Show Germany Germ an Alms Aims at F Fr ranee ance T 1 o Blow Is Intended Its lis P Nil M nd Now Ri Ripe I International 11 Staff Correspondence NEW YORK March 21 Germany Germany will next strike at France if fC strike she does All indications point to that and It is the next logical move for her to make It has been the policy and strategy of the German general staff as I lob ob observed ob observed served It at nt close hand during the war to do but one big thing at a time to con concentrate upon that and endeavor to do that well In that respect there I was a strong contract between the German and the allied military strategy Germany first smashed through Belgium Bel- Bel gium glum She then turned to the East to try to save the tho Austrians but came too toolate toolate late and both the Germans and the Austrians were forced to fall raIl back bad from HIndenburg answered answered answered an an- by driving the Russians out of ot East Prussia In May of th same year 1915 Mackensen smashed through the Russian Russian Russian Rus Rus- sian front at Tarnow and rolled roIled Russian lines It proved to be the solar plexus blow for the Russians The famous steamroller was smashed as with giant sledgehammers Later the Austrians and Germans concentrated concentrated concentrated concen concen- on another undertaking Under Under Un Un- Uni i der del Mackensen l they smashed through I Serbia That finished Hindenburg and Lu- Lu planned and Mackensen 1 and Falkenhayn did the Rumanian job 1 One big job undertaken in the I I spring of ot 1916 failed tailed utterly utterly Verdun During the summer summer of the same year i the German general staff concentrated concentrated concentrated concen concen- upon defense against the British British British Brit Brit- ish and I French rench offensive on the Somme LINE FORCED BACK In 1917 the German general staff had its hands full standing off the I British and French in their second of offensive offensive of- of I I on the Hindenburg fell back to the Siegfried line a distance distance distance dis dis- dis- dis tance ranging from three to twelve I I miles The Germans then shifted their weight to hold the British offensive in Flanders With the offensive south of Arras and in Flanders at an end the German German German Ger Ger- man general staff collaborated with the Austrian general staff on the next joint big job The joint offensive against Italy followed with the dims dims- disastrous disastrous trous effect to the Italians still fresh in the mind of the public The Italians were reported to have lost more than men in dead wounded or prisoners prisoners pris pris- ners 2700 guns and other material not to mention several million bushels of ot wheat The separate peace with Russia forces Rumania Into peace It clips cUps off miles from the front of the central central central cen cen- I powers A blow at France is the next logical logical logical logi logi- cal move for the Germans The answer answer answer an an- of President Wilson and the allies to the reichstag speech of Count von I if warlike will furnish the tho necessary moral and psychological psychological psychological background In Germany for such an offensive PEACE TALK IS STRATEGY As I pointed out in the preceding article eve every y big German military move by the general staff is preceded I Iby by some form of peace Initiative by bythe bythe the German government That persuades persuades persuades per per- I a large part of the German people that their government has first attempted to make peace but that the allies alles rejected it and left them no choice but to continue the war This political strategy of the government has dovetailed with the military strate strategy y of the staff The fact that the German government government government govern govern- ment may mayor or may not be sincere in such peace moves does not enter into the question for the Germans It must be borne in mind that they con consider consider consider con con- sider that their gov government is sincere even if the people of America and the allies alles do not just as we know President President President dent Wilson to be sincere in the ideals and principles he has set and the Germans Germans Ger tier mans charge him with insincerity The very general impression in our country is that public opinion in Germany Germany Germany Ger Ger- many has no influence upon the gov gov- It is true true- that it has not anywhere near the influence that public public public pub pub- lic opinion has lots in America But the view that it is wholly a negligible quantity to which the German government government government govern govern- ment pays pas no attention wh whatever is very erroneous The very fact that even the powerful g general staff must needs have a certain psychological background at home for its military initiatives on large scale and the government government government gov gov- takes all possible diplomatic and political advantage to prepare such a popular background certainly is evidence to the contrary DEFENSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL Last summer the Germah German general staff start could not possibly have Initiated an offensive in the West The temper of the public mind would not have permitted permitted permitted per per- It or would certainly have rendered rendered rendered ren ren- dered it a failure In December 1916 both Hindenburg and told me that their prospective plans at that time did not contemplate an offensive against France Germanys Germany's two great military military military mili mili- tary leaders were too much much concerned with the expected joint offensive of the allies on all fronts anticipated by bythe bythe bythe the Germans for the spring of 1917 The Russian revolution rendered that plan futile Hindenburg remarked to me at the time We Ve want nothing of ot France The French should be glad that we weare weare are arc willing to give them back what we weare weare are arc occupying without them demanding demand demand- ing Alsace Since then have come the Russian revolution and separate o arate peace with Russia and Rumania It is not so certain certain certain tain that Hinden Hindenburg and nd have not changed their minds in re regard regard regard re- re gard to France should they make a drive against France and have a measure measure measure meas meas- ure of ot success The temper of the German public mind also has changed Any demands In the West Vest made by Germany after a drive there the success of which may seem ever so improbable yet re remains remains remains re- re mains a possibility would be justified by the tho claim that peace had been offered offered of of offered before the offensive rejected and that the German people were en entitled entitled entitled en- en titled to some compe compensation for vast expenditures in In blood and money made inevitable by the attitude of America and the allies FURTHER LIGHT THROWN must not t be This construed into an argument that President Wilson should accept Hertling's willingness to discuss peace on th the basis of Mr l I Wilsons Wilson's four fundamental principles I 1 That That Is a matter for the president to decide decides I t am merely the toj I German frame of mind its methods of reasoning Further light is thrown upon the German thinking about an offensive in the West by Lieutenant Colonel von lie He Ie is in charge of the military department t in the foreign office and is the connecting link be between between between be- be tween the chancellor and the foreign secretary and the grand general staff He lie himself is a member of the general st staff ff and one of its most notable his his- Whatever may be charged against Germany and against some of its military military military mili mili- tary leaders Lieutenant Colonel von was one of the and most honorable officers I have met in inthe inthe inthe the army of any country countr That is the testimony of every American correspondent correspondent correspondent corre corre- in Germany lIe He never stooped to evasion He lIe never at attempted attempted attempted at- at tempted to palm off propaganda for news Ills His working policy with the war correspondent was I 1 trust you you OU trust me It was a good policy polley It was ono of Von duties I Ito to keep leep closely In touch with the diplomatic and political i phases of the war and keep him posted o on popular sentiment In Ger tier many sentiment OFFENSIVE DISCUSSED In discussing the possibilities of an anI I offensive in the West Vest after the Russian Russian Rus Rus- sian collapse Von remarked to me a few days before I left Berlin In the state of our public mind an offensive in the West could be justified justified justi justi- fied only with First that the thc allies demanded German territory or presented other terms unacceptable or declined to discuss peace at all with us Second the grand general staff would have to be satisfied that such I an offensive had reasonable chances of success in the west Third that success would quickly bring the war to an end through the collapse of France France- I Those three reasons alone could justify the minds of the German people people people peo peo- to the terrible sacrifices in human life Ufe that such an offensive would make inevitable inevitable- The following day Mathias Erzberger ger goer leader of the majority bloc Inthe in inthe inthe the reichstag told me that the reichstag reichstag tag was strongly opposed to an offensive offensive offensive offen offen- sive in the west if it peace could be had without it He lie repeated almost word for word what Von Haetten had told |