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Show THE PHILIPPINES. Speaking against the proposal to guarantee the independence of the Philippines. Senator Lodge said: "I cannot say if the Filipinos are fit for eelf -government, but they certainly cer-tainly are unfit to have the power to involve us with other nations when we have not the power to control them and prevent it..' Guaranteeing the independence of Cuba is quite a different thing from guaranteeing the independence of the Philippines. The independence of Cuba is essential to the United States from the standpoint of naval strategy. Cuba guards the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama canal. In the hands of a European power it could be used against us with decisive effect. The United States should not guarantee guaran-tee the independence of the Filipinos unless we have incurred a moral obliga-' obliga-' tion to do so. Whether such an obligation obliga-tion exists is a matter for debate. The Philippines ame into our possession a few days alter the declaration of war against Spain. Admiral Dewey was ordered or-dered to "rapture or destroy the Spanish Span-ish fleet," and when he had destroyed the warships of Admiral Monte io the Philippines were ours to all intents and purposes. We had taken them without any compart, written or verbal, and our obligations were merely the obligations involved in our own traditions as a free people and in the unwritten code of humanity and justice. We voluntarily bound oursrlves to grant independence to the Filipinos when they should be prepared for self- government. That appears to be our main obligation. Clearly it is two sided. The Filipino? must be fittf. for self-government self-government before thev are freed. Part i of the fitness consists in being able to j defend their own sovereignty after they . have come into full possession of it. I The Filipinos should not he freed, if j this view is just, until they have established estab-lished some kind of naval and military1 forces for their own defense and have provided adequate means of deriving , revenues to maintain these forc. Jt ' is extremely doubtful whether the Filipino? Fili-pino? can accomplish much along this i line in tv. o or even four years, but a i bf chining could be made with our as- j itHn'?e. I The United State might find it ad- : v i -sable to cb't'nd the independence of The Filipino', agaiir-t figgre-sion, but a ornpai't requiring in to fight for the Filipinos is a danger we should not in- : r lightly. We know by our experience with Oiba that the responsibility would be a heavy one. A Senator Lodge has indicated, the Filipinos certainly are unfit to have the power to involve us In war when we have no power to '-on-rrol their actions. And if we have power to control their actions they will not be independent, A dozen million people have great potentialities po-tentialities for ef-(jr.f(.fJ-r.. L'ndcr enlightened en-lightened rule the Filipinos will hc-onie i'-h and (.ro-i.rroiM and 'an provide such naval and rn i 1 i t a r y fore e s a s v. i j I :na .f eveN strong n a ions he'd tri t e to ati a-k t li' in. Moreover, the A h j a t ie -i tun tion is jMii-h that if the Filipinos v, ojr Attacked thev probably would be ;bie to ecnr n'f. goes without framing that what'" 'he 1,'rjited States can do iea.-onably to -tablidi the Filipino rejudd:'- up. on a firm basis ahou)d be done, even at. cgn--iderable cr,-t and j-aciifico to riur-"dve. The reward v. ill ' reaped by the ('ri)t cm States in thp fen; ryi fr, .-opi for 'nep it will have a mihtv people f.-i.. M'TP'l to it by the gobb-i; tie- r,f gratitude grati-tude and friendship, 'there -diouid bn no thought of turning th" Filipino' out into a cold a or Id Tor pr'-da ui na t i(,n-. to fiTf upon, but th- b',jt plan vonld be to ftain the I'hilir.iun' - until the in ha hit a M ;,r" fitt'-d for "-If 'go. -mui'-nt ill the la r-'i-'A ur-n . |