| Show REVIEW OF RUSSIAN IAN ON us IS GIVEN Distinguished Military Authority Says Says That While l Conditions Are lire Grave Armies of f Czar Ar Are Still Far From Being Perm Perman Permanently n De De- fe t d. d I Corres Associated Press ATHENS' ATHENS Oct 1 A A distinguished military auth authority rIty of one of the allied allied allied al al- al- al I lied powers who has Just completed a B stay eJay ay of several months in Russia I Ii i with the imperial armies has fur fur- fur I I the Associated Press with a summary of the he situation at the at-the the time when the emperor of Russia took personal command of the land hand and naval for forces es of the empire It is useless to deny the gravity I of the tha situation in Russia the officer officer of of- In question said but it would be quite as erroneous to regard RussIa's Russia Russia's Rus Rus- or-I or I sia sIas sIa's position today as desperate or even as one of imminent danger The morale of the tIie Russian forces is absolutely untouched by the long series sc so- ries of retreats retreats- The Tho Russian peo peo- pie are for the war to a 1 man and I every defeat ha has ha served only to tp confirm them in their stubborn determination determination de do- termination to drive every German from Russian soil Were Vere the government government gov gov- to undertake to make malte p. p a separate peace for Russia now it would have to face faco a spontaneous and flaming insurrection in all parts of till tho country Drawback Drawback in Change hange This is only one no side of tIle the medal however The change in the supreme command of the imperial armies has had its drawbacks drawbacks' The Grand Duke Nicholas s Nicholaie- Nicholaie was never a a great tact tactician cian I nor did he lie ever ever pretend to be one But he had the confidence ot of his officers and the absolute faith of I his men The latter the emperor will also have perhaps even to a greater extent than his uncle great-uncle I for the emperor of all all' the is almost a religious figure to the average Russian But how much I confidence he hC will inspire in his of of- is another m tte-r tte Th They y know that when Nicholas said a thing he lie meant it He w was s like a a aro ro rock k in his decisions and withal fundament fundamentally lly Just and of open mind His officers could depend de depend de dc pend upon him and they did diel depend depend depend de de- de- de pend upon him And it had an excellent excellent excellent ex ex- ex- ex effect throughout the army With the emperor the Russians fear it may be different In the first place he not only is not a soldier but he is a very strong advocate of world peace He has retained confidence in former Minister of War Var in whom certainly certainly certainly no one else lse has lias any dence clence ami and who is generally regarded regarded regarded re re- re- re in R Russia as an incompetent who with has had a avery avery avery very sinister influence on en the em em- The emperor himself also recalled recalled recalled re re- re- re called to office when with much difficulty dif dit dif dif- f culty h he had finally finally- been got rid I of S. S V. V Roul Who now occupies occupies I pies the most important civil post postin I in the empire that empire that of the ministry I of communications and communications and and who instead instead instead in in- stead of planning to transport arms arms- and munitions to armies in desperate need of them is intent intent- upon working out nationalist theories of of his own of Russia for the Russians In place of accepting a very favorable American American American Amer Amer- ican offer to erect factories in Rusala Russia Russia Rus Rus- sia ala for the reassembling reassembling- of ot American Ameri Amen can war materials by those familiar with the work insisted on having the work done by Russians totally unfamiliar unfamiliar- with it in factories factories factories facto facto- ries which the Russians took ten times as long to construct o as the Americans would have required Bad Financing On the financial side the situation situation sit sit sit- is almost as bad The minister minister min mm- ister P P. L. L Bark is a man of no very signal ability who knows enough however t tO be guided largely by his French and British I colleagues But Chipoff the head of the state bank has given rise to tono tono tono no little criticism of his his' capacity in Russia by his insistence on guarding guarding guarding guard guard- ing the gold reserve of the empire intact whatever happens to Russian exchange It is the emperors emperor's willingness to I keep men like these in office under present critical conditions which has 1 filled the intelligent Russian with i apprehension at the prospect of his active participation in military affaIrs affairs affairs af af- fairs at this uncertain juncture No Noone Noone Noone one in Russia is ignorant that the emperor takes takes' his traditional position position tion as the father of his people with almost devout seriousness It is scarcely possible to conceive to what unexpected action his conviction that he is called to to- tobe be a second St. St Vladimir VladImir mm mir may lead him His intentions are admitted to be he excellent But Russia could do with a little less exalted purpose and a little more practical efficiency The same may be said of the duma With the tile most patriotic intentions in in- in the world of lending the full operation co-operation of the people of Russia to Co the defense of the empire empire em- em em em- pire its members raIs raised d at a crisis when nobody has time to consider them the he most complex and embarrassing embarrassing embar embar- rassing questions of internal re re- form To open the discussion of the advisability of a responsible ministry min mm- when plainly every thou thought ht is necessary to the n national defense seems almost absurd yet that Is precisely what tl the tho o Russians let the duma do and by permitting It succeeded succeeded suc sue In placing th the emperor in a position which threatens to jeopardize ize his personal popularity at the moment when it is perhaps the most st valuable asset the tho government pos pOSe From a military standpoint there are two great dangers in Russia today today to to- day The first lies In a continued and successful German drive on Petrograd Pe- Pe e- e the second is a drive in inthe inthe the he opposite direction with a view to opening a R way through Russia to the tho Black sea to establish re-establish the broken communications with with- the Ottoman Ottoman Ottoman Ot Ot- Ot- Ot toman empire Both are regarded as most unlikely of success even it if attempted attempted attempted at at- tempted but both must be e considered considered consid consid- ered in weighing the present situation situa stua- tion in Russia Offensive In December It It is scar scarcely elY probable that the Russian armies will begin to r receive in sufficient quantities the small arms and munitions they lack much lack much before November It is not therefore therefore there thero- fore very likely that they will be bo ready to assume an any serious serous of ot I before the first of Decem Decem- be ber Meanwhile the defensive retreat must go on General who is looked upon as one of the ablest military commanders of the empire has the defense of Petrograd in land hand The important defensive works which he has caused to be constructed about are thought to be bo as nearly impregnable as any have proved in this war His line facing almost south 1 also serves serves to to threaten the German I communications in the event of ot any further advance into Russia and to render any such further advance dangerous In this respect therefore the Russian situation may be regarded a as though the danger of th the fall of Petr Petrograd grad should not be bo belittled Petrograd is almost essential es es- es to tile Russians not on account account ac ac- ac count of any sentimental reason connected connected con con- with its being the capital but because three-fourths three of the tile industries in in- directly connected with supplying supplying sup sup- plying the troops are located there and their loss would be a blow from which it would be difficult for the Russian troops to recover On the south tho the situation is less well defined It is evident that Constantinople if falls and the allies ames are able hl f. f to rush arms and i munitions e arms i in l large rg quantities to the Russian forces the forces the situation of ot the Germans will be most niost serious Over and over again gai l I have have- noted that whenever an important shipment of munitions h has s be been n made t to any sector of the Russian line the retreat has promptly stopped in that sector ector a slow but certain advance e has begun and nd long trainloads of prisoners have begun to come through from that part of Pf the front It Is common cornmon com corn mon opinion in Russia b based based- sedon on a great deal of experience that when the Russian Is anywhere nearly equally equipped with the German now doing the fighting on tl the Russian Russian Russian Rus Rus- sian front the Russian Is not only able to stop the German but to push him back r I presume that this is on on ac account of the fresh troops which are constantly being sent into the Russian lines while to to Judge from the prisoners the Russians have taken the opposing German troops ar are neither young nor very well trained as as- asa a rule Dardanelles I Important As then the opening of the Dardanelles means the supplying g of sufficient arms and munitions to the whole Russian army without th the long hong delays el ys now inevitable it would woul seem plain that the Germans mus must do everything in their power to prevent pre vent the defeat of the Turks and andr the fall of Constantinople of-Constantinople Const Certainly Certain Certain- r ly this is Russian opinion Moreover Moreover More More- over it is believed in Russia that the only possible way to accomplish this end is for Germany to reestablish reestablish re lish somehow her line of communications communications with the Dardanelles To achieve this the Russians figure fig ure that the Germans may follow one of these three courses They can drive through Serbia to Bulgaria anc and Turkey But this this' must be bedone bedone bedone done at once or the snows in the Serbian Serbian Ser Ser- bian blan mountains and the equinoctial rains will render render- it impossible The second possibility is a German German German Ger Ger- man drive down the valley of the to Odessa This is regarded regarded regarded re re- re- re in Russia as a possible but buta a very desperate expedient for any German army attempting It would have the Rumanians behind it which in view of of- the present attitude attitude atti atti- tude of Rumania towards the central contral cen con empires would scarcely be wise As in both of ot the first two contingencies contingencies contingencies con con- the Rumanians would have to be reckoned with the Russians Russians Russians Rus Rus- consider the tile third possible course for the Germans to be the most likely one So long they say sayas as Rumania must fight if Serbia i is attacked at and would probably probably probably ably fight if were were invaded invaded in in- why should not the Germans ideal deal with the Rumanians directly a at once and try to break through to the Black sea by the shortest am and most practicable route namely route namely across Rumania from Brasso by way of to Galatz and the mouth of the Danube This This' is indeed what the Russians exp expect ct their opponents opponents op op- op to do possibly at the the- same time time- driving down n the towards Odessa While not perhaps an imminent peril certainly this pla plan constitutes a very serious danger for Russia Cut Cu Cutoff Cutoff off from supplies either by the continued continued con con- resistance of Constantinople or or- orby by a German domination of the Black sea through a seizure of Galatz Ga Ga- latz hats or Odessa Russia's position would be grave indeed indeed indeed-a a fact whIch every intelligent Russian fully recI rec rec- I n |
