Show Germany Ready to Make Peace I Simonds Asserts Asserts' We e Are re Coming Oming omin g to o a Change an g gory a in in the a History His His- II tory ory o of the e Great tea War ar Noted o e Ex Expert x p pec er ert I Declares ec ores Meaning eosin g gac o of Teutonic eu cute I Attack ac on Italy a Y Explained x alne s I p B By Y FRANK H. H SIMONDS Author Autho of The Tha Worlds World's War Copyright 1016 1916 1916 by N N. Y T. Tribune I TN IN N THE MINDS of aU all observers all of the war the attack upon Italy J- J Jwill wilt will s seem em a natural and normal expansion of a policy well defined in the case of Verdun The P policy olic Y ma may Y Yon be described as a decision on the tale the part of of Germany to renounce grandiose o operations P stations like the campaign against Russia last summer and confine herself to a g gen genera general eng en- en era oral eral defensive supplemented by a limited offensive on a narrow front I In the case of Verdun we are now p pretty tart y familiar wi with I h t the he German method Attacking on a narrow front with a colossal concentration of artillery ry and only a relatively considerable infantry force they endeavored to take first by main force and by su surprise rise and then by a slow and steady push one of the best known of French fortresses which although no longer of military value preserved res its ifs hold loll upon the fhe imagination of the French and Genn German n publics I Both Botts the surprise attack attach and the slow and steady pounding have failed at et Verdun Despite oscillations and fluctuations the Germans Germano have made madeno no real progress for two months Now their military experts have fallen backon back on a third line of argument to justify the attack and to sustain a claim for success It is this third line lino of argument which is most int interesting inter resting r- r esting to watch with the Austrian attack on Italy in progress The effect of the German attack upon Verdun the German Gorman exp experts assert assert as sert has been to disarrange the the pe whole allied plan for a a. general offensive this spring The losses of the French the expenditure of ammunition have been so EO great that France Prance is now out of ot the running tanning for the year and the allied general offensive is impossible Germans Mistake French drench Siren Strength Add to this the German belief that France is exhausted exhausted In in men la is spirit in itt resources resources and and it is easy to explain why Germany keeps on pounding at Verdun when all hope of m military success is at an end an anat and at most moat only a a. more mora moral value can attach to any local victory The German conception as to French exhaustion is is in my view mistaken But Bat Germany Ger m many ny and German writers cling to it firmly Now an Austrian attack upon Italy is plainly predicated on the same sameI I conception France is is' out of the running Italy Is the next in is line An attack upon Italy by the southern Tyrol carries with it the tits possibility tb the the- maximum possibility of an advance e to Verona or Vicenza the isolation of oc all the Italian armies east of Vicenza on an the Isonzo front the complete dislocation of Italian plans and of ot Italian participation in a a. general allied offensive Such a maximum profit is at best unlikely but there remains the chance that Italy will lose loco so 50 heavily in men in munitions that she will also be eliminated as the Germans assert France is eliminated for tho the balance of the year Meantime it is clear that Germany is standing on the defensive in Russia Russia Rus Rus- sia aid and on the British front She is using only small forces against Verdun and tb the Austrian army ac actually in the Tyrol is not considerable according to contemporary standards Germany has failed to take Verdun Austria will possibly fall fait t to got Verona But neither failure will wilt be of oY moment if it France and Italy are put out of the running for the present season Now the converse of the German view is freely stated by allied commentators com with whom THE TELEGRAM mainly agrees These declare that Germany has Las lost lost- fa far more men and exp expended far more ammunition than the the French have done at Verdun that she has failed to precipitate a premature pre mature and ill Ili co co allied offensive and that when their time comes t the e allies ames will be able to launch a general offensive from all aU poi points t Kaiser Is Now Ready to Make Peace Remember sways that hitherto the chief German advantage has been beau the possession of the interior lines which enabled her bel to move troops quickly from the east to the west from France to Russia to meet an at tack The allies stave have not coordinated co their efforts The South in our civil war possessed the rho same advantage and used it successfully u until u Grant initiated the policy of attacking on all fronts simultaneously and then the end was relatively prompt If It the allies are correct in their assertions they possess the power to strike at their own moment on oa all fronts Germany has failed to disorganize ize their plans or break up their arrangements by the rho Verdun operation It If Germany is accurate ac the policy of limited local offensives succeeding the theold theold theold old general attack of the Marne and of ot the Russian campaigns is proving fatal to an allied offensive this year It is fair to conclude that the change in German policy represents a recognition that it is no longer possible to win the war on ott the old scale It is no longer possible to destroy the military forces of France or of Russia and thereby eliminate them from the war On the other hand It seems to indicate that the Germans have no larger hope than that of maintaining what hat they now hold until allied exhaustion compels a settlement by diplomats diplomats diplomats diplo diplo- mats not by soldiers Germany is now ready to make peace She cannot conquer Europe She no longer believes she can dispose of Russia or France permanently But she believes that she can hold her present lines indefinitely and disorganize I and wear out her opponents by small offensives like the Verdun attack I She ousts counts on the moral effect upon France and Italy of steady losses without with with- without out profit refit and she ez expects ecta that France first Italy next neat will consent to peace when peace offers them integrity and war no possible profit Central Powers Trying g gIt to Cut Losses It If Germany could provoke th the allies to a a. premature attack which failed she would reap large profit and might get peace on an terms that would leave her supreme In the near East If she can hold on her present her present line until winter and prevent a a. general offensive she may get material gain gahi out oat of the war But it is essential to recognize that her position is weakened by her manifest eagerness for peace which h has combined with the Verdun cam com campaign to inspirit the allies and an an absence of all aU success coupled with steady casualties may map have as profound effect upon her population as she has hoped it would have upon tho rho French As far as one ono can an Judge Germany and her Austrian ally are now trying tring try tr- trying ing to tol cut their losses while holding holdin on oa to their conquests against the day of settlement b by Y ne negotiation g This Thi is a com complete P taro break wi with th the method of 1914 and 1916 In Itt both of these years Germany tried to win by a a. general and colossal attack that should not defeat but annihilate Apparently we are coming to a change in the rho history of ot the great war A similar change came after Gettysburg in the civil war The South renounced renounced re reo the idea of conquering peace on the enemy's territory It clung for two years more mare to the idea that it could win freedom by defending the territory its armies held This was was the last phase of the i Confederacy It is worth recalling too that in this last p phase tease Enro Europe p e and even not nota a 3 few Northerners talked of pe peace ce and of the fatal folly of going on with a hopeless struggle To the very end the South clung t to the belief belie that it could not be beaten on Its own lines The new German policy if it is a policy policy pol icy cannot be taken as as other than a a. confession of weakness The Tho problem which remains to be faced is Will allied strength th of will endure If It it does It is not hard to foresee new German suggestions of peace this time based on the tho P prospects respects not on the present situation |