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Show FIGHTING OVER THE WAR, Not long ago General Kuropatkin published his "History of the Russo-Japanese Russo-Japanese War." It was very severo upon up-on tho organization, tho supplies, and tho fitness of tho Russian army in tho Oriont. It was Bevoro upon hi3 subordinates, sub-ordinates, and tho lack of numbers and morale in the army was held to be a prime cause for tho ineffectiveness of its oporations. It is but natural that a sweeping condemnation, such as General Gen-eral Kuropatkin mado of his subordinates subordi-nates and of tho preparedness of the arui3T for its work, as well as in tho censure cen-sure which ho passed upou various generals, gen-erals, should cause resentment aud rc-PI3-. And now comes, replying to General Gen-eral Kuropatkin, ' ' Ouo "Who Served Undor Un-dor Him," with a fierce criticism of Kuropatkin 's book. This reviewer defends de-fends the Russian soldier as "still tho man of Borodino, of Sovastopol, and of Plevna." He maintains tho great fighting fight-ing qualities of tho Russian, and claims that no such delirium of praiso as has been awarded to tho Japanese is due from tho Russian soldier's standpoint. But this critic says that tho value of the Russian soldier, "ill-equipped, ill-trained, ill-trained, and ill-led" was wastod in tho ineffectiveness of the Manchurian campaign. cam-paign. Kuropatkin himself is blamod by this critic, who claimB that tho Russian Rus-sian leader "went to pieces under the stress of military responsibility," even b3' his own confession, and ho cites tho fact that Kuropatkin blames himself iu his summing up of tho battle of Mukden, Muk-den, because "ho did not insist sufficiently suf-ficiently before tho battle" began on the assembly of as largo a strategic reserve re-serve as possible." Tho critic points out that a commander-in-chief who sees tho necessity of a thing and does not havo that thing done is "evidently out of placo at the head of an arm" And further, while it is possible that Kuropatkin Ku-ropatkin was handicapped in somo degree de-gree b3' the necessity of the retention of Snssulich, Bildorliug, Rcnncnkampf and Kaulbers, not to mention othors, ho could certainly have got rid of somo of them as ho found the in incompetent, and he should have done ho; especially was this true with regard to General Orloff, whose disastrous fiasco at Liao-Yang Liao-Yang was fully appreciated by General Kuropatkin, and was sufficient cause for Orloff 's instant dismissal from tho arm3". It is evident that no matter how man3r explanations may bo mado of the Russian defeat in Manchuria, and whilo tho power that Russia displayed there was altogether surprising to military critics nnd dispassionate observers who did not believe that Russia could assemble as-semble and maintain an effective army of a half a million men bo far away from home to be recruited and supplied over a single lino of railwa3' of rather ineffective operation and such tremendous tre-mendous length, tho truo explanation after all must resolve itself on the point of tho difference of feeling between be-tween tho two nations with respect to this war. Kuropatkiu'a critic very justly sa3's: In the present day, when victories cost very dear. It I3 not tho army alone, hut the whole nation, which must apply Itself to tho task. Victory Is rendered easier for tho combatant whoso nation does not spare Its resources, nor the llvc3 of Its best sons, sending them to tho front with Its blessings, encouraging them, approving approv-ing them, consoling thorn In their trials, never for a moment losing confidence In the ultimate triumph of Its children. That is the very meat of tho wholo question. Tho Russian pcoplo detost-od detost-od that war, saw no necessity for it, aud soldiers that wore drafted to that army went with rcluctanco and with tho fear of unknown perils in their minds. On tho contrar3', tho Japancso soldiers were animated by Iho moBt warlike war-like spirit, they were sustained by tho unanimous and enthusiastic voice and aid of the wholo of Japan. Japan was utterly devoted to tho war in thought, in spirit, in purposo, and in act. Nothing Noth-ing was withhold and no sacrifice was too dcav that was not willingly, oven-exultantly, oven-exultantly, rendered. Tho spirit of tho two nations was in such romnrkablo contrast. that it cannot be too much insisted in-sisted upon as tho great dominant reason rea-son why the ono suffered constant defeat de-feat and tho other enjoyed constant vic-tor3'. vic-tor3'. Russians expected defeat, Japancso Japan-cso counted confidoutly on success. Seldom Sel-dom in tho history of the world has thero bocu a caso moro clearly presented pre-sented of tho differences in the effectiveness effect-iveness between an army jo3'ously sustained sus-tained b3 every resource, ovcry thought, every prayer of a unanimous people as was tho caso of Japan; and a reluctant, re-luctant, ill-supplied and ill-led forco, which had not tho support of popular sentiment,, but whoso cause was execrated ex-ecrated almost throughout tho whole of Russia. And' this spirit that is at the bottom of a successful war, is one that will have to be reckoned with in even greater degree in the future than it has been in tho past, in every war which is to como. |