Show SOME LESSONS THE STRINGENCY TEACHES Pro Prof Irving Fisher of ot Yale Tin Tho actual cause o it seems to me mc is isa isa a R failure of oC tho rato of ot interest lt to fol fol- follow follow low V tho the rise ril in tho level lovel of ot prices or orin orin orin in other words n failure of tho the rato of interest to follow fonow tho loss in the tho purchasing purchasing pur pur- chasing power of ot money As tho the level leel of prices rises that i is as tho the purchasing in ing power of money decreases wo we know that it affects the man with the fixed salary or fixed receipts it also affects tho the relation between debtors and cred ered But nut more than either cither of ot these it affects tho rate of interest and it is this thin latter pharo hasp of ot tho the case caso that tho the bankers bank bank- ers an anil financiers have o failed to real- real ire ize They have havo entertained a belief that with an increasing supply of money the interest rate rato should decrease This is s not true truo The Tho greatest economic good that can result from the present crisis it seems to m mo me is an understanding of ot tho the sit flit for adjustment t between et the eu cur currency r rency supply and aud the interest t rates The flit less Is on to bo lie learned i in is not of frenzi fren frenzied fren- fren zi d nor of the tho muckrakers nor called so-called but hut it is distinct distinctly an nn economic l letson loon that should result in taking up UJ th the Question of oC a monetary standard and Dd solving it definitely as I we have o not yet t solved it it I don ot of believe 1 t that at the tho reaction from tho present crisis crisi will ill shatter industry OoM old is i coming onI D in in so 10 fast that the level le of ot prices will bo be pretty well main main- The Tho drop should not bo be more than 5 o per c cent nt The effects should be bo short sharp barp and snappy but hut I look to see sec just such uch a crisis recurring in a few fw years perhaps about 1913 1911 from the same onuses causes It is i hard to tell how Jon long th the tho pre present ent conditions condition lOa may last After the period peril of liquidation is iK is over o and we wo start tart in with A clean slate lato wo we 0 shall shan enter upon a t period Aerial of prosperity similar I believe p I to that which has haR gone one before There Thero is i.- is ho however or o a danger that the stronger hoDger in institutions institutions I will m tf try to hold up the tho weaker weak weak- er lr too loo lon long and pretend that the thing is over U b before or it realty really is It would i bo be much bettor better for Cor tho the futuro future prosperity pro prosper prosperity it ity of our industries and our financial market if thoo in contro j I market if it those in control of the tho fl situ situation situation tU would mM not try to flo gloss s over the 1 situation and pretend nd it J U Is not so Inre tf I vere as all it is If It there them is is not a R. complete liquidation if those concerns which wl h have ha been guilty of It speculation over and I hn have 0 lacked business conservatism m are arc I supported too long the tho period of depression depression de dt de- de to follow will ho he correspond correspond- In I Jon longer er and the crash crash will b be beit harder arder However Howo 1 dont don't think it will last long nor be of ot widespread indu- indu once |