Show WHAT WE THINK I By FRANK DIXON To me the most amazing thing in connection with the invasion of South Korea by the thc Russian van vandals I dals dais from the north was the com com- complete complete of this coun coun- country country country try for what has long been regard regard- regarded ed as inevitable The war department or who who- whoever whoever ever looks after such things was caught completely by surprise It did not have a single piece of suit suit- suitable suitable suitable able equipment that it should draw upon in an emergency any any- anywhere where wh re in that part of the world It must have been known that if and when such an attack was made it would be spearheaded by I tanks and yet this country didn't have a single tank within two weeks of the place Not only that I it has long been felt that the spot was a powder keg and that any day Russia might move this pawn p of Noth Korea forward on the checkerboard of political and mili mill military military tary strategy Not only that we had in posses posses- possession possession sion awn or under our control Japan at which point General MacArthur was stationed and which provided a logical depot for such equipment in the the- event of such disturbances Yet as IS far as IS the news newS' reports have revealed there are no tanks in Japan or artillery with sufficient fire power to stop tanks The disturbing thing about it is i that what was true in Korea is nc nO doubt true in every ev rv front that we weare weare are arc presuming to defend While it itis itis itIs is not reasonable to assume that we can carl have an effective force on all the fronts because of the lack of man power pow r and equipment it does docs seem SC that this front might well have h vc been policed from bases in Japan which were equipped to the point where they could at least render police pollee action The situation must be a reveal reveal- revealing revealing revealing ing one to Russia She must have been surprised that her puppets met with no more resistance than they did and especially that we knew so little about what was go go- goIng going Ing on in Korea as we did The situation is surprising to the people of this country that our intelligence service know no more about what was going on in Ift Korea than the proprietor r of a small hamburger shop in the smallest village In in this country It raises I ithe the question Is our intelligence service as weak as inept on all fronts as it is at t this point It It seems to me rather in the na nature na- na nature ture tur of an indictment of our war department that two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities we weare are sending infantrymen into int Korea against tank divisions who are ar are not I only supplied with tanks but who do not even have ground firepower capable of stopping a tank We Vc have criticized Chiang shed Kai for his exhibition of futility It seems to me that tha e e can no longer do that In my opinion our state te depart depart- department department ment and our war department and whoever has charge such of of such things lags considerably behind our soldiers sold sold- soldiers soldiers and our military forces Our soldiers won World War I and our state department and other agen agen- agencies agencies cies dies proceeded to lose it as fast as it could be lost Our soldiers won World War II and the same agencies have practically succeed succeed- succeeded ed in undoing all that was done I have lost most of my faith in inthe inthe inthe the swivel chair crowd at the Pen Pen- tagon If U we are forced into an another other oth r war I hope we will have learned lea ed enough to let the army anny take over after the peace pe ce treaties ire are signed |