intermittently from th the end of July t to the middle of ot No ember No with rather excessive losses the British commander command- command er In chief turned to a more so southerly therl portion of ot his line for the final linal offensive offensive offensive offen offen- the Cam- Cam sive of ot the year Choosing bral brat front on one which to launch the ef effort effort ef- ef fort careful preparations Including unusual number number num t the e concentration of ot an un ber of ot tanks were made to 10 Insure I sure a break through the enemy's defenses defenses The tanks tank and the thc Infantry were to tomake tomake tomake make an nn opening through which the cavalry was to pass and attack the flanks of ot the enem enemy Then French In the vicinity troops held In readiness were to follow As to the question of command of ot these combined forces when both should become engaged it tonnage and greater destruction of German Ge submarines with prospects of ot still further improvement seemed to give more of ot hopefulness b In the gen general gen eral crab situation and nd allied spirits were somewhat revived re The British had won at Cambrai and ani were making satisfactory progress in their advance on Jerusalem which It was said would be be facilitated facilitated by the use of their new base at Jaffa Th The Italians seemed to have ha recovered their morale to a limited extent with the stiffening of their lines by British and French divisions and had successfully successfully successfully success success- fully held their own against the AustrIan Austrian Austrian Aus Aus- trian attack on the Piave Not the least hopeful thing was the step Just taken town toward Id I'd unity of com command mand In the creation of ot the supreme war council But the decisive In the whole situation If it could be utilized In time was the tremendous economical and ph physical power of the United d' d States To fo make that available available avail avail- able before it was too late was the problem upon n the solution of ot which depended the s success of the allied cause Would the allies see It It Itani ani anal ami would they work together to solve sol It When all nil were seated sealed around the table In the assembly room at the thc minIstry min of or foreign affairs Prime Minister Minis ter Clemenceau who presided spoke briefly setting forth the Importance of ot the gathering and the necessity of translating the noble spirit of the the- alliance alli nih ance Into action No attempts attempts' at nt oratory oratory ora ora- tory were In evidence nor was there prolonged discourse on any subject Naturally questions concerning available avail able man power shipping munitions and supplies were mentioned but only In a general way The conference did little more than agree that the stud study of ot the various subjects should be left to committees composed of representatives It was very clear that everybody was looking to America to provide the additional man power needed to give the allies superiority None was more ea eager er to increase our forces than our- our solves but on my part evary every possible argument to procure shipping had been presented to the allies and to our War department so when the conference conference confer conter ence urged the expedition of ot our forces it made the strongest kind ofa of ofa ofa a case In favor of t Immediate Imme Increase of of allied aided aid In tonnage For some time reliance upon the allies for any considerable amount of ot tonnage had seemed almost in vain valli and It looked as though we should have to dep depend nd upon our own limited resources for most of It The British were giving some assistance In the transportation of men American ships ha had carried up to November 1 and the |