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Show WEEKLY NEWS ANALYSIS GOP Convention Hands Nomination To Dewey in Display of Unanimity; Warren Second Choice on Ticket By Bill Schoentgen, WNU Staff Writer . (EDITOR'S NOTE: Wh plnlom art xprcuH In th tolnmiu. thty art thoti Waters Ntwipiptr Union's news analysts and not n r I lj at Inn wspapr. GOVERNOR DEWEY AND FAMILY . . . They uant a new, white house . . I CRACKDOWN: Marshal Tito Russia's iron curtain bad twitched Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia was the central figure, but remamed Z only a brief instant before h-Soviet h-Soviet bosses whisked him off the boardi. , , . P!ain fact was that Tito, hitherto the fair-haired boy of eastern European Euro-pean communism, had been all but purged from the Communist party because he was trying to make a play for western capitalism. Actually he. together with his henchmen in the Yugoslav govern-ment govern-ment was ousted from the all-important Cominform (Communist information in-formation bureau) which was established estab-lished last year to provide greaUr unity for the Soviet satellite states of eastern Europe. Tito and his regime were charged with virtually everything the Soviet politburo considers a crime-ranging from Trotskyism and anti-Sovietism anti-Sovietism to "ineptness" and "false demagogic tactics." Behind this official facade which the Communists had thrown up, however, were the real reasons for Tito's expulsion from grace: As the only wartime hero of the Communists the Yugoslav marshal had begun to take' himself too seriously, seri-ously, hence, was beginning to feel the need to express his own opinions and policies on matters political and economic. Stalin wanted no other boss In his sphere. Tito was building up a "personal police" army which was molesting other Communists, including Russians, Rus-sians, in Belgrade. Also, he had followed fol-lowed an independent foreign policy pol-icy without Moscow's approval. Finally he committed the cardinal sin of currying favor with western capitalist diplomats with an eye to obtaining reconstruction credits for Yugoslavia. SERVICE: Drafting That draft which men in the 19-through-25 age group are beginning begin-ning to feel is the result of the U. S. armed forces drawing in their breath and preparing to expand all over the place. Between next fall and next summer sum-mer the services plan on calling about 30,000 draft-age young men every month. Drafting is scheduled to start about September 22. With a strength of 837.000 authorized au-thorized by congress in the selective service bill, the army has estimated that it will need between 225,000 and 250,000 selectees to approach its authorized strength. That number is in addition to the 250,000 or 300,-000 300,-000 volunteers it so fervently hopes it will get In discussing plans for this second peacetime draft in U. S. history, Army Secretary Kenneth Royall explained ex-plained that the army now has 542,-000 542,-000 men but it won't jump to the 837,000 figure immediately because funds for the fiscal year which began be-gan July 1 are not sufficient Thus, by July 1, 1949, the size of the army will bt an estimated 790.-000. 790.-000. The peacetime draft is a relatively rela-tively slow-functioning process. Certainly it can't compare with the wartime levying of manpower. Peak of the induction rate during the war was reached in February, 1943, when 406,374 men received their greetings. When the army attains its full 837,000 strength it will consist of 12 regular army divisions. Backstop-ping Backstop-ping these will be six national guard divisions, together with other supporting sup-porting elements such as anti-air. craft artillery and service troops. BLOCKADE: Berlin Russia's freight blockade of Berlin, Ber-lin, while a stark enough action In its own right nevertheless was a secondary manifestation of the same old cold war crisis arising out of the Soviet bid for power In Europe. While American and British planes by the hundreds were flying in food to besieged Berliners the western powers were pondering a question they had had to answer in 1938 when Hitler was in power-whether power-whether or not to appease. Long range plans of the Kremlin of which the Berlin blockade is just one phase, call for the forcing of the western Allies out of Berlin This, according to Soviet thinking eould be done by either of two means: Either by threats and ter-rorization ter-rorization involving the risk of war or by a four-power negotiation which could be hoped to result in a western appeasement policy such as grew out of the ill-starred Munich conference of 1938 Britain and the U.S. are on a dangerous spot If they pulled out of Berlin under pressure of force applied by Russia the power and influence in-fluence of western democracy would be perilously weakened in Europe DEWEY EYED GOP Convention Out of the smoke-blurred rooms during the recess before the third roll call came the word: It was Dewey first again with the medicine medi-cine men. From the very beginning of the GOP convention In the sweltering confines of Philadelphia's convention conven-tion hall it was a simple case of Dewey against the field. The field was composed of Taft Stassen, Vandenberg, Warren and Mac-Arthur, Mac-Arthur, plus a scattering of favorite fa-vorite sons. Despite some frenetic Jockeying for delegates by Dewey, Taft and Stassen over the week-end preceding pre-ceding the convention, the big three of the GOP started out on Monday Mon-day with their pre-convention alignments unchanged. But by the time Gov. Dwight Green of Illinois had finished with his keynote address Monday night It was apparent that a stop-Dewey movement, was struggling to get under way. As It turned out that movement never did get beyond the struggling stage and Dewey remained re-mained virtually the only one unaffected un-affected by it In retrospect, the convention by that time already had assumed an inexorable course toward the Dewey camp. Second guessers maintained that the whole affair oozed along as if motivated by some fundamental and changeless law, although that was not fully evident until the convention eould be viewed as a finished product If there was a fundamental law it was compounded from a series of heterogeneous factors, political and personal: First of all there was the superbly functioning Dewey machine, operating oper-ating with almost 100 per cent efficiency ef-ficiency to corral votes. Secondly, the Dewey opposition was divided. Taft and Stassen, poles apart in their political philosophy phil-osophy within the Republican party, could not get together. Stassen Stas-sen flatly refused a deal and Taft kept waiting for a break that never came. California's Gov. Earl Warren War-ren refused to have hand in a stop-Dewey drive. Insisted he was running for the nomination and not Just against Dewey. Vandenberg added to the confusion by remaining silent noncommittal and even disinterested. dis-interested. Nomination Actual climax of the convention came when Sen. Edward Martin of Pennsylvania renounced his favorite favo-rite son candidacy and threw his support backed by about half the members of Pennsylvania's 73 delegates, dele-gates, to Dewey. That started the blitzkrieg. From then : on it was Dewey and downhill all the way. As the crucial balloting began in humid, steaming convention hall It became more evident that a stop-Dewey stop-Dewey coalition had not jelled. On the first roll call it was Dewey 434. Taft 224, Stassen 166. On the second ballot Dewey had gone up to 515 and Taft to 274, while Stassen dropped to 149. At that point the convention recessed re-cessed for three hours, a move engineered by Taft Stassen and other anti-Dewey leaders to give them time to decide whether or not to continue the fight When the convention reconvened for the third roll call the stop-Dewey stop-Dewey drive had changed to a nominate-Dewey stampede. Sen. John Bricker of Ohio was the first on the rostrum to withdraw the GOVERNOR WARREN ... He accepted . . . name of his state's candidate, Senator Sen-ator Taft This was swiftly followed fol-lowed by similar withdrawals by Warren, Stassen, Vandenberg and MacArthur. On the third ballot the 1,094 delegates dele-gates to the convention nominated Gov. Thomas E. Dewey as their unanimous choice to run as the Republican Re-publican candirfito for President in 1948. Warren Selection of Gov. Earl Warren of California as the Republician nominee for vice-president came as a complete shock to almost everyone, every-one, despite the fact that the choice was a logical and reasonable one. Warren was a surprise pick because be-cause prior to the convention he had maintained stoutly that he could not afford to take the vice-presidency and would not accept the second spot It was even more a departure from the norm in that the Dewey-Warren Dewey-Warren ticket failed to offer a grain of consolation to the old guard and isolationist wing of the party. Warren has strongly internationalist inter-nationalist political views even more so than Dewey and has been a consistent critic of the GOP isolationists. iso-lationists. Initial speculation as to the vice-president vice-president spot ran to Rep. Charles Hal leek of Indiana or Sen. Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, both of the "conservative Republican" tradition. tradi-tion. But in the night-long pow-wow that followed the Dewey nomination nomina-tion it was Warren who was chosen. Dewey himself averred that he had not influenced the choice, that the party leaders had become convinced convinc-ed that the California governor was the best bet Nevertheless, Dewey had had to make certain promises in order to get Warren for the job: The vice-presidency, vice-presidency, he said, no longer would be the stale, flat and unprofitable un-profitable post It has been. He planned to make Warren a "full partner." Significance Whether the GOP convention constructs its policy platform to fit the candidates or nominated the candidates to fit the platform is, of course, an impossible question. ques-tion. Nevertheless, the Republicans managed to do both. Categorically, the platform is a sound, forward-looking one in the light of the issues, both foreign and domestic, to be faced. Strongly internationalist and bipartisan bi-partisan in tone, it rejects the old line of isolationism for isolationism's isolation-ism's sake and upholds the European Euro-pean recovery program. That foreign policy stand, harmonizing har-monizing as it does with the previously pre-viously stated convictions of Dewey and Warren, may stand as a historic his-toric milestone In development of the Republican party. |
