Show K M S ft X General Genet I Pershing B s sS X X K X S K K K Story Stoy of the A. A E. E F. F e X M K M X 11 K Copyright 1931 In En mil countries by Ly the tho North Am Ameri American rl- rl By General l lK X can ago World right reserved M K K including the tha Reproduction lu iu whole A Ilya Il p a n nor M M K or In 1 part t prohibited Wy U MK K X CHAPTER Continued Continued It seemed to me then that If It this picture of or civilization engaged In the persecution of ot Innocent and unarmed noncombatants mostly women and children could be brought home to all peoples reason would be forced upon rulers and governments where too often orten their passions and ambitions assume assume as sume control As a result of the German successes against the French something akin to tu toa toa a panic prevailed In Paris Probably a million people left during the spring and there was grave apprehension among the officials lest the city be betaken taken Plans were made to remove the government t to Bordeaux and we ourselves were were prepared to remove our offices CHAPTER The Second division assumed the offensive of or June 6 G 1918 1915 and began a series serIes series se se- ries of attacks which culminated some sonic three weeks later In the capture of the thelast thelast last German positions In the Bois Bols de Belleau b by Its marine brigade and of Vaux by Its regular brigade The fighting during mst most of this period pe pe- period was of or peculiar Intensity The German lines were favorably located on commanding ground and aud were made more formidable by the extensive use of or machine guns especially in Belleau ik wood In the I i iJ nr an l L rna Ir I we r rr y f 74 r r 1 lne i t uv a vu Bouresches an anTT anu i iv s' s r regular gu r brigade too 1 tarm farm and Bols Bois de la Barette Barete During the next nest few da days s 's our troops progressed progressed pro pro- gressed piecemeal June 15 the Seventh Seventh Sev Sev- infantry Third division lon arrived to reinforce the marine brigade engaged engaged en en- In the wood This regiment relieved relieved re rc- re- re the brigade on that date and anel the marines were rested for tor a week when they again entered the line Against stubborn resistance they drove the enemy from the wood June 25 Regulars Capture Vaux Meanwhile the regular regula brigade continued continued con con- con continued Us Its attacks Intermittently an and July 1 with great dash dash captured Vaux Vau and and the Bois de la In n Roche che The operations opera opera- thins of the division in this vicinity were practically at an end when the Ines v wc re re stil on n lie fhe ground 1 captured from the enemy emmy The casualties In the division were about More than 1000 1600 prisoners were captured from the enem enemy The gains b by the Second division were won with little aid on either flank by the French units which were still In poor shape and ami w were re made against an enemy my determined to crush this earl early American effort The success success success suc suc- cess of this division and of the First I at ut Cantigny and the Third on the Marne Mame following as they did the crisis of May 2 27 were loudly acclaimed by bythe bythe bythe the French and for the tI e time being had hada ha haa a very stimulating effect upon French morale With the tra transfer of activities to the French front northeast of Paris our plan to build up UI an American corps near Amiens had h corae br-corae come Impracticable and as I had offered General Petain the services of our divisions I wherever they might be needed It now appeared possible to form at least a corps and possibly an army somewhere along the Marne Maroe salient t I U. U S. S Divisions Relieve French I I had suggested that we should I bring other divisions to Join the t he Second Second Second Sec Sec- ond and antI Third for that purpose and accordingly the Twenty Sixth and second Forty were relieved from the Inactive front and five American American Ameri Amen can divisions from Crom the British area were designated to be sent to that quiet sector to relieve French lIons Blons The assembly of 01 four American Amen Ameri can divisions In aid of the French on that front would more than offset their recent losses General Petain In his letter accepting acceptIng accepting accept accept- ing my offer said In part I 1 must express m my d deep p gratitude for or the prompt and very ery Important aid you are bringing In the present crisis The American troops already engaged In the battle are the unanimous unanimous admiration of the whole French army array The power of the effort which your country Is at present showing as ns well as the resolute and generous spirit with which you ou enter the struggle Is for the allies aUle and allies and above ubo nil all for for France France n a comfort In the grave ve times through h which we are passing and a pledge of hope for fur th the future What If Paris Should Fall Leaving the suggestion with General Petain without further discussion I returned to Paris arriving Ing June 8 The next morning I 1 called on Premier Clemenceau and on that morning the fourth phase of the great German offensive offensive of of- started between and the Olse Reports Indicated thai that It was meeting considerable success Mentioning this to M. M Clemenceau 1 j askew him film what he thought would be the result If It Paris should fall M. M Clemenceau replied that that he ann ano Mr Jr Llo Lloyd d George e had considered that possibility and had reached the concluSion con COli elusion the they would do evel everything in II their power to save Paris but If II li should he be lost they would go on tight fight rig Ing Above Purls Paris Is France be added c and land above trance France Is civilization r As I was leaving lea Ing he came to the thedoor thedoor thedoor door with me and I said sahl It may not look encouraging Just now but we weare weare weare are certain to win In 10 the end Be Re clung to my hand and In a n tone that showed the utmost solicitude he replied re re- re- re pIled plied Do Du you rou really think that J Jam am glad Ind to hear you ou say It This was WUi the first and only time that I ever evor sensed any misgiving In Inthe Inthe inthe the mind of this resolute man Notwithstanding Notwithstanding Not Nut withstanding our occasional rather heated discussions on the use to be made of ot American troops I admired him greatly It alwa always s 's seemed to me he represented the true spirit of confidence confidence con con- and courage of ot the French people I then motored to General Fochs Foch's headquarters at Bombon We consla consla- ered my ray proposal to form Corm an American Ameri AmerI- AmerIcan can corps near Chateau Thierry to which he readily agreed He spoke especially of the fine wor work of 01 our troops I I asked how a German drive which threatened or perhaps captured Paris I would woul affect the armies and the peo peo- pie His reply was almost word for word like M. M The They had evidently discussed d the possibility of losing Paris tIe lie too was certain the armies would go on with the V war r. r Foch spoke so positively and with such evident feeling that I was moved mo to Set efF p hak hl 1 fi hancl n 2 e got ar arne e p v the t n Twenty Twenty lw d l ns eu joute from the British front to 10 the tte ast of ot France were stopped at Gen Generate General raJ Fochs Foch's request In the vicinity of Vil lers the object being to concentrate concentrate con con- several of our divisions on the west of the Marne salient primarily pr- pr madly marily as ns a precaution against another er German orr offensive there but ultimately ulti alt for possible use on the ofTen offen sive The Se Second ond Third Twenty Twenty- sixth and second Forty Fort were In that area and with the Fourth and Twenty Twenty- eighth there was a force equivalent to twelve French divisions although some of these units were without artillery An encouraging circumstance at nt the moment was the success of the tho French erich In holding Von Butlers Butler's attack on the theM Noyon NoOn M front This rids fourth phase of the German offensive was an effort not only to widen the vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable able Marne pocket but to secure the railway between Compel ne and Sols- Sols sons and open the way to Paris The anniversary of the arrival oi of I our advance contingent In France was the occasion of ot many congratulations on the part of the French h. h CHAPTER The demands deman s for American divisions divi s were pressing The First second second sec sec- ond and Third had already become actively ac ac- engaged the First FIt being slated to go gu to tu the reserve near the Chateau Merry Thierry salient when relieved from Cantigny The Second was still In Inline Inline inline line at Belleau wood and the Third south of 01 the Marne General Foci Foch had asked for five of the divisions recently arrived that were training with the British Of Ot these the Fourth and Twenty eighths while en route to the quiet sector sec tor to relieve French divisions had been heen diverted dl to the reserve near the western face of the Marne salient The Thirty fifth moved to the Ity of ot and und the Seventy seventh was about to enter the trenches In the Baccarat sector to replace the Fort Forty Forty- second which was to rt reinforce Gouraud's Gouraud's Gou Guu raud's urmy east cast of Rheims The Eighty Eighty- second had started for the Toul roul sector sec sea sector tor to relieve e the Twenty sixth which In turn was WIlS soon to relieve the Second Thus there were three American dl visions in quiet sectors sector and seven ther In the battle line Him or held beld In Into tidiness to meet tiny any eventuality which might result from further activity activity ac ac- ac of the Germans In the great wedge they had driven toward Paris British Displeased The British were displeased at nt the transfer of our divisions from their area claiming priority to retain them by reason of having brought ht them over When General Foch Inquired of ot the conditions under which these troops were serving with the British my reply made It clear that he had entire authority to direct where they I should go In the emergency as without without with with- o out t it the theory of a supreme command command com com- mand would fan fall The rapid succession of ot German offensives had seriously crippled the allies aIlles and not only materially reduced their powers of resistance but it had depressed depressed depressed de de- pressed their morale and caused the darkest misgivings among them They grew rew more and more fearful lest the enemy might still have untold reserves ready nearly to swell his forces That the morale of of- the allies was low was I shown by the conclusions of many of ot their soldiers returning from the front to the rest areas Reports from the British front were no hatter better Their troops continuously told our men who were with them for training that we had come too late and that our entry Into the battle would only postpone hilled Allied defeat This attitude seemed so alarming that I took steps step to prevent pre such fluch a spirit from affecting our army by promptly reporting the facts to allied tI tIes ih re ene of such sentiments Was reason for tor opp opposing op op- p posing SI of amalgamation Vastness ss f to Far short the expectations ex ex expectations of thep tine p receding e when Foch General the British and I had Joined Joined- In an urgent argent argent argentI I appeal for twenty twenty four four trained Ameri Amen American American can divisions by t the e tollo following June It Is Ls small wonder that the allies were now so insistent In urging Increased increased In in- creased and continuous shipments of men trained or untrained So serious was the situation regarded regarded regarded re re- re- re that it was no longer lon er a demand for twenty four ur divisions but but- for one hundred It Is probable that the vastness vastness vast vast- ness of this request was not full fully realized or else the had greatly exaggerated Ideas of or our power of ot accomplishment ac ac- surprising as It actually actually actu actually ally proved to be A brief calculation of these demands of ot the prime prune ministers showed that they were asking more than combatant t troops oops by the following spring which augmented by those required required re re- required re- re for the services of or supply conservatively conservatively con con- calculated for a well bal anted ha-anted force situated In n a foreign country country country coun coun- try under the circumstances stances that surrounded sur sur- surrounded rounded us would amount at least to men The American com combatant force would thus have have equaled divisions of the allies aHles and their apprehension may be Imn Imagined when c re e realize that that- this was greater by ono one fourth than the combined allied armies of divisions divisions di dl- visions then on the western front Saw as as Limit Although no nu such number as this could have haye been considered feasible as it Is Is is' unlikely that It ii could have been either transported equipped d' or or- or supplied It was necessary In view of ut the situation to lay ph plans for tor bringing over o all we could After giving the question careful study It seemed to tome tome tome me that men would be the limit we could hope to reach rench b by the spring of ot 1919 This ron roughly would provide at least sixty six or possibly over over seventy com coin combatant divisions the reit rest being necessary necessary sary for the noncombatant service A As Af we had hind hitherto made estimates es based upon a u total force farce e of ot men mell n it was quite Imperative e that should be made on t the e p and that work ork everywhere In the A. A E E. F F. F should now have ha that end eod In view A cable I 1 sent June 21 set forth the reasons for tor fixing the program forthe forthe for forthe the future definitely at men menas menas menas as a minimum and urged upon th the War department the utmost effort e lort to meet our Immediate requirements for tor forthe forthe the expansion of ot port facilities and railroads A detailed study of the troop shipments and tonnage required was wag Included My cable closed There Is nothing so dreadfully Im important Important im- im as winning this war and every possible resource should be made immediately Ira im- im mediately available a Mr Air Secretary the question Is so vital Ital to our country countr and the necessity of ot winning the war waris warIs waris is so great that there Is no limit to wt which we we should not go to carry out the plan I have outlined for the next ten months and we must be prepared to carry It on still further after that at the same rate rote or ma maybe be faster CHAPTER The The Thirty Thirty fifth firth second Forty and Seventy seventh divisions were now In training under the recently organized Third corps Especial effort was being made to hasten their preparation In to both hoth staff and line In anticipation of ot an e early ly call for more serious sen servIce ice I Inspected these troops June 1922 19 1918 and my Impressions were favorable favorable favorable favor favor- able although a num number e of ot officers were found unfamiliar with v the principles prim prin es o cd tactical leadership In In such hastily hasUly trained units this was hardly surprising especially In view of th the known defects of the instruction at al home Many were found with but slight appreciation ap ap- of the natural defensive pos possibilities of a n given position Some Som battalion and even regimental com corn commanders commanders manders had not thought to ascertain the exact location of their front lines and of course had hael failed to work out euf the details of or preparation against a n possible attack My predilection for del detailed tilled Instruction |