Show Genel-al Genel Pel Story of the e 1 JE K If CopyriGht 1931 fn 11 1 by the North J By Genera I can ean World rg 1 ht or OUD including is part prohibited the Uon In whole EJ Oal l' l li A fYI 11 VI 3 CHAPTER LV The final decision that the First American army would undertake the Hie reduction of ot the the- St SL sull sail ent us as Its first operation was ms transmitted trans to army headquarters August Au Au- August gust 10 and the army staff stal Immediately Immediately Imme began the tile development of ot plans for the concentration of oC the necessary troops for Its execution It was certain the psychological effect on the enemy of ot our success In In this first operation by the American AmerIcan Amerlean Amer Amer- ican lean army as well as us on the allies nilles our own o troops and our people people people peo peo- at home would be of ot great im The attack must therefore there there- fore foie not only succeed but a serious se rious hostile reaction must be made Impossible The headquarters of the First army were removed to 0 w a 4 t r x 1 m Fighting Their Way Into a Farmstead between August 11 it and 10 16 The special army array troops assembled north of ot Chateau Thierry were moved mo eastward during the same period was a central point for operations on any portion of ot the front from St St. Mihiel to the Swiss frontier As considerable American activity had been carried on there for tor many months Its S selection se selection se- se lection would probably keep the enemy In Ignorance of ot the exact sector we were to occupy Composition of First Army The following corps and divisions divi alons were placed at nt the disposal of the First army for the St. St MI- MI biel operation and their condition may be summarized ed as os follows The First and and and- Second divisions were excellent as to training equipment equip equip- equipment ment and morale They had attacked attacked attacked at at- tacked July 18 In the Sois Soissons ons drive e The Third Fourth Twenty-sixth Twenty and second Forty-second divisions were of ot fine morale and considerable experience experience exp as they hud lead fou fought ht In the defense about Chateau Thierry and andIn andIn andIn In the advance toward the Vesle river The ninth Eighty-ninth and Ninetieth divisions were going through their sector training on the front between between between be be- tween Toul Tout and the Moselle river and the Fifth Firth and Thirty-fifth Thirty divisions divisions divisions divi divi- were taking their sector training In the The Thirty third Seventy-eighth Seventy Eightieth and second Eighty-second divisions divi had been training behind the British front one brI brigade nde of the Thirty-third Thirty having had line front service with the British and the Ninety-first Ninety division had never been In the front line Une and had received less than four tour weeks' weeks training In France As to corps headquarters the First corps was well organized and had operated In the Marne AIsne-Marne defensive and offensive Fourth and Fifth corps headquarters were only partially organized and had bad very few corps troops Preparations of Great Magnitude The almost total Inactivity on the St. St front since 1910 uno and the preparation for an operation of such magnitude made many Initial Installations necessary The telephone telephone tele tele- phone and telegraph lines to Insure effective communication throughout through through- out the area required miles of ot wire The artillery ammunition dumps calculated on the basis of at least five days of ot battle required about rounds Engineering material material material ma ma- required to build roads across Mans No-Man's land behind the advancIng advancing ing army ran ron Into thousands of tons The construction of railway spurs advance depots and hospital accommodations for sick and wounded had to be provided and aviation lation fields prepared Many Mony other things were required such uch as the construction of ot light railways for tor distribution be beyond ond the railheads railheads rail rail- heads personnel and equipment pertaining to searchlights the d de development de- de of ot water supply Installations Installations for sound and Hash flash ranging for tor artillery arrangements for tor traffic trat- trat traffic fic tic control and the camouflage of ot positions roads and material Each item was the subject of ot consideration tion ton on by qualified specialists and all aU had bad to be co by the newly formed stAf staff The actual movement for tor the concentration con con- of the more than one one- half alf million troops whether by rail truck or on foot generally took place at night The troops bivouacked during the day la tA forests forests for tor- other hidden hid bid ests or sheltered places lien den from the observation of ot enemy lanes resuming the movement at nightfall The considerable circulation of ot troops In to the St SL area natu natu- rally attracted the attention of ot people and of ot the officers and sol sol- sol sol- diers Although cautioned against such discussion the probability of ot otan an American attack on the salient was discussed here and there To divert the enemy's attention from Crom our real objective It was necessary first to create some uncertainty un un- uncertainty certainty In the minds of oC our own o troops The rumor was therefore started around that our first offensive might ml ht be In lu the direction di dl of Mulhouse In the Rhine valley beyond the Vos es mountaIns mountains mountains moun moun- northeast of Belfort It was also decided to make a diversion In that direction and as asa asa asa a preliminary step an was as assent sent to lease hull buildings dings In Belfort DelCort At the same time lime confidential In In- Instructions n- n were sent Major General Bundy commanding the Sixth corps to proceed to Belfort with a limited staff and prepare detailed plans for an nn offensive with the object object object ob ob- ob- ob of seizing and the heI heights to the southeast and eventually eventually eventually event event- establishing our line Une- along the Rhine In the letter of ot Instructions s seven cn divisions were mentioned as having been designated for tor the attack ot- ot at attack tack and three officers from each of these units were detailed to report report report re re- re- re port to General Bundy to assist In Inthe Inthe inthe the reconnaissance He was direct direct- directed ed to expedite the work of preparation preparation tion as the movement would probably probably ably begin September 8 under my personal command Ruse Ruso Has Desired Effect The presence of a major general and an active staff In Belfort must have caused apprehension among the Germans Two days dars later reports reports reports re re- re- re ports began to come In that a hospital hospital hos hos- pital and considerable numbers of the population were moving to the theother theother theother other side of ot the Rhine Meanwhile at Belfort plans were being prepared prepared prepared pre pre- pared In all seriousness when one day Col A. A L. L Conger who was In Inthe Inthe inthe the secret and acting as my with seeming carelessness careless ness ness left In his room at the hotel as directed a 8 copy of ot Instructions to the commander of ot the Sixth corps only to find upon his return that It had disappeared at the hands of ot some spy I This apparently served sen-ed to confirm confirm confirm con con- firm the worst of ot German fears for tor I within a few days one German reserve reserve reserve re re- re- re serve division was reported moving moving move ing up to the front while another division was sent to Mulhouse and two more to the farther north The French staff gave valuable assistance by circulating false rumors rumors rumors ru ru- mors about our plans So the ruse had been successful and the result result result re re- sult quieted our anxiety over the situation In the salient An attack by the French Tenth army begun August 29 W 1918 1018 was undertaken to force the retirement of the enemy fro from the Vesle and Aisne rivers On Its relief relict from the thc Vesle Au August 7 the Thirty sec sec ond American division Hann Haan was assigned to the Tenth army and entered the line August 25 Immediately immediately Im im- im mediately undertaking a series of ot local operations In which gains were made In the face of ot very heavy fire Ravines and caves In the region provided Ideal cover for the defending troops The general attack of the army the following day met but slight sll ht success the enem enemy resisting desperately des long Mong his entire front but buton buton buton on the thirtieth by a flank attack from the south the Thirty-second Thirty division lon captured Juvigny pushing a small salient Into the flie German lines Hard fighting co continued August 31 but by the end of the day the second Thirty had reached the Important Important important Im Im- im- im St. Quentin road where It was relieved September 2 The Thirty-second Thirty division had bad advanced advanced ad ad- nearly three miles and Its success contributed greatly to the forced withdrawal of the German line Une to the Aisne river Pershing Takes Over Sector As prearranged between General Petain and myself the sector from Port Port sur sur east of the Moselle river to llIe north of Les two forty miles mUes In extent extent ex ex- tent then occupied by the entire French Eighth army and a part of the French Second t army was transferred transferred trans trans- to my command on August SO 30 The front tr nt Included the St. St l s salient which was wag between these points and embraced the permanent perma perma- permanent nent fortresses around Tou Toul We had three divisions In line Une on the south face tace of ot the sector but hut the mass mass' of ot our battle troops would not take over the trenches until the night before the attack August SO 30 the day I assumed command of the sector Marshal Foch accompanied by General Wc gand his chief of ot staff starr came cameto came cameto cameto to my residence at Bar Ligny-en-Bar- rols and after the usual cordial exchange of ot greetings presented an entirely new plan for the use of or orthe the American army The marshal began by saying that the German armies were In more or less disorder from recent attacks b by the allies and that we must not allow low them to reorganize and that the British would continue their attack In the direction of ot Cambrai and St SL Quentin and the French toward Mesnil Then much to my surprise he proposed that the objectives in the Ule St SL operation be restricted and the Ule attack made on the southern southern southern south south- ern face only and that upon Its completion t f to o 0 other operations be undertaken by combined Americans and French a number of our dIvIsions divisions div dIv- going under French com com- mand Pershing Insist insists on U. U S. S Army I repeated what I had bad often orten said that the American government and people expected the army to act as a unit and not be dispersed In Inthis Inthis inthis this way I pointed out that each time we were about to complete the organization of ot our army some proposition like this was presented to prevent It Do you OU wish to go to battle Marshal Foch och broke InMost inMost inMost in Most assuredly I replied but butas butI as an American army and In no other way He argued that there would not be time whereupon I said If you will assign me a sector I I F will take It at once Where would It be he asked Wherever you say The discussion was somewhat heated and much of It was as carried on so rapidly that It could not be translated He lie continued to reiterate reiterate reiter rester- ate his demands for the adoption of his plan but I had bad learned that It was necessary to be beery very ery firm In dealing with him and I finally said In effect Marshal Foci Foch you have no authority authority authority au au- au- au as allied commander In chief to call upon me to yield up my command of ot the American army array to J have ha It U scattered among the allied 1 forces where It will not be an American army at al al all He was apparently surprised at my resentment of his attempt to ta confine American effort ort to su subordinate subordinate nate roles and said I must Insist upon the arrangement to Lo which J I replied as we both rose You may Insist all nIl you please but I decline absolutely to tt agree to your plan While our army will fight tight wherever you may decide It will not fight except as an Independent Independent Inde lade pendent American arm army He lle said he was disposed to do what he could toward forming ng an nn American army He EIe then picked up his maps and papers and left M My chief of ot staff General McAndrew McAndrew Mc- Mc Andrew and chief of operations Fox Conner were sent to confer with We Septem September er 1 and returned returned returned re re- re- re turned to LIgny cn with word that Marshal Foch desired to see General Petain and me the following following fol fol- fol lowing day Motoring to Petain's headquarters with headquarters with Boyd lloyd and De we found McAndrew v and Conner had preceded us and after lunch we Ve went to Bombon Opening Op the Conference Foch referred referred referred re re- re- re t to the note he had hod handed me August SO 30 and to my reply and asked my observations Stating my attitude on the desirability of ot carrying car out vigorous offensives to the fullest possible extent I explained that If It It should be deemed necessary necessary sary to abandon the St SL l project project project In order to begin the larger offensive offensive of of- which war wae understood to tobe tobe be west of ot the Meuse I would abide by his decision In the ensuing discussion while there was considerable sparring It was agreed the American army should operate as a unit under Its the Meuse Meuse-Ar- own commander on gonne front Marshal Foch concluded that the date for the operation should be postponed so we could first carry carryout carryout out the limited attack at St. St l We finally reached the definite understanding un understanding that after aCter St SL our First army army should prepare to begin this second offensive not later than September 25 CHAPTER The first army attacked yesterday yesterday yester yester- day and the reduction of the St SL salient Is complete reads my diary of ot September 13 written at LIgny en Our OUI troops behaved splendidly The secretary of ot war visited two corps headquarters returned to LIgny much delighted at our suc sue cess Petain and I went to the town of St St. today and were warmly warm warmly ly greeted by the people This Ismy la Is lamy my birthday and a aery very ery happy one It The attack of ot the infantry on the southern face of ot the St. St salient started arted at 5 o'clock In the morning and before that I went with several staff officers to old oldFort oldFort oldFort Fort situated on n a commanding com corn manding height overlooking o the battlefield from the south The secondary secondary secondary sec sec- attack on the west was launched at 8 a a. a m. m as element an of ot surprise and In order to give more time for artillery preparation there Weather Gives Advantage A drizzling rain and mist prevented pre pre- vented us from getting a clear view but the progress of our troops could be followed by the barrage which preceded them Notwithstanding standing a heavy henvy rainfall the night of ot September 12 11 the weather gave us an advantage as the he mist partly screened our advance from the enemy There was a chill breeze blowing and Its direction was such that no sound Bound of ot firing could be heard from the artillery in our Immediate immediate Im im- im mediate front although the more distant artillery bombardment on the western face was heard dis The sky over the battlefield both before and after dawn aflame with |