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Show fSiWRD MARCH j ' By H. S. Sims, Jr. '"TrKOCESSM OF BlS& FBtTITFIX 'SrTl'KE OF S?vJ$s 011 18LANDS tlon with the great ' Lt now rage throughout ,?. it is important not to J too much engrossed with t, es ad t overlook the F!SCeficance of what goes on. 55,1 t fact in the Russian tf operations is not that tteStld Arny has captured ftf Its or cities. It is the s:r0f, reversal of the previous c0,r vith the Russians taking ff nsive in the Summer and W erious defeats upon the, 7 army in a season that fjCrtQFg" n0thi"g bUt both Germany and Japan. In it the power and might of the United Nations will be brought to bear against the declining forces and resources of the Axis. Nii7.t victories. ' In tho rm-lfle thoro is no groat nm.,0Rl0r,Vn,,,l U, ncfl"l'tlon ot tho Mmnlu ulrflold but tho wholo campaign In thnt nroa has b.n trnn.sfovmed. Whereas the Jnpiinco wore on the offensive with our forces barely able to hold their defense lines, we are now driving the Jnps backward, grad-ualy grad-ualy taking from them points that are important In their future defense. de-fense. Tho Mediterranean theatre offers of-fers tho same observation. Whereas, Where-as, there was a serious threat to the British position in that area, the situation has been altered so greatly thnt the threat is entirely directed against the Axis. Tunisia ond Sicily have given proof that Axis forces are not what they used to be and utterly unable to hold what they must possess to win. The decision of war depends not upon where the armies and navies fight but upon the relative strength of the contending forces. Plainly the Axis is not now strong enough to hold Russia, Sicily or the far-flung islands of the Pacific. Pacif-ic. This is a revelation of relative strength and a sign of things to come. It makes little difference whether wheth-er the Axis forces peter out in Russia or Italy or in Germany. It is of supreme significance that they are beginning to give way before the massive strength of the United Nations. The length of the war, therefore, there-fore, does not altogether depend upon positions held but upon the ability of the enemy to continue warfare. This can be whittled away anywhere the contending forces are in contact and the probability is that, when the Axis cracks, it will split wide open with a sudden bang. The Russian offensive is the most revealing indication of dwindling Axis power. "The German Ger-man army, almost non-engaged on other fronts, is unable to take care of the Red army which Hitler declared de-clared was utterly incapable of the offensive nearly two years ago. Now, if the Nazis cannot avoid a serious defeat in Russia, is it reasonable rea-sonable to expect that they will be able to meet the invasion that is scheduled to hit them in western wes-tern Europe? There is only one chance for he Nazi generalissimos, either reduce tha. Russian front, in order to release re-lease men, or make peace with one enemy or the other. Since a separate sep-arate peace is out of the question, the Germans must inevitably shorten shor-ten their line in Russia, by re- fleeted definite periods. The first, seen in Europe and the Par East, was one of rapid expansion by our enemies, when they marched, or sailed or flew with impunity, attacking at-tacking and capturing their objectives ob-jectives almost at will. This period lasted until August of last year when the first , faint suggestions of a halt were apparent. The second era has lasted a full year. It has been marked by the definite halt of the aggressors and the loss of some of their spoils. More important than recapture of territory, however, is the grinding processes of warfare which have produced definite weak nesses. Meanwhile the United Nations continue to grow "stronger, being far from peak strength even at this time. The third period is in its beginning, begin-ning, marked by the beginning of the offensive that will overwhelm treating to the Dnieper line or closer to the German border. Consider the problems of Japan. If the Japanese are not able to hold Guadalcanal or New Georgia, Geor-gia, what prospect have they of making a more successful stand in defense of vital supply routes or of the empire itself ? To destroy Japanese lines of communication, or invade the empire, em-pire, will require destruction of the Jap navy. The record of sea fighting, fight-ing, up to this time, indicates that this will be done when the stage is set for such a showdown. The strength of Germany is on the land and the power of Japan is on the sea. The events of the past few months have' demonstrated demonstrat-ed weakness on the part of both nations where they must have superior su-perior strength to win the war. The trend on land is overwhelmingly overwhelm-ingly against Germany and Italy and on the water the Japs exhibit difficulties. We are not overlooking the role of aircraft in the great struggle. It is exercising powerful influence in both land and sea operations. Here, too, the odds are against our enemies, when based upon what is happening. In Europe Italian air defenses are practically impotent and Germany is unable to meet the bombing threat or establish air superiority against the Russians. In the Far East the Japanese air arm is having disastrous losses. There is no hope for the Axis leaders lead-ers in the realm of the air. The war, up to this time, has re- |